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THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 


irv  xii.   RieoT. 


S^v,.. 


-'5 


THE 


DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY 


TH.    RIBOT, 

PKOFKSSOR    OF    COMPARATIVE  AND    EXPERIMENTAL    PSYCHOLOGY  AT  THE    COLLEGE 
DE  FRANCE  AND  EDITOR  OF  THE   "REVUE  PHILOSOPHIQUE. " 


AUTHORISED    TRANSLATION. 


CHICAGO: 

The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company 
l8qi. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Division  of  the  subject i 

The  nature  of  consciousness  :  two  hypotheses 3 

It  is  only  a  perfectionment :  facts  in  support 6 

Importance  of  the  psychic  factor 17 

CHAPTER  I. 

ORGANIC  DISORDERS. 

The  sense  of  the  body,  its  importance  and  its  complexity.  ...  19 

Slight  variations  of  the  personality  in  the  normal  state 30 

More  serious  cases o-? 

j^ 

Cases  of  double  personality 34 

Personality  of  double  monsters 38 

Personality  of  twins 45 

CHAPTER  II. 

EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS. 

Emotional  manifestations  in  general 55 

Depressions  and  exaltations  of  the  personality 57 

Their  alternation  in  cyclic  insanity 60 

Complete  metamorphosis  of  the  personality 62 

Sexual   characters :  eunuchs,   hermaphrodites,    opposite   sex- 
uality  ' 56 

Complete  transformation  of  character 72 

Foundation   of  the  personality  :  personal   unity  and  identity 
are  the  psychic  expression  of  the  unity  and   identity  of  the 

organism g^ 


CHAPTER  III. 
DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 

PAGE 

Alterations  arising  from  parsesthesis  and  dyssesthesis,  and  from 

hallucinations 92 

Cerebral  dualism  and  double  personality:  discussion 100 

Role  of  the  memory T14 

Ideas,  transformations  proceeding  from  above  ;  their  super- 
ficial character  :  madmen,  hypnotised  subjects 118 

Disappearance  of  the  personality  in  mystics  . 125 

CHAPTER  IV. 
DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY. 

The  insane  :  cases  of  real  double  personality  ;  periods  of  the 
dissolution 117 

Attempt  at  classification  of  the  diseases  of  personality  ;  three 
principal  types:  alienation,  alternation,  substitution 135 

CONCLUSION. 

Zoological  individuality  and  its  ascending  evolution 139 

Colonial  consciousness 141 

Physical  synthesis  and  psychical  synthesis  of  personality  in 

man 146 

The  ego  is  a  co-ordination 151 


ERRATA. 

Page  6,  line  12  from  top  ;  for  by  read/or. 

Page  12,  line  15  from  top  ;  for  actually  read  in  the  present  instance. 

Page  16,  line  7  from  bottom  ;  for  relation  read  revelation. 

Page  17,  line  8  from  top  ;  for  dictum  read  datu7n. 

Page  24,  foot-note,  first  line  ;  for  TJie  Senses  and  Intelligence  read  The 
Senses  and  the  Intellect. 

Page  24,  foot-note,  last  line ;  for  Pathology  of  Spirit  read  Pathology  of 
Mind. 

Page  27,  lines  10,  9,  and  8  from  bottom  ;  for  all  consciousness,  whether  clear 
or  obsure,  acttial  or  reproduced  by  some  external  circtimstance  read  all  con- 
sciousness whether  clear  or  obscure,  abtual  or  reproduced,  of  any  extraneous 
thing. 

Page  29,  line  14  from  bottom  ;  for  exerts  read  exhibits. 

Page  44,  line  18  from  top  ;  delete  the  comma  after  Siamese. 

Page  49,  line  7  from  top  ;  read  attended  for  attented. 

Page  53,  line  5  from  bottom  ;  physical  personality :  the  original  also  reads 
"physical  personality";  perhaps /.ycAzra/. 

Page  84,  line  3  from  bottom  ;  delete  by  way  of. 

Page  106,  line  10  from  top  ;  delete  that  it  looks  quite  obvious. 

Page  no,  line  2  from  top  ;  for  inancinis7n  read  Manicheisfn. 

Page  120,  lines  11  and  12  from  bottom  ;  for  Hypertrophied  and  atrophied 
read  Hypertrophy  and  atrophy. 

Page  124,  line  10  from  top  ;  for  hynotising  read  hypnotising. 

Page  124,  last  line  of  large  type  ;  iox  purpose  read  investigation. 


DISEASES  OF  PERSON  A  LITY. 


INTRODUCTION. 


In  psychological  language   by  '^  person  "    we   gen- 
erally understand  the  individual  as  clearly   conscious 
of  itself,   and   acting   accordingly.      It   is   the   highest 
form  of  individuality.     In  order   to  explain  this  attri- 
bute, which  metaphysical  psychology   exclusively  re- 
serves for  man,  the  latter  science  is  satisfied  with   the 
hypothesis  of  an  ego  ;  that  is  a  perfect  unity,  simple  and 
identical.     Unfortunately,  however,  this  is  only  a  de- 
ceptive  clearness   and    the   semblance   of   a  solution. 
Unless    we  attribute  to  this  ego  a  supernatural  origin^ 
it  will   be  necessary   to  explain  how  it   is  born,   and 
from   what  lower  form  it  proceeds. 

Experimental  psychology  does  not  propose  the 
problem  in  the  same  manner,  or  treat  it  according  to 
the  same  methods.  Experimental  psychology  learns 
from  natural  scientists  that  in  many  instances  it  is 
difficult  to  determine  the  characteristics  of  individual- 
ity, even  of  those  creatures  that  are  by  far  less  com- 
plex than  human  persons.  Hence  it  mistrusts  any 
purely  simple  solution,  and,  far  from  regarding  the 
question  as  settled,  as  it  were,  at  the  first  onset,  it  sees 
the  problem  at  the  close  of  its  researches,  as  rather 
the  result  of  long  and  laborious  investigations.  There- 
fore, it   is  but  natural   that  the   representatives  of  the 


2  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

old  school,  after  once  having  lost  their  true  bearings, 
should  groundlessly  accuse  the  adepts  of  the  new 
school  of  actually  purloining  their  ego.  But  on  either 
side  both  language  and  methods  have  now  become  so 
different,  that  all  mutual  understanding  henceforth 
will  be  impossible. 

It  will  be  necessary,  even  at  the  risk  of  increasing 
the  alread}^  extant  confusion,  to  investigate  what 
teratical,  morbid,  or  simply  rare,  cases  can  teach  us 
concerning  the  formation  and  disorganization  of  per- 
sonality, yet  without  assuming  to  treat  the  subject  in 
its  totality. 

Personality  being  the  highest  form  of  psychic  in- 
dividuality, there  arises  the  preliminary  question  : 
What  is  the  individual?  There  are  few  problems  that  in 
our  time  have  been  more  discussed  among  natural 
scientists,  or  remain  more  obscure  in  regard  to  the 
lower  degrees  of  animal  existence.  This  is  not  the 
right  moment  to  speak  of  it  in  detail.  At  the  close  of 
this  work,  after  studying  the  constitutive  elements  of 
personality,  we  shall  consider  it  in  its  totality.  Then 
will  occur  the  time,  to  compare  it  with  the  lower  forms, 
through  which  nature  has  essa5^ed  to  produce  it,  and 
to  show,  that  the  psychic  individual  is  the  expression 
of  an  organism  ;  in  conformity  with  the  latter,  it  is 
either  low,  simple,  incoherent,  or  complex  and  unified. 

Descending  the  whole  series  of  animated  beings, 
we  see  how  the  psychic  individual  is  always  formed 
through  the  more  or  less  complete  fusion  of  more  sim- 
ple individuals.  ^' A  colonial  consciousness"  is  created 
through  the  cooperation  of  local  consciousnesses.  The 
discoveries  of  modern  naturalists,  in  this  respect,  are 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  psychology,  because  they 
completely  transform  the  problem  of  personality.  The 


INTR  on  UCTION.  3 

latter  henceforth  must  be  studied  from  below— from 
the  lowest  step  of  the  ladder. 

Thus  we  are  prompted  to  ask,  whether  the  human 
person  itself  is  not   also,  im  tout  de  coalition—?,  whole 
by  coalition— the   extreme   complexity  of  which   veils 
from  us  its  origin,  and  whose  origin  would  remain  im- 
penetrable, if  the  existence  of  elementary  forms  did  not 
throw  a  certain  light  upon  the  mechanism  of  this  fus- 
ion.     In  fact,  the  human  personality  is  an  aggregated 
whole,  a  complex.  In  order  to  know  it,  we  must  analyze 
it ;   but  the   analysis   here   is  fatally  artificial,  because 
it  disjoins  groups  of  phenomena,  which  do  not  merely 
stand  in  juxtaposition,  but  are  really  coordinate,  their 
relation  being  not  of  simple   simultaneousness,  but  of 
reciprocal  dependence.   And  yet,  this  work  of  analysis 
is  altogether  indispensable  and  we  must  severally  un- 
dertake to  investigate  the  organic,  emotional,  and  /«/^/- 
/^^/?/^/ conditions  of  personality^,  at  the  same  time  lay- 
mg  due  stress  on  occurring  anomalies  and   disorders. 
Our  final  study  of  the  subject  will  allow  us  to   group 
together  anew  these  several  disjoined  elements. 

II. 

Before  entering  into  the  exposition  and  interpre- 
tation of  facts,  it  is  first  useful,  even  for  reasons  of 
clearness  and  good  faith,  to  understand  the  true  nature 
of  consciousness.  It  is  not  here  the  question  of  a 
monograph  embracing,  as  it  were,  the  entire  science 
of  psychology ;  it  will  suffice,  simply,  to  present  the 
problem  in  a  precise  form. 

Leaving  aside  details,  we  are  confronted  by  two 
hypotheses;  the  one,  a  very  old  hypothesis,  which  re- 
gards consciousness  as  the  basic  property  of   ''  soul  " 


4  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

or  of  '^  mind,"  constituting  its  essence  ;  the  other,  a 
very  recent  theory,  which  regards  it  as  a  simple  phe- 
nomenon, superadded  to  the  activity  of  the  brain — as 
an  event  having  its  own  conditions  of  existence,  and 
which  appears  or  disappears  according  to  circum- 
stances. The  former  hypothesis  has  for  so  many 
centuries  reigned  supreme,  that  it  has  become  an 
easy  matter  to  appreciate  its  respective  merits  and 
deficiencies.  I  have  not  to  pass  sentence  on  this  the- 
ory ;  I  shall  limit  myself  to  showing  its  radical  incom- 
petency to  explain  the  unconscious  life  of  the  mind. 
At  first,  during  a  long  time,  this  hypothesis  did  not 
even  mention  this  unconscious  life.  The  precise  and 
profound  views  of  Leibnitz  upon  this  point  remain 
forgotten  or,  at  least,  without  any  application  ;  and 
in  the  present  century,  even,  the  most  renowned  psy- 
chologists (with  only  a  few  exceptions)  yet  remain 
ensconced  within  their  theory  of  conscious  life.  When 
finally  the  problem  thrust  itself  forward,  and  it  be- 
came evident  to  all,  that  to  reduce  psychic  life  to  the 
sole  data  of  consciousness,  is  such  a  poor  and  sterile 
conception,  that  practically  it  becomes  useless — then, 
indeed,  there  arose  a  very  great  confusion.  Then, 
so-called  "unconscious  states"  were  admitted, — an 
ambiguous  and  half-contradictory  term,  which  has  rap- 
idly spread,  and  has  its  equivalent  in  all  languages, 
but  by  its  very  nature  betrays  the  period  of  confusion, 
in  which  it  was  born.  In  fact,  what  are  these  uncon- 
scious states  ?  Prudent  writers  posit  their  existence, 
without  attempting  to  explain  them.  The  more  ven- 
turesome speak  of  latent  ideas,  of  unconscious  con- 
sciousness, both  of  which  are  expressions  so  vague 
and  so  full  of  inconsequences  that  many  authors  have 
been  compelled  to  admit  their  shortcomings.     In  fact. 


INTRODUCTION.  •      5 

when  the  soul  is  conceived  in  its  quahty  of  a  thinking 
substance,  whose  states  of  consciousness  are  modifi- 
cations, in  such  case  it  will  be  impossible  without  a 
manifest  contradiction  to  refer  to  it  the  unconscious 
states  ;  subterfuges  of  language  or  dialectic  subtleties 
will  be  of  no  avail ;  and  as  we  can  not  deny  the  high 
importance  of  these  unconscious  states  as  factors  of 
psychic  life,  there  would  be  no  exit  from  this  inextric- 
able situation. 

The  latter  hypothesis  rids  itself  of  all  this  conflict- 
ing logomachy  ;  it  does  away  with  the  factitious  prob- 
lems that  crop  up  in  the  former  (for  example,  whether 
consciousness  is  a  general  or  particular  faculty,  etc.), 
and  without  hesitation  we  may  claim  for  it  the  benefit 
of  a  lex  parcimonice.  It  is  simpler,  clearer,  more  con- 
sistent. By  way  of  contrast  to  the  other,  we  may 
characterize  it  by  saying,  that  it  expresses  the  uncon- 
scious in  physiological  terms  (as  states  of  the  nervous 
system),  and  not  in  psychological  terms  (as  latent 
ideas,  non-felt  sensations,  etc.).  But,  this  is  only  a 
particular  side  of  an  hypothesis,  which  must  be  con- 
sidered in  its  entirety. 

Like  all  general  terms,  consciousness  must  be 
resolved  into,  concrete  data.  Will,  in  general,  does 
not  exist,  but  volitions  \  and  in  a  like  manner  there  is 
no  consciousness  in  general,  but  only  states  of  con- 
sciousness.    The  latter  are  the  reality. 

It  would  be  idle  to  define  consciousness  as  :  "the 
fact  of  being  conscious,"  for  this  is  merely  a  datum  of 
observation,  a  final  fact.  Physiology  teaches  that  its 
production  is  always  associated  with  some  activity  of  the 
nervous  system,  particularly  of  the  brain.  The  reverse, 
however,  does  not  take  place.  All  psychic  activity  cer- 
tainly implies  nervous  activity;  still,  all  nervous  activity 


6      .         DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

does  by  no  means  imply  psychic  activity  —  nervous 
activity  being  far  more  extended  than  psychic  ac- 
tivity. Consciousness,  accordingly,  is  something  su- 
peradded. 

In  other  terms,  we  have  to  bear  in  mind,  that  every 
state  of  consciousness  is  a  complex  event,  conditioned 
by  a  particular  state  of  the  nervous  system.  This  ner- 
vous process  is  not  an  accessory  but  an  essential  part 
of  the  event,  and,  moreover,  is  its  basis  and  funda- 
mental condition.  As  soon  as  produced,  the  event 
exists  in  itself;  as  soon  as  consciousness  is  added  to  it, 
the  event  exists  by  itself.  Consciousness  completes  and 
perfects  the  event,  but  does  not  constitute  the  same. 

This  hypothesis  easily  explains  how  all  manifesta- 
tions of  psychic  life,  sensations,  desires,  feelings,  vo- 
litions, memories,  reasonings,  inventions,  etc.,  may  al- 
ternately be  conscious  and  unconscious.  There  is  noth- 
ing mysterious  in  these  alternations,  since  in  all  cases 
the  essential  conditions,  /.  e.,  the  physiological  condi- 
tions, ever  remain  the  same,  and  consciousness  is  but  a 
perfectionment. 

Yet,  why  is  this  perfectionment  sometimes  super- 
added, and  at  other  times  lacking? 

If  in  the  physiological  phenomenon  itself  there  was 
not  something  more  when  consciousness  is  present 
than  when  it  is  absent,  we  should  indirectly  adjudge 
victory  to  the  adverse  hypothesis.  Could  it  be  proved 
that  every  time  certain  physiological  conditions  exist, 
consciousness  will  appear;  that  whenever  they  disap- 
pear, the  former  disappears ;  and  whenever  they  vary, 
consciousness  also  varies— this  would  no  longer  be  an 
hypothesis,  but  actually  a  scientific  truth.  We  are 
still  very  far  from  this  point. 

At  all   events,  we   may  be   sure  that  consciousness 


INrKODUCTION.  j 

itself  will  not  furnish  these  revelations.  As  Maudsley 
justly  observes,  consciousness  at  the  same  moment 
cannot  be  effect  and  cause, — cannot  be  itself  and  its 
molecular  antecedents.  It  lives  but  for  a  moment,  and 
cannot  through  a  direct  intuition  return  backward  as 
far  as  its  ov^n  immediate  physiological  antecedents; 
and  moreover,  to  go  back  to  its  material  antecedents, 
would   be  to  lay   hold  of,  not  itself,  but  its  own  cause. 

At  the  present  moment  it  would  be  chimerical  to 
attempt  even  a  broad  determination  of  the  necessary 
and  sufficient  conditions  of  the  appearance  of  con- 
sciousness. We  know,  indeed,  that  cerebral  circula- 
tion, in  the  double  relationship  of  the  quantity  and 
quality  of  the  blood,  is  a  matter  of  great  importance. 
A  striking  proof  of  this  is  furnished  by  experiments 
performed  upon  the  heads  of  recently  beheaded  ani- 
mals. Psychometric  researches  demonstrate  every  day 
that  the  more  complex  a  state  of  consciousness  is  the 
greater  length  of  time  it  requires,  and  that,  on  the 
contrary,  automatic  acts — whether  primitive  or  ac- 
quired, and  the  rapidity  of  which  is  extreme — do 
not  enter  into  consciousness.  We  may,  moreover, 
admit  that  the  appearance  of  consciousness  is  con- 
nected with  the  period  of  disassimilation  of  the  nerv- 
ous tissue,  as  Herzen  distinctly  has  shown.*  All 
these  results,  however,  are  only  partial  conquests  ;  but, 
the  scientific  knowledge  of  the  genesis  of  a  phenom- 
enon supposes  the  determination  of  all  its  essential 
conditions. 

The  near  future,  perhaps,  will  furnish  these.  In 
the  meantime,  in  order  to  corroborate  our  hypoth- 
esis, it  will   be  more   profitable  to   prove,  that  it  alone 

*  Rrvnc  Philoso/>h/que,  Vol.  VII,  p.  353,  and  La  Condizione  fisica  della  Cos- 
cienza.     Rome,  1879. 


8  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

explains  a  principal  characteristic  (not  a  condition)  of 
consciousness,  namely,  its  intei-mission.  In  order 
from  the  outset  to  avoid  all  equivocation,  I  may  ob- 
serve that  here  it  is  not  the  question  of  the  discontin- 
uity of  the  states  of  consciousness  among  themselves. 
Each  state  of  consciousness  has  its  limits  which,  while 
allowing  it  to  associate  with  the  others,  at  the  same 
time  will  protect  their  respective  individualities.  Here 
it  is  not  the  question  of  this,  but  simply  of  the  well- 
known  fact  that  consciousness  has  its  interruptions, 
or  as  is  said  in,  popular  parlance  :  "  Man  does  not  al- 
ways think." 

It  is  true  that  this  assertion  has  been  contradicted 
by  the  majority  of  metaphysicians.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  they  never  have  furnished  any  proof  for  the 
Support  of  their  thesis,  and  as  all  appearances  are 
against  it,  the  onus  p7-obatidi  would  legitimately  seem 
to  be  incumbent  on  the  former.  Their  whole  argu- 
mentation reduces  itself  to  maintaining  that  since  the 
soul  is  essentially  a  thinking  subject,  it  is  impossible  that 
consciousness  should  not  exist  in  some  certain  degree, 
even  when  there  remains  no  trace  of  it  in  the  memory. 
But  this  is  simply  begging  the  question,  since  the  hy- 
pothesis maintained  by  us  contests  precisely  their  ma- 
jor premise.  Their  alleged  proof  is  definitively  but  a 
deduction  drawn  from  a  contested  hypothesis.  Leaving 
aside  all  a  piHori  solutions  let  us  examine  the  question 
in  itself.  Let  us  leave  aside  the  cases  of  syncope,  pro- 
voked anaesthesia,  epileptic  vertigo,  coma,  etc.,  and 
abide  by  what  is  more  common,  more  frequent,  to  wit : 
the  psychic  state  during  sleep. 

It  has  been  maintained  that  there  is  no  sleep  without 
dreams  ;  but  this  is  a  purely  theoretic  assertion,  and  a 
consequence  of  the   above-mentioned   principle,   that 


INTRODUCTION.  g 

the  soul  always  thinks.  The  sole  argument  of  fact  that 
they  can  plead,  is  to  the  effect,  that  sometimes  the 
sleeper,  addressed  or  questioned,  may  answer  in  a  suf- 
ficiently pertinent  manner,  yet  upon  waking  will  have 
no  recollection  of  the  matter.  Still,  this  fact  alone 
does  not  justify  any  general  conclusion  and  to  the 
theory  of  the  metaphysicians  physiology  opposes  an- 
other. Physiology  lays  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  life 
of  every  organ  comprises  two  periods  :  the  one  of  rel- 
ative rest  or  assimilation,  the  other  of  activity  or  dis- 
assimilation ;  that  the  brain  makes  no  exception  to 
this  law  and  that  experience  shows,  how  the  duration 
of  sleep  at  different  times  and  in  the  different  circum- 
stances of  life  stands  in  direct  ratio  to  the  craving  of 
assimilation.  The  cause  is  the  necessity  of  repairing 
the  losses  sustained ;  of  making  nutritive  circulation 
follow  upon  functional  circulation.  During  the  state 
of  being  awake  the  brain  consumes  more  material 
than  the  blood  furnishes,  so  that  oxidation  soon  di- 
minishes and  along  with  it  the  excitability  of  the  ner- 
vous tissue.  The  experiments  of  Preyer  prove  that 
sleep  then  will  overtake  the  subject,  when  through 
prolongated  activity  the  substance  of  the  brain,  like 
that  of  a  fatigued  muscle,  is  encumbered  with  a  quan- 
tity of  acid  waste  material  {deti-itus).'^  Even  the  pres- 
ence of  these  products  at  a  given  moment  will  stop  the 
activity  of  the  brain,  and  the  latter  does  not  reappear 
before  rest  has  allowed  the  complete  elimination  of  these 
waste  products.  It  must  be  admitted,  that  complete, 
absolute  sleep,  without  dreams,  is  the  exception  ;  but 
that  it  actually  occurs,  and  not  unfrequently,  suffices  to 
establish  the  intermittent  character  of  consciousness. 

*  Through  the  absorption  of  a  certain  quantity  of  lactate  of  soda,  as  a  type 
of  the  products  of  disassimilation  in  the  brain,  Preyer  has  produced  yawn- 
ings,  somnolence,  and  even  sleep. 


lo  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

The  physiological  thesis  has  a  much  stronger  de- 
monstrative value  than  the  metaphysical  thesis.  Let 
us  further  remark — and  this  is  an  important  point — 
that  all  those  who  have  investigated  whether  there  ex- 
ists perfect  cerebral  sleep,  have  been  cultured  and  active 
minds  (psychologists,  physicians,  men  of  letters,)  in 
whom  the  brain  is  ever  upon  the  alert,  like  a  delicate 
instrument  vibrating  to  the  touch  of  the  slightest  exci- 
tation, and  endowed,  as  it  were,  with  a  constant  habit 
of  consciousness.  Thus,  it  happens  that  the  very  men 
who  propound  the  problem  :  "Do  we  always  dream  ?  " 
in  reality  are  the  least  competent  to  solve  it  negatively. 

But  the  same  does  not  happen  with  people  engaged 
in  the  manual  trades.  A  peasant  living  far  from  all 
intellectual  agitation,  limited  to  the  same  occupations 
and  same  routine,  generally  speaking,  does  not  dream. 
I  know  several,  who  regard  dreams  as  a  rare  incident 
in  their  nocturnal  life.  "The  most  convincing  proof, 
that  the  mind  can  be  completely  inactive  during  sleep, 
that  its  existence  can  be  momentarily  interrupted  or 
suspended,  would  incontestably  be  furnished,  if  the 
mind  should  join  end  to  end,  as  it  were,  the  instant 
in  which  a  man  falls  asleep  with  that  in  which 
he  awakes,  and  when  this  space  of  time  appears  to 
him,  as  if  it  had  never  existed.  Philosophers,  who  do 
not  believe  in  complete  sleep,  themselves  have  pointed 
out  this  kind  of  proof,  at  the  same  time  denying  that 
it  had  ever  occurred.  I,  myself,  nevertheless,  have 
been  a  witness  to  this  fact  under  the  following  cir- 
cumstances :  I  was  called  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing to  lend  my  assistance  to  a  person  in  the  neighbor- 
hood, attacked  by  cholera.  At  the  moment  of  going 
out  my  wife  made  some  admonitory  remarks  about  the 
candle   that  I   held   in  my  hand,  and  immediately  fell 


INTR  OD  ucrroN.  1 1 

asleep  again.  I  returned  home  in  about  half  an  hour. 
The  noise,  caused  by  the  key  in  opening  the  door,  sud- 
denly awoke  my  wife. 

''  Her  sleep  had  been  so  deep,  and  she  had  so  closely 
joined  the  instant  at  which  she  fell  asleep  with  the 
instant  at  which  she  awoke,  that  she  believed  she  had 
not  slept  at  all,  and  imagined  that  the  noise  made  by 
the  key  on  my  return  actually  was  the  noise  made  at 
the  moment  of  my  departure.  Beholding  my  return, 
she  thought  I  had  merely  stepped  round,  and  asked 
me  the  reason  why  ;  and  she  was  greatly  astonished  to 
hear,  that  I  had  been  absent  during  half  an  hour."* 

I  do  not  see  what  objections  can  be  made  to  facts 
of  this  kind,  unless,  indeed,  we  revert  to  the  unavoid- 
able hypothesis  of  states  of  consciousness  that  left  no 
trace  in  the  memory;  but,  I  repeat,  this  is  merely  a 
gratuitous  hypothesis,  destitute  of  probabihty.  Those 
who  are  subject  to  fits  of  fainting,  with  loss  of  con- 
sciousness well  know,  that  pending  their  duration  they 
might  fall  down,  hurt  a  limb,  upset  a  chair,  and  on  re- 
covering their  senses,  not  have  the  faintest  idea  of 
what  had  taken  place.  If  these  sufficiently  serious  in- 
cidents had  been  attended  with  consciousness,  is  it 
likely  that  they  would  not  have  left  any  persistent  re- 
collection at  least  for  a  few  seconds  ?  We  do  not  for 
a  moment  deny  that  in  certain  circumstances,  normal 
or  morbid  (for  example  in  hypnotized  subjects),  states 
of  consciousness  will  leave  no  apparent  traces  on 
awaking,  and  can  later  be  revived  again  ;  we  shall  even 
limit  to  any  desired  extent  the  actual  instances  cf  com- 

*Despine,  Natural  Psychology,  Vol.  I.  p.  522.  Alienists  have  mentioned 
cases  in  which  a  pathologic  state  suddenly  happens  to  suppress  consciousness, 
and  the  patient  after  a  more  or  less  long  interval  resumes  his  speech  at  the 
very  word  where  he  h?d  stopped.  See  other  facts  of  this  kind  in  Winslow, 
"  On  Obscure  Diseases,"  etc.,  p.  322,  and  following. 


12  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

plete  interruption  of  consciousness ;  it  suffices  that 
there  be  a  single  one,  in  order  to  raise  insurmountable 
difficulties  to  the  hypothesis  of  the  soul  as  a.  think- 
ing substance.  In  the  contrary  hypothesis,  everything 
is  easily  explained.  Since  consciousness  is  an  event 
depending  upon  determined  conditions,  it  is  not  at  all 
a  matter  of  surprise  that  at  times  it  should  fail. 

If  this  were  the  occasion  to  treat  exhaustively  the 
problem  of  consciousness,  it  also  would  be  possible  to 
prove,  that  in  our  hypothesis  there  is  nothing  wavering 
or  contradictory  in  the  relation  of  the  conscious  to  the 
unconscious.  The  term  unconscious  can  always  be  para- 
phrased as  follows:  a  physiological  state,  which  some- 
times and  even  most  frequently  being  accompanied  by 
consciousness,  or  at  its  origin  having  been  so,  actually  is 
not  so  accompanied.  This  characteristic,  although  neg- 
ative as  psychology,  is  positive  as  physiology.  It  af- 
firms that  in  every  psychic  event  the  basic  and  active 
element  is  the  nervous  process,  the  other  is  only  a  con- 
comitant. As  a  consequence  of  this,  there  will  no 
longer  be  any  difficulty  in  understanding  the  proposi- 
tion, that  all  manifestations  of  psychic  life  by  turns 
can  be  either  unconscious  or  conscious.  To  effect  the 
former  instance  it  is  sufficient  that  there  be  produced 
a  determined  nervous  process,  that  is,  the  putting  into 
play  of  a  determined  number  of  nervous  elements, 
forming  a  determined  association,  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  other  nervous  elements,  and  of  all  other  possible 
associations.  In  the  latter  instance,  it  is  necessary  and 
sufficient  that  there  be  added  certain  supplementary 
conditions,  whatever  they  may  be,  without  changing 
anything  in  the  nature  of  the  phenomenon,  except 
making  it  conscious.  We  further  understand,  how 
unconscious  cerebration  is  able  to  perform  such  a  heavy 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

piece  of  work  noiselessly  and,  presently,  after  a  very 
long  incubation,  will  reveal  itself  through  unexpected 
resiilts.  Every  state  of  consciousness  represents  only 
a  very  inconsiderable  portion  of  our  psychic  life,  be- 
cause every  instant  it  is  supported  and,  as  it  were,  im- 
pelled by  unconscious  states.  Each  volition,  for  ex- 
ample, dives  to  the  very  depths  of  our  being;  the  mo- 
tives that  accompany  and  apparently  explain  it,  are 
never  but  a  feeble  part  of  its  true  cause.  The  same 
takes  place  in  a  great  number  of  our  sympathies,  and 
this  fact  is  to  such  a  degree  manifest  that  even  minds 
completely  destitute  of  observation,  will  often  wonder 
at  being  unable  to  explain  to  themselves  their  aver- 
sions or  sympathies. 

It  would  be  irksome  and  beyond  our  purpose  to 
continue  the  present  demonstration.  If  the  reader 
wishes,  he  may  turn  in  Hartmann's  Philosophy  of  the 
Unconscious,  to  the  part  bearing  the  title  "Phenome- 
nology." Here  he  will  find  classed  all  manifestations 
of  the  unconscious  life  of  the  mind,  and  he  will  see 
that  in  this  classification  there  is  not  a  single  fact  which 
may  not  be  explained  through  the  hypothesis  that 
has  here  been  sustained. 

A  last  point  still  remains  to  be  explained  :  the 
theory  that  regards  consciousness  as  a  phenomenon. 
It  is  the  upshot  (as  could  be  easily  proved,  if  this  di- 
gression were  opportune)  of  this  fundamental  principle 
in  physiology:  '^ reflex  action  is  the  type  of  nervous 
action  and  the  basis  of  all  psychic  activity."  To  many 
over-cautious  persons  this  theory  has  seemed  para- 
doxical and  irreverent.  It  seems  to  them  that  it  de- 
prives psychology  of  all  solidity  and  dignity.  They  are 
unwilling  to  admit,  that  the  shghtest  manifestations  of 
nature  should   be  unstable,  transient,  superadded,  and 


14  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

subordinate  as  to  their  conditions  of  existence.  Yet 
this  is  simply  a  prejudice.  Consciousness,  whatever 
be  its  origin  and  nature,  loses  nothing  of  its  genuine 
value  :  "consciousness  must  be  appreciated  in  itself; 
and  to  him  who  places  himself  at  the  point  of  view  of 
evolution,  the  origin  does  not  matter  the  most,  but 
rather  the  height  that  has  been  attained.  Experience, 
moreover,  shows  that  the  higher  we  reascend  the 
series,  the  more  complex  and  unstable  become  the  na- 
tural compounds.  If  stability  really  afforded  the  true 
standard  of  dignity,  in  such  case,  the  minerals  would 
play  the  most  prominent  part.  This  purely  sentimen- 
tal objection,  accordingly,  is  not  tenable.  As  to  the 
difficulty  of  explaining,  through  this  hypothesis,  the 
unity  and  continuity  of  the  conscious  subject,  at  present 
it  would  be  premature  even  to  moot  this  subject.  In 
due  time  this   problem,   in  its  turn,  will  also  appear. 

There  is,  however,  one  weak  point  in  the  hypothesis 
of  consciousness- phenomenon.  Its  most  convinced 
partisans  have  defended  it  in  a  form  that  has  caused 
them  to  be  called  the  theorists  of  pure  automatism. 
According  to  their  favorite  comparison,  consciousness 
is  like  the  sparks  from  a  steam-engine,  lighting  it  up 
at  intervals,  but  having  no  effect  upon  its  speed.  Con- 
sciousness, thus,  does  not  produce  action  any  more 
than  the  shadow  that  accompanies  the  steps  of  the 
traveler.  We  have  no  objection  to  these  metaphors, 
viewed  purely  as  vivid  illustrations  of  the  doctrine  in 
question  ;  but  taken  in  a  strict  sense  they  are  exag- 
gerated and  inexact.  Consciousness  in  itself  and 
through  itself  is  really  a  new  factor,  and  in  this  there 
is  nothing  either  mystical  or  supernatural,  as  will 
presently  be  seen. 

In  the  first  place,  from   the  hypothesis  itself   (the 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

state  of  consciousness  supposing  physiological  condi- 
tions more  numerous,  or  at  least  other  ones,  than  the 
same  state  when  unconscious),  it  results  that  two  in- 
dividuals,— the  one  being  in  the  former  state,  the  other 
in  the  latter, — all  other  things  being  equal,  are  strictly- 
speaking,  not  comparable  to  each  other. 

It  is  possible  to  allege  even  stronger  reasons, — not 
logical   deductions,  but   facts.     When  a  physiological 
state  has  become  a  state  of  consciousness,  through  this 
very  fact  it  has  acquired  a  particular  character.     In- 
stead of   occurring  in   space,  that   is,  instead  of  being 
conceived  as  the  setting  into  activity  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  nervous  elements,  occupying  a  determined  sur- 
face, it   assumes  a  position  in  time  ;  it  has  been  pro- 
duced after  this,  and  before  that  other  thing,  while  in 
the   unconsciousness  state   there  was  neither  a  before 
nor  an  after.     The  physiological  state  becomes  suscep- 
tible of  being  recollected,  /.  e.,  of  being  recognized  as 
having  occupied  a  precise  position  among  other  states 
of  consciousness.     It  has,  accordingly,  become  a  new 
factor   in  the  psychic   life  of   the  individual — a  result 
that  can  serve  as  a  starting-point  to  some  new  (either 
conscious  or  unconscious)  work ;    and  it  is  so  far  from 
being  the  product  of   a  supernatural  operation,  that  it 
reduces  itself   to  the  organic  registering  which  is  the 
basis  of  all  memory. 

In   order  to  be  more  precise,  let  us  take  a  few  ex- 
amples.    Volition  is  always  a  state  of  consciousness 

the  affirmation  that  a  thing  must  either  be  done  or  pre- 
vented ;  it  is  the  final  and  clear  result  of  a  great  num- 
ber of  conscious,  sub-conscious,  and  unconscious  states; 
but  once  affirmed,  it  becomes  a  new  factor  in  the  life 
of  the  individual,  and,  in  the  assumed  position,  it  marks 
a   series,   /.    e.,  the  possibility  of  being  recommenced 


i6  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

(begun  over  again),  modified,  prevented.  Nothing 
similar  exists  in  regard  to  automatic  acts  that  are 
not  accompanied  by  consciousness.  NoveHsts  and 
poets,  who  usually  are  good  observers  of  human  nature, 
have  frequently  described  that  well-known  situation, 
in  which  a  passion — whether  love  or  hatred — long 
brooded  over,  unconscious,  ignorant  of  itself,  at  last 
bursting  forth,  recognizes,  affirms  itself,  becomes  con- 
scious. Then  its  character  changes ;  it  either  redoubles 
in  intensity  or  is  crossed  by  antagonistic  motives. 
Here,  likewise,  consciousness  is  a  new  factor,  which 
has  modified  the  psychological  situation.  One  may  by 
instinct,  that  is,  through  unconscious  cerebration,  solve 
a  problem,  but  it  is  very  possible  that  some  other  day, 
at  another  moment,  one  will  fail  in  regard  to  an  anal- 
ogous problem.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  solution  of 
any  problem  is  attained  through  conscious  reasoning, 
a  failure  will  scarcely  occur  in  a  second  instance ;  be- 
cause every  step  in  advance  marks  a  gained  position, 
and  from  that  moment  we  no  longer  grope  our  way 
blindly.  This,  however,  does  not  in  the  least  dimin- 
ish the  part  played  by  unconscious  work  in  all  human 
discoveries. 

These  examples  taken  at  hazard  may  suffice  to 
show,  that  the  above-mentioned  metaphors  are  true  of 
each  state  of  consciousness  taken  i7i  itself.  In  itself, 
indeed,  it  is  but  a  light  without  efficacy,  merely  the  sim- 
ple relation  of  an  unconscious  work ;  but  in  relation  to 
the  future  development  of  the  individual  it  is  a  factor 
of  the  first  order. 

What  is  true  of  the  individual  is  also  true  of  the 
species,  and  of  the  succession  of  species.  From  the 
sole  point  of  view  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  ir- 
respective of  all  psychological  considerations,  the  ap- 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

pearance  of  consciousness  upon  earth  was  a  fact  of  the 
greatest  magnitude.  Through  it  experience,  that  is, 
an  adaptation  of  a  higher  order,  became  possible  to 
the  organic  animal.  We  have  not  to  investigate  its 
origin.  In  this  respect,  very  clever  hypotheses  have 
been  made,  which  all  enter  the  domain  of  metaphysics, 
and  which  experimental  psychology  has  not  to  discuss, 
because  it  accepts  consciousness  as  a  dictum. 

It  is  probable  that  consciousness  has  been  pro- 
duced like  any  other  vital  manifestation,  at  first  in  a 
rudimentary  form,  and  apparently  without  great  effi- 
cacy. But  from  the  moment  it  was  able  to  leave  be- 
hind a  vestige,  to  constitute  in  the  animal  a  memory 
for  the  psychic  sense,  utilizing  its  past  for  the  profits 
of  its  future,  from  that  moment  a  new  chance  of  sur- 
vival was  created.  To  unconscious  adaptation,  blind, 
incidental,  dependent  upon  circumstances,  there  was 
added  a  conscious  adaptation,  uniform,  dependent 
upon  the  animal,  surer  and  more  rapid  than  the  other; 
and  the  latter  has  shortened  the  work  of  selection. 

Thus,  the  parts  played  by  consciousness  in  the 
development  of  psychic  life  are  manifest.  I  have 
dwelt  rather  long  upon  this  point,  because  the  advo- 
cates of  the  hypothesis,  above  set  forth,  have  only 
considered  it  in  its  present  form,  without  concerning 
themselves  about  that  which  results  from  its  ap- 
pearance. 

They  certainly  had  stated,  that  consciousness  en- 
lightens ;  but  they  had  not  shown,  that  consciousness 
also  adds.  To  repeat  once  again  our  former  state- 
ment :  consciousness  itself  is  but  a  phenomenon,  only 
an  accompaniment.  If  there  exist  animals,  in  which 
it  should  appear  and  disappear  at  each  instant,  with- 
out leaving  any  traces,  it  would  be  strictly  correct  tq 


1 8  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

call  such  animals  spiritual  automatons ;  but  if  the  state 
of  consciousness  leaves  a  vestige,  a  registration  in  the 
organism,  in  such  case  it  does  not  act  merely  as  an 
indicator,  but  as  condenser.  The  metaphor  of  an  auto- 
maton is  no  longer  acceptable.  This  being  admitted, 
many  objections  to  the  theory  of  a  consciousness-phe- 
nomenon fall  to  the  ground  of  themselves.  The  theory 
is  completed,  without  having  been  weakened. 


19 


CHAPTER  I. 
ORGANIC  DISORDERS. 


I  SHALL  now  dwell  more  at  length  upon  the  organic 
conditions  of  personality ;  inasmuch  as  everything  de- 
pends upon  these  and  they  explain  all  the  rest.  Met- 
aphysical psychology,  with  logical  consistency,  has  paid 
no  attention  whatever  to  these  conditions ;  for  it  de- 
rives its  ego  from  above,  and  not  from  below.  On  the 
contrary,  we  shall  maintain  that  the  elements  of  per- 
sonality must  be  sought  for  in  the  most  elementary 
phenomena  of  life  ;  the  latter,  in  fact,  stamp  it  with  its 
own  distinctive  mark  and  character. 

In  every  animal  the  basis  of  its  psychic  individu- 
ality is  the  organic  sense — the  sense  of  the  body, 
usuall}^  vague  and  obscure,  but  at  times  very  clear  in 
all  of  us.* 

This  organic  sense  is  that  ''principle  of  individu- 
ation" so  eagerly  sought  for  by  scholastic  doctors,  for 
the  reason  that  everything — either  directly  or  indi- 
rectly— rests  upon  it.  We  may  regard  as  highly  prob- 
able, that  according  as  we  descend  toward  the  lower 
animals  this  organic  sense  of  body  will  more  and  more 
preponderate,  down  to  the  point  where  it  actually  be- 

*  Incidentally,  I  may  observe  that  a  great  metaphysician,  Spinoza,  plainly 
maintains  the  same  thesis,  although  in  difterent  terms:  "The  object  of  the 
idea  that  constitutes  the  human  soul  is  body.... and  nothing  else."  "The 
idea  that  constitutes  the  formal  existence  of  the  human  soul  is  not  simple, 
but  composed  of  several  ideas."  (^Ethics,  part  IL  propositiojis  13  and  15.  See 
also  Scholia  of  prop.  17.) 


20  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

comes  the  entire  psychic  individuality.  But,  in  man 
and  with  the  higher  animals,  the  turbulent  world  of 
desires,  passions,  perceptions,  images,  and  ideas  covers 
up  this  silent  back-ground.  Except  at  given  intervals, 
it  is  forgotten,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  known.  Here 
the  same  takes  place  as  in  the  order  of  social  facts. 
The  millions  of  human  beings,  making  up  a  large  na- 
tion, as  regards  itself  and  others,  are  reduced  to  a  few 
thousand  men,  who  constitute  its  clear  consciousness, 
and  who  represent  its  social  activity  in  all  its  aspects, 
its  politics,  its  industry,  its  commerce,  and  its  intel- 
lectual culture.  And  yet  these  millions  of  unknown 
human  beings, — limited  as  to  manner  and  place  of  ex- 
istence, quietly  living  and  quietly  passing  away — make 
up  all  the  rest;  without  them  there  would  be  nothing. 
They  constitute  that  inexhaustible  reservatory,  from 
out  of  which,  through  a  rapid  or  sudden  selection,  a 
few  individuals  rise  to  the  surface  ;  but  these  favorites 
of  talent,  power,  or  wealth  themselves  enjoy  but  an 
ephemeral  existence.  Degeneracy — always  fatally  in- 
herent in  that  which  rises — will  again  lower  their  race 
and  themselves,  while  the  silent  work  of  the  ignored 
millions  will  continue  to  produce  other  ones,  and  to 
impress  upon  them  a  distinctive  character. 

Metaphysical  psychology  only  keeps  in  view  the 
lofty  heights ;  but  purely  internal  observation  cannot 
tell  us  much  about  what  takes  place  within  the  body, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  course,  from  the  very  outset,  the 
study  of  general  sensibility  has  been  mainly  the  work 
of  physiologists. 

Henle  (1840)  defined  general  sensibility  or  ''coen- 
aesthesis"  as:  '^the  tonus  of  the  sensible  nerves,  or 
the  perception  of  the  state  of  average  activity  in  which 
these  nerves  are  constantly  engaged,  even  during  the 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS. 


21 


moments  when  they  are  not  excited  by  any  external 
impression."  And  elsewhere:  ''General  sensibility  is 
the  sum  total,  or  the  not  yet  unravelled  chaos,  of  sensa- 
tions that  from  every  point  of  the  body  are  being  in- 
cessantly transmitted  to  the  sensorium.  "*  By  the  above- 
mentioned  term  E.  H.  Weber  even  more  precisely  un- 
derstands :  an  internal  sensibility,  an  inward  touch  that 
imparts  information  to  the  sensorium  concerning  the 
mechanical  and  chemico-organic  state  of  the  skin,  the 
mucous  and  serous  membranes,  the  viscera,  the  mus- 
cles, and  the  articulated  parts. 

In  France,  Louis   Peisse,  a  physician-philosopher, 
was  the   first  to  react  against  the  doctrine  of  Jouffroy^ 
who   maintained  that  we   do  not  know   our  own   body 
except   in  an   objective  manner,  as  an  extended,  sohd 
mass,  similar  to  other  bodies  in  the  universe,  situated 
beyond  the  ego,  and  foreign  to  the  perceiving  subject. 
Peisse   proved,  though   in  somewhat   cautious   terms, 
that  the   knowledge  of   our  body,  above  all,  is  entirely 
subjective.    His  description  of  this  organic  conscious- 
ness seems  by  far  too  correct,  not  to  be  quoted  entire. 
''Is  it  certain,"  he  says,   "that  we  have  absolutely 
no  consciousness  of  the  activity  of  the  organic  functions? 
If  it  be  the  question  of  a  clear,  distinct,  and  locally  de- 
terminable  consciousness,    like   that   of  external   im- 
pressions, it  is  clear  that  we  lack  it ;  but  we  might  pos- 
sibly possess  a  kind  of  silent  consciousness,  obscure, 
and  latent,  as   it  were,  the   analogue,  for  example,  of 
that  of  sensations  which   provoke  and  accompany  the 
respiratory  movements— sensations,   which,   although 
incessantly  repeated,  pass   by  unperceived.      In   fact, 
might   we  not  -regard  that   remarkable   feeling  which 

*  Pathologische    Untersuchungen,   1848,    p.    114.      Allgemeine    Anatomie 
1841,  p.  728. 


22  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY, 

ceaselessly  and  without  intermission,  warns  us  of  the 
presence  and  actual  existence  of  our  own  body,  as  a  dis- 
tant, faint,  and  confused  echo  of  the  universal  vital  ac- 
tivity ?  Almost  always,  and  wrongly,  we  confuse  this 
feeling  with  the  accidental  and  local  impressions  that 
in  waking  hours  arouse,  stimulate,  and  maintain  the 
play  of  sensibility.  These  sensations,  though  inces- 
sant, make  but  a  fugitive  and  transient  appearance  on 
the  stage  of  consciousness,  while  the  feeling  in  ques- 
tion lasts  and  persists,  even  beneath  this  ever  mobile 
theatrical  display. 

'^Condillac  very  appropriately  called  it  the  basic 
feeling  of  existence;  Maine  de  Biran  termed  it,  the 
feeling  of  sensitive  existence.  Through  this  feeling, 
the  body  incessantly  appears  to  the  ego  as  its  ow?t, 
and  through  it  the  spiritual  subject  feels  and  per- 
ceives itself  to  exist,  locally,  as  it  were,  within  the 
limited  extent  of  its  organism.  Like  a  constant,  un- 
failing admonisher,  it  renders  the  state  of  the  body  in 
cessantly  present  to  consciousness,  and  thus,  in  the 
most  intimate  manner,  displays  the  indissoluble  bond 
subsisting  between  psychic  and  physiological  life.  In 
the  usual  state  of  equilibrium,  which  constitutes  the 
state  of  perfect  health,  this  feeling,  as  I  said,  is  con- 
tinuous, uniform,  and  is  always  equal,  which  prevents 
it  from  reaching  the  ego  and  attaining  the  state  of  dis- 
tinct, special,  and  local  sensation.  In  order  to  be  dis- 
tinctly remarked,  it  must  acquire  a  certain  intensity. 
This  organic  feeling  is  then  expressed  by  a  vague  im- 
pression of  well-being,  Or  of  general  distemper  ;  the 
former  denoting  a  simple  exaltation  of  vital  physio- 
logical action ;  the  latter  its  pathologic  perversion. 
But  in  such  case  it  does  not  fail  to  localize  itself  under 
the  form  of  particular  sensations,  connected  with  some 


ORGAN  J  C  DISORDERS.  23 

certain  region  of  the  body.  It  often  reveals  itself  in  a 
more  indirect,  yet  far  more  evident,  manner,  when  it 
chances  to  fail  in  any  given  point  of  the  organism ;  for 
example,  in  a  limb  struck  by  paralysis.  Such  a  limb 
still  naturally  clings  to  the  living  aggregate,  but  it  is 
no  longer  included  in  the  sphere  of  the  organic  ego — 
if  vi^e  may  use  this  expression.  The  affected  limb 
ceases  to  be  perceived  by  the  ego  as  its  own,  and  the 
fact  of  this  only  negative  separation  is  expressed  by  a 
particular,  positive  sensation,  known  to  all,  who  have 
experienced  a  complete  numbness  of  any  member 
caused  by  cold  or  a  compression  of  the  nerves.  The 
sensation  is  nothing  more  than  the  expression  of  the 
break  or  loss  which  the  universal  feeling  of  physical 
life  suffers ;  it  proves  that  the  vital  state  of  the  limb  in 
question  really  existed,  though  obscurely  felt,  and  that 
it  constituted  one  of  the  partial  elements  of  the  gen- 
eral feeling  of  life  of  the  organic  whole.  In  this  man- 
ner any  continuous,  monotonous  noise — as  that  of  a 
carriage  in  which  we  happen  to  be  riding — ceases  to  be 
perceived,  although  continuing  all  the  time  to  be  heard  ; 
for  if  it  suddenly  stops,  its  cessation  will  be  instantly 
remarked. 

"  This  analogy  helps  us  to  understand  the  nature  and 
mode  of  existence  of  the  basic  feeling  of  organic  life, 
which  in  this  hypothesis  simply  would  be  a  resultant 
'^171  confuso'^  of  the  impressions  produced  upon  the 
living  points  by  the  internal  movement  of  the  func- 
tions carried  to  the  brain,  whether  directly  by  the  cer- 
ebro-spinal  nerves,  or  mediately  by  the  nerves  of  the 
ganglionic  system."* 

Since   the  time   when  this   passage  was   published 

*Note   to  his   edition  of   the  "Rapports  du  physique  et  dn   moral,"  by 
Cabanis,  pp.  io8,  109. 


24  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

(1844)  psychologists  and  physiologists  have  been  at 
work  studying  the  elements  of  this  organic  or  general 
sense  of  the  body.  They  have  determined  what  each 
vital  function  contributes  as  its  own  share ;  they  have 
shown  how  complex  this  confused  feeling  of  life  is, 
which,  by  means  of  incessant  repetition  has  become 
ourselves  ;  and  that  searching  after  it  would  be  equiv- 
alent to  seeking  for  ourselves.  Consequently  we  know 
it  only  through  the  variations  that  raise  it  above,  or 
lower  it  beneath  the  normal  tone.  The  reader  in  va- 
rious special  works'^  will  find  the  detailed  study  of  these 
vital  functions  and  their  general  physical  contributions. 
It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  enter  upon  a  special  in- 
vestigation of  these  topics,  and  therefore  a  condensed 
recapitulation  will  be  sufficient. 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  the  organic  sensations 
attached  to  respiration:  the  feeling  of  comfort  produced 
by  pure  air  ;  of  suffocation  from  close  air  ;  those  arising 
from  the  alimentary  canal,  and  others,  still  more  gen- 
eral, connected  with  the  state  of  nutrition.  Hunger 
and  thirst,  for  example,  despite  appearances,  have  no 
precise  localization  ;  they  simply  result  from  a  discom- 
fort of  the  whole  organism.  They  are  the  loud  plead- 
ings of  a  too  impoverished  blood.  As  regards  thirst 
especially,  the  experiments  of  CI.  Bernard  have  shown 
that  it  arises  from  lack  of  water  in  the  organism,  and 
not  from  dryness  of  the  pharynx.  Of  all  the  functions, 
general  and  local  circulation  exerts,  perhaps,  the  great- 
est psychological  influence,  and  its  variations  import 
the  most  from  individual  to  individual,  and  according 
to  the  different  moments,  within  the  same  individual. 

Let  us  further  recall  to  mind  the  organic  sensations 

*  See  particularly  Bain  :  The  Senses   and    Intelligence.     Part  I.    Ch.    II. 
and  Maudsley  :  Pathology  of  the  Spirit. 


ORGANJC  DISORDERS.  25 

that  arise  from  the  state  of  the  muscles  :  the  feeling  of 
fatigue,  exhaustion,  or  its  reverse  ;  finally  the  group  of 
muscular  sensations  which,  associated  to  the  external 
sensations  of  sight  and  touch,  play  such  a  prominent 
part  in  the  creation  of  our  knowledge.  Even  reduced 
to  itself  alone,  in  its  purely  subjiective  form,  muscular 
sensibility  will  reveal  the  degree  of  contraction  or  re- 
laxation of  the  muscles,  the  position  of  our  limbs,  etc. 
I  purposely  omit  the  organic  sensations  of  the  genital 
apparatus  ;  I  shall  revert  to  it  when  studying  the  emo- 
tional bases  of  personality. 

If  the  reader  will  conceive  for  a  moment  the  mul- 
titude and  diversity  of  the  vital  actions  just  cited  in  a 
general  way,  he  will  be  able  to  form  a  certain  idea  of 
what  must  be  understood  by  the  expression  :  physical 
bases  of  personality.  Constantly  active,  they  make  up  by 
their  continuity  for  their  weakness  as  psychic  ele- 
ments. Hence,  as  soon  as  the  higher  forms  of  mental 
life  disappear,  they  pass  to  the  front  rank.  A  clear 
example  of  this  exists  in  dreams  (whether  pleasant  or 
painful)  aroused  by  organic  sensations;  as  night-mares, 
erotic  dreams,  etc.  In  these  dreams,  even  with  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  precision,  we  may  assign  to  each  organ 
the  part  that  belongs  to  it ;  the  sensation  of  weight 
seems  mainly  attached  to  the  digestive  and  respira- 
tory organs ;  the  feeling  of  struggle  and  combat  to  af- 
fections of  the  heart.  In  more  rare  instances  patho- 
logical sensations,  unperceived  during  waking  hours, 
will  re-echo  during  sleep  like  premonitory  symptoms. 
Armand  de  Villeneuve  dreams  that  he  is  bitten  in  the 
leg  by  a  dog ;  and  a  few  days  later  that  same  leg  is  at- 
tacked by  a  cancerous  ulcer.  Gessner  in  his  sleep 
fancies  that  he  is  bitten  in  the  left  side  by  a  serpent ; 
a  little  later  on  the  very  spot  there  developed  an  anthrax 


26  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

of  which  he  died.  Macario  dreams  that  he  has  a 
very  sore  throat ;  he  rises  in  normal  health  ;  but  a  few 
hours  later  is  attacked  by  an  intense  amygdalitis.  A 
man  sees  in  a  dream  an  epileptic ;  a  short  time  after- 
wards he  himself  becomes  one.  A  woman  dreams  that 
she  speaks  to  a  man  who  cannot  reply  to  her,  because 
he  is  dumb  ;  at  her  waking  she  herself  has  lost  the 
power  of  speech. 

In  all  these  cases  we  take  for  facts  those  obscure 
incitations  which,  from  the  depths  of  the  organism, 
reach  the  nervous  centres,  and  which,  amid  all  its  turmoil 
and  perpetual  mobility,  conscious  life  hides  from  us 
instead  of  revealing. 

It  is  clear  that  the  exclusive  faith  which  psychology 
has  so  long  accorded  the  mere  data  of  consciousness, 
would  throw  into  the  shade  the  organic  elements  of 
personality ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  a  professional 
way,  physicians,  as  a  matter  of  course,  were  expected 
to  cling  to  it.  The  doctrine  of  the  temperaments,  old 
as  medical  science  itself,  ever  criticized  and  ever  re- 
molded,* is  only  a  vague  and  fleeting  expression  of  the 
principal  types  of  the  physical  personality,  such  as 
furnished  by  observation,  and  with  the  main  psychical 
traits  that  flow  hence. 

The  few  psychologists,  accordingly,  who  have  stu- 
died the  problem  of  the  different  types  of  character, 
have  sought  their  ground  of  support  in  this  doctrine. 
Kant  did  so  more  than  a  century  ago.    If  the  determina- 

*Henle  has  attempted  recently  (Anthropological  Lectures,  1877,  p.  103- 
130),  to  attach  the  temperaments  to  the  different  degrees  of  the  activity,  or 
tonus,  of  the  sensitive  and  motor  nerves.  When  this  degree  is  at  its  lowest,  we 
obtain  the  phlegmatic  temperament.  At  a  high  degree,  with  a  rapid  ex- 
haustion of  nerves,  we  have  the  sanguine  temperament.  The  choleric  also 
supposes  a  high  tonus,  but  with  persistence  in  the  nervous  action.  The  mel- 
ancholic temperament  cannot  be  defined  by  the  simple  quantity  of  the  nervous 
action ;  it  supposes  a  high  tonus,  with  the  tendency  to  emotions  rather  than  to 
voluntary  activity. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  27 

tion  of  the  temperaments  at  any  time  could  become 
scientific,  the  question  of  personality  would  be  greatly 
simplified. 

Until  this  takes  place,  the  most  relevant  point  will 
be,  to  rid  ourselves  of  the  purely  preconceived  notion, 
that  personality  is  a  mysterious  attribute,  dropped 
down  from  the  skies,  and  without  antecedents  in  na- 
ture. If  we  simply  cast  a  glance  at  the  animals  that 
surround  us,  we  shall  have  no  difiiculty  in  admitting, 
that  the  difference  between  horses  and  mules,  between 
geese  and  ducks,  their  ''principle  of  individuation," 
can  onl}^  be  derived  from  a  difference  of  organization 
and  of  adaptation  to  environment,  with  the  ps3xhical 
consequences  that  thence  result ;  and  that  in  the  same 
species  the  differences  of  one  individual  from  another 
cannot  originally  be  owing  to  any  other  cause.  In  the 
natural  order  of  things  there  is  no  reason  for  making 
an  exception  of  man;  apart  from  the  fact  that  in  man 
the  excessive  development  of  intellectual  and  emo- 
tional faculties  causes  illusion,  and  hides  the  primitive 
origin. 

Does  physical  personality  exist  in  nature  ?  Under- 
standing by  physical  personality  the  mere  sense  of  a 
state  of  organized  being  ;  a  mode  of  being  where,  by 
supposition,  all  consciousness,  whether  clear  or  ob- 
sure,  actual  or  reproduced  by  some  external  circum- 
stance, would  be  absent? 

Evidently  not  as  regards  the  higher  animals  ;  phy- 
sical personality,  in  the  sense  explained,  can  be  pos- 
ited only  as  a  very  artificial  abstraction.  It  is  prob- 
able, that  this  form  of  psychic  individuality,  consisting 
simply  in  the  consciousness  which  the  animal  has  of 
its  own  body,  exists  m  very  low  species,  yet  not  in  the 
lowest. 


28  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

In  the  latter, — e.  g.,  in  multicellular  individuals 
composed  of  cells  entirely  similar  among  them- 
selves,— the  constitution  of  the  organism  is  to  such  a 
degree  homogeneous,  that  each  element  lives  apart 
by  itself,  and  each  cell  has  its  own  particular  action 
and  reaction.  But  their  entirety  no  more  represents 
an  individual  than  six  horses,  drawing  a  carriage  in 
the  same  direction,  constitute  one  single  horse.  Here 
there  is  neither  coordination  nor  consensus,  but  simply 
juxtaposition  in  space.  If,  with  certain  authors,  we 
attribute  to  each  cell  the  analogue  of  consciousness 
(which  only  would  be  the  psychic  expression  of  their 
irritability),  we  should  obtain  consciousness  in  a  state 
of  complete  diffusion.  From  one  element  to  the  other 
there  would  exist  a  degree  of  impenetrability,  that 
would  leave  the  entire  mass  in  the  condition  of  living 
matter,  without  even  an  external  unity. 

In  a  higher  order,  however,  for  example  in  Hydras, 
observation  is  able  to  prove  a  certain  consensus  in  the 
actions  and  reactions,  and  a  certain  division  of  work. 
Yet  the  individual  is  very  precarious.  Trembly, 
by  aid  of  his  scissors,  out  of  a  single  individual  was 
able  to  make  fifty.  Inversely,  of  any  two  Hydras  we 
can  make  one  ;  it  is  sufficient  to  reverse  the  smaller, 
before  introducing  it  into  the  larger  specimen,  in  a 
manner  that  the  two  endoderms  touch  and  merge  into 
each  other.  If  allowed  to  venture  an  opinion  on  this 
obscure  matter,  I  should  say  that  this  kind  of  adapta- 
tion of  movements  might  denote  a  certain,  tem- 
porary, unstable  unity,  subject  to  circumstances,  yet, 
perhaps,  not  entirely  destitute  of  a  certain  obscure 
consciousness  on  the  part  of  the  organism. 

If  we  find   that  we   are  still  too  low,  we   may  re- 
ascend  the  series  (for  every  determination  of  this  kind 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  '       29 

is  arbitrary),  in  order  to  fix  the  point  at  which  the 
animal  has  only  the  consciousness  of  its  organism,  of 
what  it  undergoes  and  produces — or,  has  but  one 
organic  consciousness.  This  form  of  consciousness, 
in  the  pure  state,  perhaps,  does  not  even  exist ;  for, 
as  soon  as  any  rudiments  of  the  special  senses  appear, 
the  animal  transcends  the  level  of  general  sensibility. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  does  general  sensibility  alone 
suffice  to  constitute  a  consciousness?  It  is  known,  that 
the  human  foetus  makes  efforts  to  extricate  itself  from 
any  inconvenient  position,  to  escape  the  impression 
of  cold  or  of  painful  irritation  ;  yet,  are  all  these  merely 
unconscious  reflexes  ? 

I  hasten  away  from  all  conjectures  of  this  kind. 
One  thing,  at  least,  is  incontestable  ;  viz.,  that  organic 
consciousness — (the  consciousness  which  the  animal 
has  of  its  body  and  only  of  its  body) — in  the  greater 
part  of  animal  existence  exerts  an  enormous  pre- 
ponderance; that  it  stands  in  inverse  ratio  to  the 
higher,  psychic  development ;  and  that,  everywhere 
and  always,  this  consciousness  of  the  organism  is  the 
basis  upon  which  all  individuality  rests.  Through  it 
all  is  ;  without  it  there  is  nothing.  Indeed,  it  would 
be  impossible  to  imagine  the  contrary;  for,  do  not 
external  impressions — that  first  matter  of  all  mental 
life — enter  through  the  organism,  and — what  is  still 
more  important — are  not  instincts,  feelings,  aptitudes, 
proper  to  each  species,  to  each  individual,  stamped 
and  fixed  by  heredity  in  the  organism — we  know  not 
how,  but  as  proved  by  facts — with  an  unalterable  soHd- 
ity? 


30  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


II. 

If,  accordingly,  we  admit  that  the  organic  sen- 
sations proceeding  from  all  the  tissues,  organs,  and 
movements  produced— in  a  word,  from  all  the  states  of 
the  body — are  in  some  degree  and  form  represented 
in  the  sensorium  ;  and  if  the  ph57sical  personality  be 
only  their  sum  total,  it  follows  that  personality  must 
vary  as  the}^  vary,  and  that  these  variations  admit  of 
all  possible  degrees,  from  simple  distemper  to  the 
total  metamorphosis  of  the  individual.  Instances  of 
' '  double  personality  "  about  which  there  has  been  great 
discussion,  (we  shall  later  speak  of  it,)  are  but  an  ex- 
treme case.  By  dint  of  patience  and  careful  in- 
vestigations we  should  find  in  mental  pathology  enough 
observations  to  establish  a  progression,  or  rather  a 
continuous  regression  from  the  most  transient  change, 
to  the  most  complete  alteration  of  the  ego. 

It  is  an  incontestable  fact,  that  the  ego  exists  only 
on  the  condition  of  continually  changing.  As  regards 
its  identity  this  is  only  a  question  of  quantity.  Its 
identity  will  persist  as  long  as  the  sum  of  the  states 
that  remain  relatively  fixed  is  greater  than  the  sum 
of  the  states  that  are  added  to  or  detached  from  this 
stable  group. 

For  the  present  we  have  onty  to  stud}^  the  irregu- 
larities of  personality  that  are  immediately  connected 
with  organic  sensations.  Since,  by  itself,  general  sen- 
sibility has  only  a  very  feeble  psychic  value,  it  pro- 
duces only  partial  disorders,  except  in  cases  where  the 
alteration  is  total  or  sudden. 

By  way  of  a  beginning,  we  shall  here  notice  a  state 
which  can   hardly   be  called   a   morbjd  state,  yet  pro- 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  31 

bably  is  well-known  to  all,  and  consists  in  an  alternate 
feeling  of  exuberant  vitality  or  of  depression,  without 
apparent  cause.  In  these  states  the  usual  tone  of  life 
changes,  rises,  or  falls.  In  the  normal  state  there  is 
a  positive  ''euphory";  neither  comfort  nor  discomfort 
arise  from  the  body.  Often,  on  the  other  hand,  the  vital 
functions  become  exalted  ;  activity  superabounds  and 
seeks  to  expend  itself;  everything  seems  easy  and 
profitable.  This  state  of  weU-being,  at  first  entirely 
physical,  is  propagated  to  the  whole  nervous  organi- 
sation, and  arouses  a  multitude  of  pleasant  feelings,  to 
the  exclusion  of  contrary  ones.  Everything  looks 
bright.  At  other  times  the  reverse  will  happen,  as  in 
states  of  disease,  despondency,  listlessness,  impotence 
and — as  consequences  of  grief — in  fear,  in  painful  and 
depressing  feelings.  At  such  times  everything  looks 
black.  In  either  instance,  however,  there  is  no  news, 
no  event,  in  fact,  nothing  external  to  us,  to  justify  this 
sudden  joy  or  sadness. 

Surely,  in  an  absolute  sense,  it  cannot  be  here  said, 
that  personality  has  been  transformed.  Relatively  it 
has  been  so.  The  individual  man  has  been  changed, 
is  not  the  same  as  before  to  himself,  or  better  still,  to 
those  who  know  him.  This,  when  translated  into  the 
language  of  analytic  psyshology,  simply  means,  that 
this  personality  is  constituted  by  elements,  some  re- 
latively fixed,  but  others  variable  ;  that  the  variabiHty 
having  by  far  exceeded  its  average  value,  the  stable 
portion  has  been  affected,  yet  has  not  disappeared. 

Now,  if  instead  of  disappearing  merely  to  return 
after  a  brief  delay  to  the  normal  state,  we  suppose  that 
this  change  persists  (a  supposition  that  is  daily  real- 
ized; ;  in  other  words,  if  the  physical  causes  that 
induce   this   change   are   permanent,  instead   of  being 


32  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

transitor}^,  in  such  instance  there  is  formed  a  new 
physical  and  mental  habitude,  and  the  centre  of  gravity 
of  the  individual  shows  then  a  tendency  to  displace- 
ment. 

This  first  change  may  then  give  rise  to  others  so 
that  the  transformation  is  constantly  on  the  increase. 
For  the  present  I  shall  not  discuss  this  subject  at 
length.  I  simply  wished  to  prove  that  from  a  normal 
state  we  may  by  imperceptible  stages  descend  to  the 
state  of  complete  metamorphosis ;  or  that  it  is  purely 
a  question  of  degree. 

In  studying  the  disorders  of  personality,  it  is  im- 
possible strictly  to  determine  those  that  have  their 
immediate  cause  in  the  perturbations  of  general  sen- 
sibility, because  these  latter  by  a  secondary  action 
excite  psychic  states  of  a  higher  order  (hallucinations, 
feelings,  and  morbid  ideas).  I  shall  limit  myself  to 
instances  in  which  they  appear  to  preponderate. 

We  shall  find  in  the  ^'- Annales  medico-psycholo- 
giqiies^^  "^  five  observations,  which  the  author  has 
grouped  under  the  title:  "^^An  aberration  of  the 
physical  personality."  Without  caviling  about  the 
title,  which,  perhaps,  conveys  somewhat  more  than  it 
ought,  we  are  shown  in  the  examples  quoted  how  an 
unknown  organic  state,  an  alteration  of  the  coenaes- 
thesis,  /.  e.  of  the  organic  sense,  without  any  external 
cause,  may  produce  a  feeling  of  corporeal  annihilation. 
"In  the  fullness  of  health,  and  in  the  possession  of 
exuberant  vitality  and  strength  the  person  experiences 
an  ever  increasing  sensation  of  weakness,  to  such  a 
point,  that  every  moment  he  has  the  fear  of  falling 
into  syncope,  and  of  ceasing  to  exist."  Otherwise  the 
sensibility  remains   intact;   the  patient   eats  with  ap- 

*  §ept.  1878.     56  Serie,  tome  XX,  pp.  191-223. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  ■^2> 

petite,  and  if  we  attempt  to  oppose  his  will,  he  will 
react  with  the  utmost  energy;  still- he  will  keep  re- 
peating that  he  feels  like  one  dying  ;  that  he  is  slowly 
passing  away  ;  that  there  are  left  to  him  only  a  few 
hours  to  live.  Very  naturally,  upon  this  purely  phys- 
ical foundation  at  the  same  time  there  are  grafted 
any  number  of  delirious  conceptions  :  one  subject  be- 
lieves himself  to  be  poisoned,  another  maintains  that 
some  demon  has  entered  into  his  system,  and  is  actually 
''sucking  away  his  life,"  etc. 

Let  us,  however,  confine  our  attention  to  the  im- 
mediate consequences  of  the  physical  state.  We  here 
encounter  that  state  of  despondency,  already  described, 
and  known  to  everybody,  yet  here  in  a  much  more 
serious  and  stable  form.  The  mental  distemper  in- 
creases in  proportion  and  systematizes  itself.  The  in- 
dividual tends  to  be  no  longer  the  same.  This  forms 
a  new  stage  toward  the  dissolution  of  the  ego,  al- 
though as  yet  far  from  having  been  reached. 

This  beginning  of  transformation,  due  to  exclu- 
sively physical  causes,  is  also  met  with  in  persons 
who  maintain  that  they  are  enveloped  in  a  veil  or 
cloud,  cut  off  from  the  external  world,  insensible. 
Others  enjoy  with  delight  the  hghtness  of  their 
bodies  ;  will  feel  as  if  suspended  in  mid-air  ;  believe 
they  are  able  to  fly  j  or  have  a  feeling  of  heaviness 
either  in  the  whole  body,  in  certain  hmbs,  or  in  a  sin- 
gle limb  that  seems  stout  and  heavy — all  of  which 
phenomena  are  naturally  explained  from  disorders  of 
the  muscular  sensibility.  ''A  young  epileptic  at  times 
felt  his  body  so  abnormally  heavy,  that  he  scarcely  was 
able  to  support  it.  At  other  times  he  felt  so  light  that 
he  believed  he  did  not  touch  the  ground.  Sometimes 
it   seemed   to  him,  that  his   body  had  assumed   such 


34  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

huge  dimensions  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  pass 
through  a  certain  door-way."* 

In  the  case  of  the  latter  illusion,  which  relates  to 
the  dimensions  of  the  body,  the  patient  feels  himself 
much  smaller  or  much  larger  than  in  reality  he  is. 

The  local  perversions  of  general  sensibility — al- 
though by  nature  limited — are  not  of  less  psychologic 
importance.  Some  subjects  will  assert,  that  they  no 
longer  have  teeth,  mouth,  stomach,  intestines,  brain  : 
which  can  only  be  explained  through  a  suppression  or 
alteration  of  the  internal  sensations  that  exist  in  the 
normal  state  and  contribute  to  constitute  the  notion 
of  the  physical  ego.  To  the  same  cause,  at  times 
aggravated  by  cutaneous  anaesthesia,  we  must  refer 
certain  cases  in  which  the  patient  believes,  that  one 
of  his  limbs  or  even  his  whole  body  is  of  wood,  glass, 
stone,  butter,  etc. 

After  a  while,  he  will  say,  that  he  has  no  body  at 
all,  that  he  is  dead.  Instances  of  this  kind  are  really 
encountered.  Esquirol  speaks  of  a  woman  who  be- 
lieved that  the  devil  had  carried  off  her  body  ;  the  sur- 
face of  her  skin  was  completely  insensible.  The  phy- 
sician Baudelocque,  during  the  last  period  of  his  life, 
had  lost  all  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  his  body  : 
he  maintained  that  he  no  longer  possessed  head,  arms, 
etc.  Finally,  there  is  a  widely  known  instance  related 
by  Foville.  "A  soldier  believed  himself  to  be  dead 
ever  since  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  at  which  he  had 
been  seriously  wounded,  f  When  asked  about  his  con- 
dition, he  would  answer :  '  You  wish  to  know  how 
fares  old  Lambert  ?  He  is  no  more ;  he  was  carried 
off  by  a  cannon-ball.     What  you  see  there  is  not  him- 

*  Griesinger  :   Traite  des  jnaladies  mentales,  trans.  Doumic,  p.  92. 
t  Michea,  Annales  inedico-psychologiques ,  1856,  p.  249  et  seqq. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  35 

self,  but  only  a  wretched  machine  that  has  been  made 
like  him  ;  you  ought  to  ask  them  to  make  another 
one.'  In  speaking  of  himself,  he  never  said  'I,'  but 
'that  thing.'  His  skin  was  insensible,  and  often  he 
would  fall  into  a  state  of  complete  insensibility  and 
immobility,  lasting  several  days." 

In  the  case  just  mentioned,  we  enter  into  the  realm 
of  serious  perturbations  ;  meeting  for  the  first  time 
with  an  instance  of  double  personality,  or  more  strictly 
speaking,  a  discontinuity,  a  lack  of  fusion  between 
two  periods  of  psychic  life.  The  present  case  might 
*  be  explained  as  follows.  Before  his  accident,  this  sol- 
dier, like  everybody  else,  had  his  organic  conscious- 
ness, the  sense,  the  feeling  of  his  own  body,  of  his 
physical  personality.  After  the  accident  an  internal 
change  was  brought  about  in  his  nervous  organization. 
Concerning  the  nature  of  this  change,  unfortunately, 
we  can  only  form  hypotheses,  the  effects  alone  being 
known.  Whatever  it  may  have  been,  it  resulted  in 
giving  birth  to  another  organic  consciousness — that 
of  a  "wretched  machine."  No  kind  of  amalgamation 
had  been  effected  between  the  latter  and  the  older 
consciousness — the  recollection  of  which  had  tena- 
ciously remained  with  the  patient.  The  feeling  of 
identity,  accordingly,  is  lacking ;  because  in  the  or- 
ganic states  as  well  as  in  others,  this  feeling  can  only 
result  from  a  slow,  progressive,  and  continuous  assi- 
milation of  the  new  states.  Here,  the  new  states  did 
not  enter  the  old  ego  as  an  integral  part.  Hence, 
that  odd  situation  in  which  the  old  personality  appears 
to  itself  as  having  been,  and  as  being  no  more,  and 
in  which  the  present  state  appears  as  an  external, 
strange  thing,  and  as  not  existing.  It  may  be  re- 
marked, in  fine,  that  in  a  state  where  the  surface  of 


.  ^6  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

the  body  no  longer  yields  sensations  and  where  those 
that  do  arrive  from  the  organs  are  equivalent  almost 
to  none  at  all ;  where  both  superficial  and  deep  sen- 
sibilit}^  is  extinguished — that  in  such  a  state  the  or- 
ganism no  longer  excites  those  feelings,  images,  and 
ideas  that  connect  it  with  higher  psychical  life.  The 
organism  is  simply  reduced  to  the  automatic  acts  that 
constitute  the  habitude  or  routine  of  life,  or  properly 
speaking,  it  becomes   ''a. machine." 

Strictly  viewed,  we  are,  indeed,  allowed  to  as- 
sume, that  the  only  personality  in  this  example  is  the 
personality  which  recollects ;  we  must  nevertheless 
acknowledge,  that  it  is  of  a  very  extraordinary  nature, 
existing  only  in  the  past ;  and  that,  instead  of  calling 
it  a  person,  it  would  be  more  correct  to  call  it  a 
memor3^ 

What  distinguishes  the  above-mentioned  instance 
from  those  of  which  we  shall  speak  elsewhere,  is  pre- 
cisely this,  that  here  the  aberration  is  altogether  phy- 
sical, springs  solely  from  body  and  bears  solely  upon 
the  body.  The  old  soldier  did  not  believe  himself  to 
be  another  (Napoleon,  for  example,  although  the  lat- 
ter also  had  been  at  Austerlitz).  The  present  case  is 
as  free  as  possible  of  intellectual  elements. 

The  illusion  of  patients  or  convalescents,  who  be- 
lieve themselves  double,  must  also  be  referred  to  per- 
turbations of  general  sensibility.  At  times  there  is 
pure  and  simple  illusion  without  doubling,  where  the 
morbid  state  is  projected  outward,  and  the  individual 
alienates  a  part  of  his  physical  personality.  Such,  are 
the  cases  of  the  patients,  of  whom  Bouillaud  speaks, 
who  having  lost  the  sensibility  of  half  of  the  body, 
imagine  to  have  beside  them  in  bed  an  other  person, 
^or  even   a  corpse.      But  when  the  group   of  organic 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  37 

sensations  of  a  morbid  nature,  instead  of  thus  being 
alienated,  clings  to  the  normal,  organic  ego  and  for 
some  time  coexists  with  it,  without  fusion,  then  and 
for  just  this  space  of  time  the  patient  believes  that 
he  has  two  bodies.  '^  A  certain  convalescent  from  a 
fever  believed  himself  to  consist  of  two  individuals, 
of  which  one  was  in  bed,  while  the  other  was  walking 
about.  Although  without  appetite,  he  ate  a  great 
deal ;  having,  as  he  said,  two  bodies  to  feed."  * 

''Pariset,  in  his  early  youth  having  been  affected 
by  typhus  during  an  epidemic,  remained  several  days 
in  an  extremely  low  state,  verging  on  death.  One 
morning  there  suddenly  awoke  a  more  distinct  feeling 
of  himself.  He  began  to  think,  and  seemed  to  ex- 
perience a  genuine  resurrection  ;  but,  strange  to  say, 
at  the  same  instant  he  had,  or  believed  to  have, 
two  bodies  ;  and  these  bodies  seemed  to  him  to  be 
resting  in  two  different  beds.  In  so  far  as  his  soul 
was  present  in  one  of  these  bodies,  he  felt  recovered, 
and  enjoyed  delightful  repose.  In  the  other  body  his 
soul  suffered,  and  he  argued  with  himself  :  Why  am  I  so 
well  in  this  bed  and  so  ill  and  oppressed  in  the  other  ? 
This  thought  preoccupied  him  for  a  long  while. 
Pariset  himself — a  man  most  subtle  in  psychological 
analysis — has  many  times  told  me  the  detailed  his- 
tory of  the  impressions  which  at  that  time  he  ex- 
perienced, "f 

In  the  above  we  possess  two  instances  of  double 
physical  personality.  Although  as  yet  we  are  not  far 
advanced  in  our  study,  the  reader,  at  all  events,  is 
able  to  see,  how  the  two  cases  referred  to,  when 
closely  examined,  are  really  unlike.      The  current  term 

*  Leuret,  Fragiitents  psychologiqiies  sur  la/blie,  p.  95. 

t  Gratiolet,  Anatomze  coviparec  du  systhne  nerveux.  Vol.  II,  p.  548. 


38  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

"double  personality"  is  but  an  abstraction.  As  soon 
as  we  translate  it  into  concrete  facts,  into  authen- 
tic observations,  we  shall  only  find  diversity.  Each 
case,  as  it  were,  asks  for  a  particular  interpretation ; 
and  a  priori  we  certainly  might  expect  one.  Per- 
sonality—  as  we  maintain,  and  as  we  shall  further 
attempt  to  prove — being  a  very  compound  complex, 
it  clearly  follows  that  its  perturbations  likewise  must 
be  multiform.  Each  case  shows  it  as  differently  decom- 
posed. Disease  becomes  a  subtle  instrument  of  an- 
alysis, and  furnishes  us  experiences  that  are  inacces- 
sible by  any  other  method.  The  difficulty  is  to  inter- 
pret them  satisfactorily ;  but  even  errors  will  only  be 
transitory,  since  the  facts  which  the  future  has  in  store 
will  serve  either  to  verif}^  or  rectify  them. 


III. 

The  part  sustained  by  the  physical  personality  as 
an  element  in  the  make-up  of  the  complete  person- 
ality is  so  important  and  has  been  so  much  neglected, 
often  indeed  intentionally,  that  too  much  light  cannot 
be  shed  upon  it.  In  this  connection  we  may  derive 
much  profit  from  the  consideration  of  a  number  of 
rare  cases  which  psychology  has  overlooked,  but 
which  bring  to  the  support  of  our  thesis  the  supple- 
mental evidence  of  facts  which,  although  they  are  not 
more  convincing,  are  at  least  more  striking.  I  refer 
to  cases  of  double  monsters. 

We  must  admit  that  the  available  data  in  such 
cases  are  very  meagre.  Nature  does  not  multiply 
monsters,  and  among  the  seventy  or  eighty  species 
pointed  out  by  teratologists,  the  majority  have  no  in- 
terest for   us.      Of   double   monsters,  moreover,  many 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  39 

do  not  reach  the  adult  age.  The  anatomist  and  phys- 
iologist, consequently,  may  learn  much  from  such 
prodigies ;  but  this,  it  will  be  seen,  is  not  the  case 
with  the  psychologist.  And,  furthermore,  really  trust- 
worthy observations  on  this  subject  seldom  reach  back 
further  than  a  century.  In  everything  beyond  that 
date  the  marvellousness  and  vagueness  of  the  de- 
scriptions recorded  nullifies  any  value  they  might  pos- 
sess. 

The  ego,  it  has  been  repeatedly  affirmed,  is  im- 
penetrable ;  it  forms  in  itself  a  complete,  a  perfectly 
circumscribed  whole,  the  which  is  a  proof  of  its  essen- 
tial unity.  This  assertion,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  in- 
contestable ;  but  that  impenetrability  is  merely  the 
subjective  expression  of  the  impenetrability  of  the  or- 
ganism. One  ego  cannot  be  another  ego,  for  the 
reason  that  one  determinate  organism  cannot  at  the 
same  time  be  a  different  organism.  But  if,  through  a 
concurrence  of  causes  which  we  need  not  here  enu- 
merate, two  human  beings,  whose  condition  dates 
back  to  the  foetal  stage,  be  united  at  some,  part  of 
their  bodies,  while  both  their  heads,  the  essential  or- 
gans of  human  individuality,  remain  perfectly  separate, 
the  following  condition  of  affairs  will  be  presented  : 
namely,  each  organism  will  no  longer  be  completely 
limited  in  space,  and  distinct  from  every  other  organ- 
ism ;  there  will  be  a  joint  and  undivided  part  common 
to  both  ;  and  if,  as  we  maintain,  the  unity  and  com- 
plexity of  the  ego  are  but  the  subjective  expression  of 
the  unity  and  complexity  of  the  organism,  there  will 
be  of  necessity,  in  the  case  now  presented,  a  partial 
penetration  of  the  one  ego  by  the  other,  and  there 
must  exist  a  determinate  element  of  psychic  life  that 
is  held  in  common,  and  that  cannot  be  said  to  belong 


40  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

to  an  I,  but  must  belong  to  a  We.  Each  indivi- 
dual is  thus  a  little  less  than  an  individual.  And  this 
has  been  fully  corroborated  by  experience. 

''  From  an  anatomical  point  of  view  a  double 
monster  is  always  more  than  a  unitary  individual,  and 
less  than  two  ;  yet  at  times  it  approaches  closer  to 
unity,  and  again  closer  to  duality.  In  the  same  way, 
from  a  physiological  point  of  view,  a  double  monster 
is  always  endowed  with  something  more  than  unitary 
life,  and  with  something  less  than  two  lives  :  but  its 
double  life  may  incline  in  the  one  case  more  to  unity, 
or  in  the  other  more  to  duality. 

'*  Regarding  merely  the  phenomena  of  sensibility 
and  of  will,  a  monster  composed  of  two  almost  com- 
plete individuals,  united  simply  at  a  given  part  of 
their  body,  will  be  double,  morally  as  well  as  phys- 
icalty.  Each  individual  will  have  a  sensibility  and  a 
will  of  his  own,  the  effects  of  which  will  extend  to  his  own 
body,  and  to  his  alone.  It  may  even  happen  that  the 
twins,  while  widely  different  in  facial  outlines,  stature, 
and  physical  constitution,  will  be  no  less  so  in  point  of 
character  and  degree  of  intelligence.  At  the  same 
instant  the  one  will  be  merry,  and  the  other  sad  ;  one 
will  be  awake,  while  the  other  will  be  asleep  ;  one 
will  want  to  walk  while  the  other  wishes  to  rest ;  and 
from  this  conflict  of  two  wills,  animating  two  bodies 
indissolubly  bound  together,  certain  movements  may 
arise  that  are  wholly  without  results,  that  will  be 
neither  resting  nor  walking.  These  two  human  halves 
may  quarrel,  or  even  come  to  blows.  .  .  .  And  thus 
their  moral  duality,  the  consequence  of  their  physical 
duality,  may  be  demonstrated  by  a  hundred  proofs. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  since  there  exists  a  point 
of  junction  in  the  double  body,  situated  at  the  line  of 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  41 

division  of  the  two  component  individuals,  and  com- 
mon to  both,  other  phenomena,  less  numerous  though 
they  be,  show  in  them  a  beginning  of  unity. 

*' Impressions  made  upon  the  region  of  union,  es- 
pecially if  made  at  its  central  point,  are  perceived  at 
the  same  time  by  both  brains,  and  both  are  able  to 
react  upon  the  impressions  in  the  same  manner.  .  .  . 
Let  us  add,  that  although  peace  may  often  be  ruptured 
between  the  twins,  still  there  nearly  always  prevails 
between  them  a  harmony  of  feelings  and  desires,  sym- 
pathy and  reciprocal  attachment,  the  full  extent  of 
which  it  is  impossible  to  comprehend  without  having 
read  the  entire  evidence  .... 

''The  same,  and  also  different,  phenomena  are 
present  where,  by  a  still  more  intimate  union,  we  find 
two  heads  upon  one  body,  and  with  but  a  single  pair 
of  legs.  Anatomical  examination  proves  that  in  such 
beings  each  individual  possesses  for  himself  one  side  of 
the  common  body,  and  one  of  the  two  legs.  The  ob- 
servation of  physiological  and  psychological  phenom- 
ena fully  corroborates  this  singular  result.  Impres- 
sions made  at  any  point  along  the  axis  of  union,  will 
be  perceived  at  the  same  time  by  both  the  heads  ;  be- 
yond and  at  a  distance  from  the  axis  impressions  are 
perceived  by  but  one  head  ;  and  what  is  true  of  the 
sensations  is  true  of  the  will.  The  right  brain  is  the 
seat  of  perception  for  the  right  leg  alone,  and  it  alone 
will  act  upon  the  right  leg;  and  so  the  left  brain  alone 
acts  upon  the  left  leg,  so  that  the  act  of  walking  will 
result  from  movements  executed  by  two  limbs  belong- 
ing to  two  different  individuals,  and  co-ordinated  by 
two  distinct  wills. 

''Finally,  in  parasitic  monsters,  where  the  organ- 
ization almost  becomes  unitary,  all   vital  acts,   sensa- 


42  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

tions,  and  manifestations  of  will  are  performed  almost 
exactly  as  they  are  in  normal  beings.  The  smaller  of 
the  two  individuals,  having  become  an  accessory  and 
inert  portion  of  the  larger,  exerts  but  a  feeble  influence 
upon  it,  limited  to  a  very  small  number  of  functions.'"*" 

To  these  general  traits  we  shall  add  a  few  details 
borrowed  from  the  most  remarkable  instances. 

We  possess  numerous  records  concerning  Helen 
and  Judith,  a  twin  female  monster,  born  at  Szony 
(Hungary)  in  1701,  died  at  Presbourg  at  the  age  of 
twenty-two  years.  The  bodies  were  placed  almost 
back  to  back,  united  in  the  sacro-pelvic  region  and 
part  of  the  loins.  The  sexual  organs  were  double  ex- 
ternally, but  with  a  single  vulva  hidden  between  the 
four  thighs ;  there  were  two  intestines  terminating  in 
a  single  anus.  The  two  aortas  and  two  inferior  venae 
cavae  were  united  by  their  extremities,  and  thus  formed 
two  large  and  direct  communications  between  the  two 
hearts,  and  hence  a  semi-communion  of  life  and  func- 
tions. '^  The  two  sisters  had  neither  the  same  temper- 
ament nor  the  same  character.  Helen  was  taller, 
prettier,  more  agile,  more  intelligent,  and  of  a  sweeter 
disposition.  Judith,  at  the  age  of  six  years  was  at- 
tacked by  paralysis,  which  retarded  her  growth  and 
development ;  her  temperament  was  consequently  more 
sluggish.  She  was  slightly  malformed,  and  had  a 
somewhat  difficult  utterance.  Nevertheless,  like  her 
sister,  she  spoke  Hungarian,  German,  French,  and 
even  a  little  English  and  Italian.  Each  seemed  to 
feel  a  tender  affection  for  the  other,  although  in  their 
infancy  they  sometimes  had  quarrelled,  and  even  come 

*I.  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire,  Histoire  des  Anomalies,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  373.  The 
monster  called  "  Home's  epicome  "  (a  monstrosity  in  which  a  second  head 
grew  from  the  first)  had  a  parasitic  head  that  only  presented  a  very  imperfect 
delifieation  of  the  normal  life. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  43 

to  blows.  The  needs  of  nature  were  felt  simultaneously 
except  in  the  case  of  urination.  They  had  simultane- 
ously been  afflicted  with  measles  and  small-pox  ;  and 
if  other  maladies  attacked  either  one,  the  sister  would 
experience  at  the  same  time  internal  discomfort  and 
keen  anxiety.  Finally  Judith  was  attacked  by  a  dis- 
ease of  the  brain  and  lungs.  Helen,  after  suffering 
for  several  days  from  a  low  fever,  suddenly  lost  her 
strength,  yet  preserving  the  clearness  of  her  mind  and 
the  faculty  of  speech.  After  a  brief  illness  she  suc- 
cumbed a  victim,  not  to  her  own,  but  to  her  sister's 
maladies.      Both  expired  at  the  same  moment." 

The  Siamese  twins,  Chang-Eng,  born  in  181 1  in 
the  kingdom  of  Siam,  were  united  from  the  navel  to 
the  xiphoid  appendix.  After  a  description  of  their 
external  peculiarities,  I.  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire  adds  : 
^'The  two  brothers,  also  in  their  other  functions  [other 
than  respiration  and  arterial  pulsation],  evince  a  re- 
markable concordance,  though  not  absolutely  constant, 
as  people  have  been  pleased  to  maintain,  and  as  Chang 
and  Eng  themselves  have  stated  to  persons  who  were 
satisfied  with  addressing  them  a  few  vague  questions. 
There  is,  doubtless,  nothing  stranger  than  the  contrast 
of  an  almost  complete  physical  duality  and  an  absolute 
moral  unity  \  but,at  the  same  time,nothing  is  more  con- 
trary to  sound  theory.  I  have  made  careful  observa- 
tions, and  gathered  together  every  information  that 
could  enlighten  me  concerning  the  value  of  the  above 
too  frequently  repeated  assertion ;  and  I  have  found, 
that  in  the  conflict  between  the  disregarded  principles 
of  theory,  and  all  the  psychological  assertions  of  which 
the  unity  of  the  Siamese  twins  has  formed  the  inex- 
haustible topic,  the  facts — ^_as  was  to  be  expected — have 
•declared   themselves  in  favor  of  the  former.      Twins 


44  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

formed  according  to  two  almost  identical  types;  in- 
evitably submitted  during  their  life  to  the  influence  of 
the  same  physical  and  moral  circumstances ;  similar 
in  point  of  organisation  and  education — the  Siamese 
brothers  became  two  beings  whose  functions,  actions, 
words  and  even  thoughts,  are  almost  always  con- 
cordant, conceived  and  produced  parallel  to  each 
other.  .  .  .  Their  joys  and  griefs  are  common.  In 
these  twin-souls  the  same  desires  are  manifested  at 
the  same  instant;  a  phrase,  begun  by  the. one  is  often 
finished  by  the  other.  But  all  these  concordances 
only  prove  parity,  not  unity.  Other  twins  in  the  nor- 
mal state  present  analogies  of  this  kind,  and,  doubt- 
less would  reveal  even  more  remarkable  ones,  if  dur- 
ing their  whole  life  they  had  always  seen  the  same  ob- 
jects, felt  the  same  sensations,  enjoyed  the  same  pleas- 
ures, and  suffered  the  same  griefs.  .  .  .'"*'  As  regards 
the  Siamese,  twins  I  may  add  that  with  advancing  age 
and  through  the  effect  of  circumstances  their  differences 
of  character  became  more  marked,  and  that  one  of 
the  latest  observers  described  one  of  the  two  brothers 
as  morose  and  taciturn,  the  other  as  gay  and  cheerful. 

The  subject  of  the  present  work,  however,  is  not 
the  psychology  of  double  monsters,  since  they  only 
figure  as  examples  of  the  deviations  of  physical  per- 
sonality. I  shall,  accordingly,  only  recall  to  mind  the 
recent  case  of  Milie  and  Christine,  in  whom  the  sensi- 
bility of  the  inferior  limbs  is  common.  The  two  spinal 
cords  must  in  consequence  form  a  genuine  commissure 
at  the  level  of  the  point  of  union. 

The  civil  and  ecclesiastical  laws,  which  are  inter- 
ested in  this  problem  under  several  heads,  (questions 

*  As  regards  further  details,   see  the  above-quoted  work  Vol.   Ill,  p.  90,. 
and  following. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  45 

of  civil  condition,  marriage,  right  of  succession,  bap- 
tism, etc.,)  have  not  hesitated  to  acknowledge  two 
persons  where  two  distinct  heads  existed,  and  justly 
so,  although  practically  certain  perplexing  instances 
might  be  met  with.  The  head  in  man  being  the  true 
seat  of  personality — the  locality  in  which  the  synthesis 
of  the  latter  takes  place — it  may  upon  the  whole  be 
said  to  represent  the  individual.  Later  on  we  shall 
see  in  descending  the  scale  of  animal  existence  that 
this  point  is  more  doubtful.  But,  if  the  question  is 
discussed  scientifically,  it  is  impossible  in  double  mon- 
sters to  consider  each  individual  as  complete. 

I  shall  not  weary  the  reader  with  entirely  useless 
comments,  since  the  facts  speak  for  themselves.  If 
the  reader  carefully  examines  the  preceding  passages, 
he  will  convince  himself  that,  even  where  the  per- 
sonalities are  the  most  distinct,  there  exists  a  com- 
plication of  organs  and  functions  to  such  an  extent 
that  each  cannot  be  itself  except  on  condition  of  being 
more  or  less  the  other,  and  itself  being  conscious  of 
the  fact. 

The  ego,  accordingly,  is  not  an  entity  acting  where 
it  chooses  or  as  it  pleases  ;  controlling  the  organs  in 
its  own  way,  and  limiting  its  domain  according  to  its 
own  wish.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  resultant,  even  to 
such  a  degree  that  its  domain  is  strictly  determined 
by  the  anatomical  connections  with  the  brain,  and  that 
at  one  time  it  represents  an  entire  body,  less  an  undi- 
vided part,  and  at  another  time  the  half  of  a  body, 
and  in  parasitic  monsters  such  a  limited  domain,  that 
it  does  not  suffice  to  support  life,  and  accordingly  is 
expelled  prematurely. 


46  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


IV. 


In  order  to  prove  once  more  and  in  another  man- 
ner that  the  principle  of  individuation  is  the  organism  ;: 
that  it  is  such  without  restriction,  immediately  through 
the  organic  sensations,  but  mediately  through  the 
emotional  and  intellectual  states,  of  which  we  shall 
speak  later  \  let  us  examine  what  takes  place  in  cases 
of  twins.  Psychology  has  not  concerned  itself  about 
the  latter,  any  more  than  about  cases  of  double  mon- 
sters, while  at  the  same  time  modern  biologists  furnish 
a  number  of  very  curious  data. 

In  the  first  place,  we  must  recall  to  mind  that  twins 
represent  on  the  average  of  births  about  i  in  70.  The- 
cases  of  triplets  or  quadruplets  are  very  rare^  not  more 
than  I  in  5000,  and  i  in  150,000  respectively;  ta 
mention  instances  of  these  would  uselessly  complicate 
our  researches.  Let  us  further  remember,  that  twins 
are  of  two  species.  Either  each  of  them  is  germinated 
from  a  distinct  ovule,  in  which  case  they  may  be 
either  of  the  same  or  of  a  different  sex  ;  or  they  may 
have  issued  from  two  germinative  spots  in  the  same 
ovule,  and  then  they  are  enveloped  within  the  same 
membrane  and  are  invariably  of  the  same  sex.  The 
latter  instance  alone  yields  two  personalities  that  are 
strictly  speaking  legitimately  comparable. 

Leaving  aside  animals,  we  shall  abide  by  man  and 
take  the  problem  in  all  its  complexity.  It  is  evident, 
that  since  the  physical  and  moral  state  of  the  parents 
is  the  same  for  both  of  the  twin  individuals,  a  cause 
of  difference  has  thus  been  removed  at  the  very  mo- 
ment of  procreation.  As  their  development  has  for  a 
starting-point  the  materials  of  the   same  fecundated 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  47 

ovule,  there  will  exist  a  great  probability  of  extra- 
ordinary likeness  in  the  physical  constitution,  and 
consequently,  according  to  our  thesis,  in  their  mental 
constitution  also.  Let  us  now  glance  at  the  facts 
that  are  in  our  favor  ;  and  afterwards  consider  objec- 
tions and  exceptions. 

The  perfect  resemblance  of  twins  is  a  matter  of 
common  observation.  Since  remote  antiquity  this 
topic  has  furnished  subject-matter  to  the  humorous 
poets,  and  later  it  has  more  than  once  been  used  by 
modern  novelists.  But  writers  have  generally  limited 
themselves  to  external  resemblances,  resulting  from 
stature,  form,  face,  voice,  etc.  But,  there  are  other 
much  deeper  resemblances.  Even  long  ago  physi- 
cians had  observed  that  most  twins  also  present  ex- 
traordinary agreement  of  tastes,  aptitudes,  faculties,, 
even  of  fates.  Recently  Mr.  Galton  has  made  an 
inquiry  on  this  subject,  issuing  lists  of  questions,, 
to  which  about  eighty  answers  were  returned,  thirty- 
five  with  the  addition  of  minute  details.  Mr.  Galton's- 
aim,  however,  was  totally  different  from  our  own. 
Through  his  researches  upon  heredity,  he  wished  to 
determine  by  a  new  method  the  respective  parts  played 
by  natur-e  and  education  ;  but  among  his  material  is 
much  that  is  of  profit  to  us.* 

Mr.  Galton  reports  a  number  of  anecdotes  similar 
to  those  which  have  been  long  current  :  a  sister  tak- 
ing two  music-lessons  daily,  in  order  to  leave  her 
twin- sister  at  liberty  ;  the  perplexities  of  a  certain  col- 
lege-janitor, who,  when  a  twin  came  to  see  his  brother,. 
did   not  know  which  of  the  two  he  ought  to  allow  to 

*  They  will  be  found  under  the  title  '-History  of  Twins  "  in  his  book 
Inquiries  into  Hujnan  Faculty  and  its  Development  (pp.  216-242),  London: 
Macmiilan,  1883. 


48  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

depart,  etc.  Others  evince  a  persistent  resemblance 
under  circumstances  scarcely  favorable  to  preserve  it. 
*'A.  was  again  coming  home  from  India,  on  leave  ; 
the  ship  did  not  arrive  for  some  days  after  it  was  due; 
the  twin  brother  B.  had  come  up  from  his  quarters  to 
receive  A.,  and  their  old  mother  was  very  nervous. 
One  morning  A.  rushed  in  saying,  '  O  mother,  how 
are  you  ?  '  Her  answer  was,  '  No,  B.,  it's  a  bad  joke  ; 
you  know  how  anxious  I  am  !  '  and  it  was  a  little  time 
before  A.  could  persuade  her  that  he.  was  the  real 
man."  (p.  224.) 

But  that  which  relates  to  mental  organisation  has  a 
still  greater  interest  to  us.  ''  One  point  which  shows 
the  highest  degree  of  resemblance  between  twins," 
says  Galton,  ''is  the  similarity  in  the  association  of 
their  ideas.  No  less  than  eleven  out  of  the  thirty-five 
cases  testify  to  this.  They  on  the  same  occasion  make 
the  same  remarks,  begin  singing  the  same  song  at  the 
same  moment,  and  so  on  :  or  one  would  commence  a 
sentence,  and  the  other  would  finish  it.  An  observant 
friend  graphically  described  to  me  the  effect  produced 
on  hef  by  two  such  twins  whom  she  had  met  casually. 
She  said  :  'Their  teeth  grew  alike,  they  spoke  alike, 
and  together,  and  said  the  same  things,  and  seemed 
just  like  one  person.'  One  of  the  most  curious  anec- 
dotes that  I  have  received  concerning  this  similarity 
of  ideas,  was  that  one  twin.  A,  who  happened  to  be  at  a 
town  in  Scotland,  bought  a  set  of  champagne  glasses 
which  caught  his  attention,  as  a  surprise  for  his 
brother  B ;  while  at  the  same  time  B,  being  in  Eng- 
land, bought  a  similar  set  of  precisely  the  same  pat- 
tern, as  a  surprise  for  A.  Other  anecdotes  of  a  like 
kind  have  reached  me  about  these  twins."  {^Loc.  cit. 
p.  231.) 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  49 

The  nature  and  evolution  of  physical  and  men- 
tal maladies  will  also  furnish  very  convincing  facts. 
The  latter  only  may  interest  psychology,  but  the  former 
reveal  a  similarity  in  the  innermost  constitution  of  the 
two  organisms  which  sight  cannot  discover  in  the  form 
of  external  resemblances. 

'*!  have  attented  professionally,"  says  Trousseau, 
"a  case  of  twin- brothers  so  marvellously  like  each 
other,  that  I  was  unable  to  distinguish  between 
them  unless  I  saw  them  side  by  side.  This  physical 
resemblance  extended  still  further ;  they  had  an  even 
still  more  remarkable  pathological  resemblance.  One 
of  them,  whom  I  saw  in  Paris,  when  he  happened  to 
be  suffering  from  rheumatic  ophthalmia,  said  to  me  : 
*At  this  very  moment  my  brother  must  be  suffering 
like  me.'  And  as  I  strongly  protested  against  such  an 
idea,  a  few  days  later  he  showed  me  a  letter  that  he 
had  just  received  from  his  brother,  then  at  Vienna, 
and  who  wrote  :  '  I  have  got  my  ophthalmia,  you  must 
have  yours.'  However  strange  this  may  appear,  the 
fact  nevertheless  remains  incontestable.  It  was  not  a 
circumstance  related  to  me,  but  an  actual  fact  that 
came  within  my  own  experience,  and  during  my  prac- 
tice I  have  witnessed  other  remarkable  cases  of  this 
kind.  "*  Galton  furnishes  several  examples  of  which  we 
will  cite  only  the  following:  ''Two  twin-brothers, 
quite  alike,  warmly  attached  to  each  other,  and  having 
identical  tastes,  had  both  obtained  government  clerk- 
ships. They  kept  house  together ;  one  of  them  sick- 
ened of  Bright's  disease  and  died  of  it;  the  other  sick- 
ened of  the  same  disease  and  died  seven  months  later  " 
(p.   226). 

We  might  fill  whole  pages  with  analogous  instances. 

*Trousseau,  Clinique  Medicate,  Vol.  I,  p.  253.     "  Leron  sur  I'asthme." 


50  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

In  the  case  of  mental  diseases  the  same  sympathy  is 
observed ;  a  few  examples  of  which  will  suffice.  Moreau 
(de  Tours)  records  a  case  of  twins,  physical^  alike, 
who  were  attacked  by  insanity.  In  both  patients  ''the 
predominant  ideas  are  absolutely  the  same.  Both  be- 
lieve themselves  to  be  the  objects  of  imaginary  per- 
secutions. The  same  enemies  have  sworn  their  ruin, 
and  employ  the  same  means  to  accomplish  their  ends. 
Both  are  subject  to  hallucinations  of  hearing.  They 
never  address  a  word  to  any  one  whatever,  and  with 
difficulty  return  an  answer  to  questions.  They  always 
keep  aloof  from  each  other,  and  do  not  even  com- 
municate between  themselves.  An  extremely  curious 
fact  that  has  frequently  been  verified  by  the  attendants 
of  the  ward  and  also  by  ourselves  is  the  following  : 
from  time  to  time,  at  irregular  intervals,  of  two,  three, 
or  several  months,  without  apparent  cause  and  through 
an  entirely  spontaneous  caprice  of  their  malad}^,  there 
occurs  a  very  marked  change  in  the  condition  of  the 
two  brothers.  Both,  at  the  same  time,  often  on  the 
very  same  day,  emerge  from  their  state  of  stupor  and 
habitual  prostration;  they  make  the  same  complaints 
and  appeal  to  the  physician  to  immediately  restore 
them  to  freedom.  I  have  seen  this  rather  strange  fact 
reproduce  itself  even  when  they  were  separated  from 
each  other  by  a  distance  of  several  miles;  the  one  be- 
ing at  the  Bicetre,  the  other  living  on  the  farm  Sainte- 
Anne."* 

T\\^  Journal  of  Mental  Science  \  has  more  recently 
published   a  case   of   insanity  in  twins,  where  we  see 

*  Psychologie  morbide,  p.  172.  We  also  find  an  extraordinarily  curious 
case  in  the  Annales  medico-psychologiques ,  1863,  Vol.  I,  p.  312.  On  the  ques- 
tion of  twins  may  be  consulted  the  special  work  of  Kleinwaechter  :  Die  Lekrc 
von  den  Zwillingen,  Prague,  1871. 

t  April  1883,  and  Ball,  De  la  folie  gemellaire,  in  D Encephale . 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  51 

two  sisters,  resembling  each  other  very  closely  in 
features,  manners,  language,  and  intellectual  disposi- 
tion, '^to  such  a  point  that  it  would  be  very  easy  to 
mistake  one  for  the  other,"  and  who,  placed  in  dif- 
ferent wards  of  the  same  asylum,  with  no  possibility  of 
seeing  each  other,  presented  exactly  the  same  symp- 
toms of  mental  alienation. 

We  must  nevertheless  anticipate  certain  objec- 
tions. There  are  twins  of  the  same  sex,  who  are  dis- 
similar, and  although  statistics  do  not  tell  us  in  what 
proportion  true  twins  (issues  of  the  same  ovule)  pre- 
sent these  differences,  it  is  sufficient  if  it  takes  place 
only  in  a  single  case  to  be  worthy  of  a  particular  dis- 
cussion. Elsewhere  *  we  have  enumerated  the  nu- 
merous causes  that  in  every  individual  tend  from 
conception  until  death  to  produce  variations,  that  is, 
certain  marks  peculiar  to  an  individual,  and  differen- 
tiating it  from  every  other.  Here,  as  we  have  said,  a 
certain  category  of  causes  must  be  eliminated  :  those 
which  proceed  immediately  from  the  parents.  But 
the  impregnated  ovule  also  represents  ancestral  in- 
fluences,— 4,  12,  28  possible  influences  according  as 
we  ascend  to  grandparents,  great- grandparents,  great- 
great-grandparents,  etc.  We  can  know  only  through 
experience  which  of  them  prevail  j  and  to  what  ex- 
tent. As  a  fact,  in  this  case  it  is  the  same  ovule 
which  serves  to  produce  two  individuals  ;  but  nothing 
proves  that  everywhere  and  always  there  was  made 
a  rigorously  equivalent  division  between  both  in  re- 
gard to  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  materials.  The 
eggs  of  all  animals  not  only  possess  the  same  anatom- 
ical composition,  but  chemical  analysis  can  only  re- 
veal in  them  a  few  infinitesimal  inequalities ;  still,  the 

*  L'heredite psyckologique,  2nd  edition,  part  II,  ch.  IV. 


52  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

one  produces  a  sponge,  the  other  a  man.  This  ap- 
parent resemblance,  accordingly,  must  hide  profound 
differences,  although  it  escapes  our  most  subtle  means 
of  investigation.  Do  they  arise  from  the  nature  of 
the  molecular  movements,  as  certain  authors  think  ? 
We  may  suppose  anything  we  please,  on  condition 
that  we  perfectly  understand  that  the  egg  itself  is  al- 
ready a  complex  thing,  and  that  any  two  individuals 
emerging  from  it,  strictly  speaking,  cannot  be  similar. 
Our  perplexity  only  arises  from  our  ignorance  of  the 
processes  according  to  which  the  primitive  elements 
group  themselves  in  order  to  constitute  each  indi- 
vidual, and  in  consequence,  of  the  physical  and  psy- 
chic differences  which  thence  result.  Some  of  Gal- 
ton's  correspondents  have  reported  the  curious  fact 
of  certain  twins  who  were  '' complementary  to  each 
other."  ''There  is,"  writes  the  mother  of  the  twins, 
^'a  sort  of  reciprocal  interchangeable  likeness  in  ex- 
pression that  often  gave  to  each  the  effect  of  being  more 
like  his  brother  than  himself." — ''A  fact  struck  all  our 
school  contemporaries  (writes  a  senior  wrangler  of 
Cambridge)  that  my  brother  and  I  were  complement- 
ary, so  to  speak,  in  point  of  ability  and  disposition. 
He  was  contemplative,  poetical  and  literary  to  a  re- 
markable degree.  I  was  practical,  mathematical,  and 
linguistic.  Between  us  we  should  have  made  a  very 
decent  sort  of  a  man."  (pp.  224  and  240.)  The  phys- 
ical and  mental  capital  seems  to  have  been  divided 
.between  them  not  by  equality  but  by  equivalence. 

If  the  reader  carefully  considers  how  complex  the 
psychic  organization  is  in  man  ;  how  improbable  it  is, 
by  the  very  reason  of  this  complexity,  that  two  persons 
should  be  the  repetition  of  each  other,  although  twins 
approach  it  to  an  astonishing  degree,  the  reader,  as  I 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  53 

maintain,  will  irresistibly  be  induced  to  think,  that  a 
single  perfectly  verified  fact  of  this  kind  proves  more 
than  even  ten  exceptions,  and  that  the  moral  resem- 
blance is  but  the  correlative  of  the  physical  resem- 
blance. If  by  an  impossible  hypothesis  any  two  men 
were  created  in  such  a  manner  that  their  respective 
organisms  were  identical  as  to  constitution  ;  that  their 
hereditary  influences  were  rigorously  alike  ;  if,  by  a 
still  greater  impossibility,  both  received  the  same 
physical  and  moral  impressions  at  the  same  moment, 
there  would  not  be  any  other  difference  between  them 
than  that  of  their  position  in  space. 

In  closing  this  chapter,  I  feel  somewhat  ashamed 
of  having  accumulated  so  many  data  and  proofs  to 
establish  a  truth  so  evident  to  my  eyes  as  the  proposi- 
tion :  As  the  organism,  so  the  personality.  I  should 
have  hesitated  greatly  to  do  it,  if  it  had  not  been  too 
easy  to  show,  that  this  truth  has  been  forgotten  and 
disregarded  rather  than  denied  ;  and  that  writers  have 
almost  always  been  contented  to  mention  it  under  the 
vague  law  of  the  influence  of  the  physical  over  the 
moral  nature. 

The  facts  that  up  to  this  point  have  been  studied 
cannot  alone  lead  to  a  conclusion  :  they  only  pave  the 
way  for  it.  They  have  shown  that,  reduced  to  its 
last  elements,  physical  personality  presupposes  the 
properties  of  living  matter,  and  their  co-ordination ; 
that,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  body  is  only  the  or- 
ganized and  co-ordinated  sum  of  all  the  elements  that 
constitute  it,  so  also  the  physical  personality  is  only 
the  organized  and  co-ordinated  sum  of  the  same  ele- 
ments as  psychic  factors.  They  express  their  nature 
and  agencies,  but  nothing  more.  The  normal  state, 
the  teratological  cases,  the  resemblance  of  twins  have 


54  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

proved  it.  The  aberrations  of  the  physical  person- 
ality, or  as  M.  Bertrand  ingeniously  calls  them,*  ''the 
hallucinations  of  the  sense  of  the  body"  contribute  an 
additional  amount  of  evidence.  But  there  are  devia- 
tions of  the  human  person,  arising  from  other  causes, 
and  produced  by  a  more  complicated  mechanism, 
which  we  will  now  proceed  to  investigate. 

*  De  V aperception  du  corps  huntain  par  la  conscience,  p.  269  et  seqq. 


CHAPTER  II. 
EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS. 


Before  proceeding  farther  let  us  remind  the  rea- 
der once  for  all,  (and  this  also  applies  to  the  intellectual 
derangements,)  that  we  are  still  continuing  our  study 
of  organic  conditions,  but  under  a  different  aspect. 
The  desires,  feelings,  passions  that  impart  to  character 
its  fundamental  tone,  have  their  roots  in  the  organism 
and  are  predetermined  by  it.  The  same  applies  to 
even  the  highest  intellectual  manifestations.  Still,  as 
the  psychic  states  here  play  a  preponderating  part, 
we  shall  treat  them  as  the  immediate  causes  of  the 
changes  of  personality,  without  forgetting,  however, 
that  these  causes  are  in  their  turn  effects. 

Without  presuming  to  give  a  rigorous  classifica- 
tion of  the  emotional  manifestations,  which  we  have 
not  to  follow  up  in  detail,  we  will  reduce  them  to 
three  groups  of  which  the  psychological  complexity 
goes  on  increasing,  while  the  physiological  import- 
ance decreases.  They  are :  (i)  the  tendencies  con- 
nected with  the  preservation  of  the  individual  (nutri- 
tion, self-defense)  ;  (2)  those  relating  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  species ;  (3)  the  highest  of  all,  those 
which  presuppose  the  development  of  intelligence 
(moral,  religious,  aesthetic,  and  scientific  manifesta- 
tions, ambition  in  all  its  forms,  etc.)  If  we  consider 
the   development  of  the  individual,  we  shall  find  that 


56  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

it  is  in  this  chronological  order  the  sentiments  appear. 
We  see  it  in  a  marked  degree  in  the  evolution  of  the 
human  species.  Inferior  human  races — with  whom 
education  does  not  correct  nature  by  furnishing  the 
accumulated  result  of  the  work  of  centuries — never 
pass  beyond  the  preservation  of  the  individual  and  of 
the  species,  or  at  most  exhibit  only  a  slight  trace  of 
the  sentiments  belonging  to  the  third  group. 

The  emotional  states  connected  with  nutrition  con- 
stitute with  the  child  in  its  early  infancy  the  only  ele- 
ments, as  it  were,  of  its  nascent  personality.  Thence 
arise  comfort  and  peevishness,  desires  and  aversions. 
It  constitutes  that  sense  of  the  body  about  which  we 
have  spoken  so  much,  arrived  at  its  highest  psychic 
expression.  As  natural  causes,  too  manifest  to  need 
further  explanation,  cause  nutrition  almost  exclusively 
to  predominate  with  the  child,  it  follows  that  the  child 
has,  and  can  only  have,  a  personality. almost  entirely 
nutritive,  that  is,  the  most  indefinite  aud  lowest  form 
of  personality.  The  ego,  for  him  who  does  not  re- 
gard it  as  an  entity,  can  here  only  be  a  compound  of 
extreme  simplicity. 

As  we  grow  up  from  infancy  the  preponderating 
role  of  nutrition  will  diminish ;  still,  it  will  never 
completely  lose  its  rights,  because  among  all  the  prop- 
erties of  the  living  being  it  alone  remains  fundamental. 
Thus  it  happens  that  important  alterations  of  person- 
ality are  associated  with  its  variations.  When  nutri- 
tion is  diminished,  the  individual  feels  himself  de- 
pressed, weakened,  contracted  ;  when  it  is  increased, 
he  feels  himself  excited,  strengthened,  expanded. 
Among  all  the  functions  whose  harmony  constitutes 
this  basic  property  of  life,  the  circulation  seems  to  be 
that    one   of    which   the    sudden  variations    have  the 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  57 

greatest  influence  upon  the  emotional  states  and  dis- 
play themselves  by  an  immediate  counter-stroke  ;  but 
let  us  leave  aside  detailed  conjectures,  in  order  to  in- 
vestigate the  facts. 

In  the  states  known  under  the  names  of  hypochon- 
dria,   lypemania,   melancholia   (in  all    its  forms),   we 
find   alterations  of   personality  that  imply  all  possible 
degrees,  including  complete  metamorphosis.     Among 
these  different   morbid  states  physicians  have  marked 
certain   clinical  distinctions,  but   these   are   not   very 
important  here.      We  can  include  them  within  a  com- 
mon description.      In   such    morbid   states  there    is  a 
feeling  of  fatigue,  of  oppression,  anxiety,  depression, 
sadness,  absence  of  desires,  permanent  lassitude.      In 
the  most  serious  cases,  the   very  source  of   the   emo- 
tions is  completely  dried  up  :  ''The  patients  have  be- 
come insensible  to   everything.      They  have  no  longer 
any  affection  for   parents  or  children,    and  even   the 
death  of  persons  that  were  dear  to  them,  would  leave 
them   perfectly    cold    and    indifferent.      They    cannot 
weep,  and  nothing  moves  them  except  their  own  suf- 
ferings."*    As   regards  activity,  there   is  torpor,  loss 
of  power  to  govern  the  actions  or  even  the  will,  over- 
powering  inaction  for   many  hours,  in  one  word,  that 
"aboulia"  (lack   of  will)   of  which  we   studied  all  the 
forms   in  treating  of   the   diseases  of  the  will.      As  re- 
gards  the  external  world,  the   patient,  without  being 
under  an  hallucination,  finds  that  all   his  relations  to 
it   are   changed.      It   seems  as   if  his  habitual  sensa- 
tions had  lost  their  usual  character.      ''All  that  sur- 
rounds me,"  said  one  of  them,  "is  still  as  formerly, 
and  yet  a  change  must  have  been  effected ;  things  still 
have   their  old   forms,  I  can   see  them   perfectly  well, 

*  Falret,  Archives  generates  de  medecine,  December,  1878. 


i8  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

and  yet  they  have  also  changed  a  great  deal."  One 
of  Esquirol's  patients  complains  that  his  existence  is 
incomplete.  "Each  of  my  senses,  each  part  of  myself 
is,  as  it  were,  separated  from  me,  and  can  no  longer 
give  me  any  sensation  ;  it  seems  to  me  that  I  never 
actually  reach  the  objects  that  I  touch."  This  morbid 
state,  due  sometimes  to  cutaneous  anaesthesia,  may 
increase  to  such  an  extent  '^that  it  seems  to  the  pa- 
tient that  the  real  world  has  completely  vanished  out 
of  sight,  or  is  dead,  and  that  there  only  remains  an 
imaginary  world,  in  which  he  is  afraid  of  dwelling."* 
To  this  picture  we  may  add  the  physical  phenomena ; 
such  as  disturbances  of  the  circulation,  of  the  respira- 
tion, and  of  the  secretions.  The  emaciation  of  the  sub- 
jects may  become  considerable,  and  the  weight  of  the 
body  very  rapidly  diminish  during  the  period  of  de- 
pression. The  respiratory  function  is  impaired,  the 
circulation  reduced,  and  the  temperature  of  the  body 
is  lowered. 

By  degrees  these  morbid  states  take  form,  organize 
themselves,  concentrate  themselves  in  some  wrong 
conception,  which — having  been  excited  by  the  psy- 
cho-physiological mechanism  of  association — in  its 
turn  becomes  a  centre  of  attraction  toward  which 
everything  converges.  One  patient  will  say  that  his 
heart  has  become  petrified,  another  that  his  nerves 
are  like  burning  coals,  etc.  These  aberrations  have 
innumerable  forms,  and  vary  according  to  individuals. 
In  extreme  cases  the  individual  will  doubt  his  own  ex- 
istence, or  deny  it.  A  young  man,  while  maintaining 
that  he  had  been  dead  for  two  years,  expressed  his 
perplexity  in  the  following  words  :    "I  exist,  but  out- 

*  Griesinger,  Traite  des  maladies  mentales.      Fr.  trans,  p.   265.     V Ence- 
J>hale.     June,  1882. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  59 

side  of  real  material  life  and  despite  myself,  for  noth- 
ing has  really  killed  me.  Everything  in  me  is  mechan- 
ical, and  takes  place  unconsciously."  Is  not  this  con- 
tradictory situation,  in  which  the  subject  claims  to  be 
alive  and  dead  at  the  same  time,  the  logical  and  nat- 
ural expression  of  a  state  in  which  the  old  ego  and  the 
new,  vitality  and  annihilation  seem  to  keep  in  equili- 
brium ? 

Still,  the  psychological  interpretation  of  all  these 
cases  is  not  doubtful.  They  are  organic  disturbances, 
the  first  result  of  which  is  to  depress  the  faculty  of 
feeling  in  general,  and  the  second  effect  is  to  pervert 
it.  In  this  manner  there  is  formed  a  group  of  organic 
and  psychic  conditions  that  tend  profoundly  to  mod- 
ify the  constitution  of  the  ego  in  its  inmost  nature, 
because  they  do  not  act  after  the  manner  of  sudden 
emotions,  the  effect  of  which  is  violent  and  superficial, 
but  by  slow,  silent  actions  of  unconquerable  tenacity. 
At  first  this  new  mode  of  being  seems  strange  or  ex- 
traneous to  the  individual  and  outside  of  his  ego.  By 
slow  degrees,  however,  and  through  habit,  this  new 
feeling  insinuates  itself  into  and  becomes  an  integral 
part  of  the  ego,  changes  its  constitution,  and  when  of 
an  overpowering  nature,  entirely  transforms  it. 

In  perceiving  how  the  ego  is  dissolved,  we  under- 
stand also  how  it  is  made.  In  most  instances,  doubtless, 
the  alteration  is  only  partial.  The  individual,  while 
seeming  to  become  another  to  himself,  and  to  those 
who  know  him,  still  preserves  a  fundamental  feeling 
of  himself.  In  fact,  complete  transformation  can  only 
be  a  very  rare  occurrence  ;  and  we  may  besides  ob- 
serve, that  whenever  a  patient  maintains  that  he  is 
changed  or  transformed,  he  is  actually  right,  notwith- 
standing  the  denials  or  hilarity  of  his  friends.      He 


6o  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

really  cannot  feel  otherwise,  because  his  consciousness 
is  but  the  expression  of  his  organic  state.  Subjec- 
tively he  is  not  the  sport  of  any  illusion  ;  he  is  merely 
what  he  ought  to  be.  On  the  contrary  it  is  the  un- 
conscious unacknowledged  hypothesis  of  an  independ- 
ent ego, — existing  by  itself  as  an  unalterable  entity, — 
which  instinctively  urges  him  to  believe,  that  this, 
change  is  only  an  external  event,  a  strange  or  ridicu- 
lous garb  in  which  his  personality  has  been  wrapped,, 
while  in  reality  the  change  is  internal,  and  implies, 
certain  losses  and  acquisitions  in  the  substance  of  the 

ego  itself. 

* 
*  * 

The  counterpart  of  these  partial  alterations  is  met 
with  in  cases  where  the  ego  is  exalted  and  elated, 
and  ascends  extremely  far  above  its  normal  tone- 
Instances  of  this  are  found  at  the  beginning  of  general 
paralysis,  in  certain  cases  of  mania,  during  the  excited 
period  of  so-called  "cyclic"  insanity.  It  forms  alto- 
gether the  inverse  of  the  previous  picture.  Here  we  have 
a  feeling  of  physical  and  moral  well-being,  superabun- 
dant strength,  exuberant  activity,  which  vents  itself 
with  reckless  prodigality  in  speeches,  projects,  enter- 
prises, and  incessant,  fruitless  journeys.  To  this  super- 
excitation  of  the  ps5^chic  life  corresponds  an  over- 
activity of  all  the  organic  functions.  Nutrition  in- 
creases— often  at  an  exaggerated  rate — respiration 
and  circulation  are  quickened,  the  genital  function  is 
aroused ;  and  notwithstanding  a  great  expenditure  of 
force  the  individual  does  not  feel  any  fatigue.  After- 
wards these  several  states  group  themselves,  become 
unified  and  finally  to  a  considerable  extent  transform 
the  ego.  One  individual  may  feel  a  herculean  strength, 
and  be  able  to  lift  prodigious  weights,  procreate  thou- 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  6i 

sands  of  children,  race  with  a  railway-train,  etc.     An- 
other  subject   is   an   inexhaustible   mine   of   learning, 
imagines  himself  a  great  poet,  artist,  or  inventor.      At 
times   the   transformation   approaches   still   nearer  to 
complete   metamorphosis  ;    and  then  the   subject,  en- 
tirely   engrossed    with    the  ^  feeHng   of   his   matchless 
power,  proclaims  himself  pope,  emperor,  god.     "The 
patient,"  as  Griesinger  justly  observes,  "feeling  proud, 
bold,  cheerful;   discovering   in   himself   an   unwonted 
freedom  in  all  his  decisions;   and  moreover,   feeing 
the  super-abundance  of  his  thoughts,  is  naturally  prone 
to  ideas  of  grandeur,  rank,  riches,  or  some  great  moral 
or  intellectual  power,  which  alone  can  have  the  same 
degree  of   freedom,  of  thought,  and  will.     This  exag- 
gerated idea  of  force  and  of  freedom  must  neverthe- 
less have  a  motive ;  there  must  exist  in  the  ego  some- 
thing that  corresponds  to  it;  the  ego  must  momentarily 
have  become  entirely  another;   and  the  patient  knows 
no  other  way  of  expressing  this  change,  than  by  pro- 
claiming himself  a  Napoleon,  a  Messiah,  or  some  other 
exalted  being."  * 

It  would  be  a  mere  waste  of  time  to  endeavor  to 
show,  that  this  transformation  of  the  ego,  whether 
partial  or  complete,  momentary  or  permanent,  is  of 
the  same  nature  as  in  the  preceding  instances,  and 
that  it  assumes  the  same  mechanism,  with  this  sole 
difference  that  here  the  ego  is  dissolved  in  the  inverse 
sense,  not  through  defect  but  through  excess. 

These  alterations  of   personality  into  more  or  less, 

■this  metamorphosis  of  the  ego,  which  either  raises  or 

lowers  it,  would  be   even   more   remarkable   if  in  the 

same  individual  they  followed  at  regular  intervals.   As 

a  matter   of   fact,  an   instance  of  this  very  frequently 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  333. 


62  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

happens  in  so-called  '^  cyclic  "  madness,  or  insanity  in. 
double  form,  essentially  characterized  by  successive 
periods  of  depression  and  excitement,  following  each 
other  at  regular  intervals,  and  in  some  patients  with  oc- 
casional intermissions  of  lucidity.  And  then  the  fol- 
lowing strange  fact  may  be  witnessed.  Upon  what 
might  be  called  the  primitive  and  fundamental  per- 
sonality, of  which  there  still  remain  a  few  greatly 
altered  fragments,  are  grafted  by  turns  two  new^ 
personalities — not  only  quite  distinct,  but  which 
wholly  exclude  each  other.  Here  it  is  indispensable 
to  give  a  summary  of  certain  observations  on  the  sub- 
ject.* 

A  woman,  observed  by  Morel,  had  been  abandoned 
by  her  mother  to  a  life  of  vice  from  the  age  of  fourteen 
years.  ''Later  in  her  career,  a  prey  to  every  pang  of 
shame  and  wretchedness,  she  had  no  other  resource 
than  to  enter  a  house  of  ill-fame.  A  year  afterwards 
she  was  rescued  from  it  and  placed  in  the  convent  of 
the  Good  Shepherd,  at  Metz.  There  she  remained  for 
two  years,  and  the  too  intense  reaction  in  her  feelings 
which  occurred  resulted  in  the  outburst  of  a  religious 
mania,  which  was  followed  by  a  period  of  profound 
stupidity."  It  is  then,  while  under  the  treatment  of 
the  physician,  she  passes  through  alternate  periods 
during  which  she  imagines  herself  by  turns  a  prosti- 
tute and  a  nun.  On  coming  out  of  the  period  of  stu- 
pidity, ''she  resumes  her  work  with  regularity,  speaks 
with  becoming  propriety ;  but  at  the  same  time  ar- 
ranges her  toilet  with  a  certain  coquetry.  The  latter 
tendency  thereupon  increases,  her  eyes  become  spark- 
ling, her   glances   lascivious,    she   dances    and   sings. 

*  They  will  be  found  in  extenso  in  Ritti,  Traite  clinique  de  lafolie  h  double 
forme.     Paris,  1883,  observations  XVII,  XIX,  XXX,  and  XXXI. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  63 

Finally  the  obscenity  of  her  utterances  And  her  erotic 
solicitations  necessitate  her  solitary  confinement.  She 
gives  herself  the  name  of  Mme.  Poulmaire,  and  fur- 
nishes the  most  cynical  details  of  her  former  state  of 
prostitution."  Then  again  after  a  period  of  depres- 
sion ''she  becomes  meek  and  timid;  and  evinces  the 
most  scrupulous  decency  in  her  demeanor.  She  ar- 
ranges her  toilet  with  extreme  severity.  The  intona- 
tion of  her  voice  is  peculiar.  She  speaks  of  the  con- 
vent of  the  Good  Shepherd  at  Metz  and  of  her  desire 
to  return  there ;  she  now  calls  herself  Sister  Martha 
of  the  Five  Wounds,  Theresa  of  Jesus,  Sister  Mary  of 
the  Resurrection.  She  refrains  from  speaking  in  the 
first  person  :  says  to  the  sisters,  Take  our  dress,  this 
is  our  pocket-handkerchief.  Nothing  now  belongs  to 
her  personally  (according  to  the  rule  of  Catholic  con- 
vents.) .  .  .  She  sees  angels  who  smile  upon  her,  and 
has  moments  of  ecstacy. " 

In  another  instance  reported  by  Krafft-Ebing,  a 
neuropathic  patient  of  insane  parentage,  ''was  during 
the  period  of  depression  disgusted  with  the  world, 
preoccupied  with  the  thought  of  approaching  death, 
and  of  eternity,  and  then  thought  of  becoming  a  priest. 
During  the  maniacal  periods  he  is  turbulent,  studies 
furiously,  will  not  hear  a  word  more  about  theology, 
and  only  thinks  of  practicing  medicine." 

An  insane  woman  of  Charenton,  of  a  .very  distin- 
guished and  highly  gifted  mind,  would  change  "from 
day  to  day  in  person,  condition,  and  even  in  sex.  At 
one  time  she  would  be  a  princess  of  royal  blood,  be- 
trothed to  an  emperor  ;  at  another  time  a  woman  of 
the  people  and  democratic ;  to-day  married  and  en- 
ceinte ;  to-morrow  once  more  a  maiden.  She  would 
even   at  times   believe   herself   to  be  a  man  ;   and  one 


64  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

day  she  imagined  herself  a  political  prisoner  of  im- 
portance, and  composed  verses  upon  the  subject." 

Finally  in  the  following  case  we  find  the  complete 
formation  of  a  second  personality.  ''A  lunatic,  an  in- 
mate of  the  asylum  at  Vanves, "  says  Billod,*  ^' about 
every  eighteen  months  would  let  his  beard  grow  and 
introduce  himself  to  the  whole  house,  quite  changed  in 
dress  and  manners,  as  a  lieutenant  of  artillery,  named 
Nabon,  recently  arrived  from  Africa,  to  become  a  sub- 
stitute for  his  own  brother.  He  would  say,  that  be- 
fore leaving  his  brother  had  imparted  to  him  infor- 
mation respecting  everyone ;  and  at  his  arrival  he 
would  ask  and  obtain  the  honor  of  being  introduced 
to  each  person  present.  The  patient  thereafter  for 
several  months  remained  in  a  state  of  marked  exalta- 
tion, adapting  his  whole  conduct  to  his  new  individu- 
ality. At  the  expiration  of  a  certain  time,  he  would 
announce  the  return  of  his  brother,  who,  as  he  said, 
was  in  the  village  and  would  come  to  replace  him. 
Then  one  day  he  would  have  his  beard  shaved  off, 
change  his  dress  and  manner,  and  resume  his  real 
name.  But  then  he  would  exhibit  a  marked  expression 
of  melancholy,  walking  along  slowly,  silent,  and  soli- 
tary, usually  reading  the  Imitation  of  Jesus  Christ,  and 
the  Fathers  of  the  Church.  In  this  mental  state — a 
lucid  one  perhaps,  but  one  that  I  am  far  from  con- 
sidering as  normal — he  would  remain  until  the  return 
of  the  imaginary  Lieutenant  Nabon." 

The  two  first  of  the  above-mentioned  cases  con- 
clusively show  an  exaggeration,  a  considerable  aug- 
mentation of  what  takes  place  in  the  normal  state. 
The  ego  of  all  of  us  is  made  up  of  contradictory  ten- 
dencies, such  as  virtues  and  vices,  modesty  and  pride, 

*  Annates  fnedico-psychologiques ^  1858,  according  to  Ritti  op.  cit.,  p.  156. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  65 

avarice  and  prodigality,  desire  for  rest  and  craving  for 
action,  and  many  others.  In  the  ordinary  state  these 
opposite  tendencies  are  balanced,  or,  at  least,  that 
which  prevails  is  not  without  a  counterpoise.  But 
here,  through  very  well  determined  organic  condi- 
tions, there  is  not  only  an  impossibility  of  equilibrium, 
but  a  group  of  tendencies  is  hypertrophied  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  antagonist  group,  which  is  atrophied  ; 
then  a  reaction  takes  place  in  an  inverse  sense,  so  that 
the  personality,  instead  of  consisting  of  those  average 
oscillations  of  which  each  represents  one  side  of  hu- 
man nature,  passes  constantly  from  one  excess  to  the 
other.  Incidentally  we  may  observe  that  these  diseases 
of  personality  consist  in  a  reduction  to  a  more  simple 
condition.  But  this  is  not  the  place  to  insist  on  this 
point. 

II. 

Nutrition  being  less  a  function  than  the  basic  prop- 
erty of  all  that  lives,  it  follows  that  the  tendencies 
and  feelings  that  are  connected  with  it  have  a  very 
general  character.  The  same  does  not  apply  to  the 
preservation  of  the  species.  This  function,  connected 
with  a  determinate  part  of  the  organism,  reveals  itself 
hy  feelings  of  a  very  precise  character.  Accordingly 
it  is  highly  adapted  to  the  purpose  of  verifying  our 
thesis.  For  if  personality  is  a  compound,  varying  ac- 
cording to  its  constituent  elements,  a  change  in  the 
sexual  instincts  will  change  it,  a  perversion  will  per- 
vert it,  an  inversion  will  invert  it;  and  this  is  just  what 
occurs. 

In  the  first  place,  let  us  call  to  mind  certain  facts 
which  are  .well  known,  although  the  conclusions  which 
they  would  seem   to  impose   are  not  generally  drawn 


66  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

from  them.  At  the  period  of  puberty,  a  new  group  of 
sensations,  and  in  consequence  new  feelings  and  ideas 
are  developed.  This  afflux  of  unaccustomed  psychic 
states — stable,  because  their  cause  is  stable,  co-ordinate 
among  themselves  because  their  source  is  the  same — 
tends  profoundly  to  modify  the  constitution  of  the  ego. 
It  feels  itself  undecided,  tortured  by  a  vague,  latent 
distemper,  the  cause  of  which  is  not  understood  j  by 
degrees  these  new  elements  of  the  moral  life  are  as- 
similated by  the  old  ego,  enter  into  it,  become  a  part 
of  it,  but  at  the  same  time  make  it  a  different  one. 
The  ego  is  changed  ;  a  partial  alteration  of  the  per- 
sonality has  been  accomplished,  the  result  of  which 
has  been  to  constitute  a  new  type  of  character — the 
sexual  character.  This  development  of  an  organ  and 
its  functions  with  their  train  of  instincts,  images,  sen- 
timents, and  ideas,  has  produced  in  the  neutral  per- 
sonality of  the  child  a  differentiation,  has  made  of  it  a 
male  or  a  female,  in  the  complete  sense.  Until  this 
period  there  had  existed  only  the  foundation  of  it,  by 
virtue  of  which,  however,  the  change  could  be  effected 
without  a  sudden  shock,  without  a  break  between  the 
past  and  the  present,  and  without  a  complete  change 
of  personality. 

If  now  we  pass  from  the  normal  development  to 
exceptional  and  morbid  cases,  we  find  certain  varia- 
tions or  transformations  of  personality  connected  with 
the  state  of  the  genital  organs. 

The  effect  of  castration  upon  animals  is  well  known. 
It  is  not  less  marked  upon  man.  Leaving  aside  a  few 
exceptions  (some  of  which  are  recorded  in  history), 
eunuchs  represent  a  deviation  from  the  psychic  type. 
According  to  Maudsley,  they  are  selfish,  cunning,  de- 
^ceitful,  liars,   destitute  of  moral  sentiment,  and  fur- 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  67 

thermore  exhibit  marked  impairment  of  intellectual 
vigor.  '^^  Whether  this  moral  degradation  directly  results 
from  castration,  as  certain  authors  maintain,  or  in- 
directly from  an  equivocal  social  position,  matters 
little,  for  our  thesis  :  whether  directly  or  indirectly, 
the  cause  remains  the  same. 

With  hermaphrodites  experience  corroborates  what 
might  have  been  predicted  a  priori.  With  the  ap- 
pearances of  one  sex  they  present  some  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  the  other  ;  but  far  from  combining  both 
functions  they  only  exhibit  incomplete  organs  usually 
destitute  of  sexual  function.  Their  moral  character 
is  sometimes  neutral,  sometimes  masculine,  and  at 
other  times  feminine.  Abundant  instances  of  this  are 
found  in  writers  who  have  studied  the  question. f 
^'Sometimes  the  hermaphrodite,  after  showing  a  lively 
inclination  for  women,  manifests  through  the  sudden 
descent  of  the  testicles  completely  opposite  instincts." 
In  a  recent  case  observed  by  Dr.  Magitot,  an  hermaph- 
rodite woman  evinced  alternately  very  pronounced 
feminine  and  masculine  tastes.  ''In  general  the  emo- 
tional faculties  and  the  moral  dispositions  experience 
the  counter-effect  of  the  defective  conformation  of  the 
organs."  Still,  as  Tardieu  observes,  ''it  is  only  fair 
that  we  should  make  a  large  allowance  for  the  influence 
of  the  habits  and  occupations  that  the  mistake  made 
as  to  their  real  sex  has  forced  upon  the  individuals. 
Some  males  who  from  the  first  had  been  dressed,  edu- 
cated, employed,  and  sometimes  married  as  females, 
retained  the  thoughts,  habits,  and  manners  of  women. 
Such   was   the   case   of   Maria   Arsano,    who   died   at 

*  Pathology  of  Mind,  p.  454. 

+  As  regards  the  facts,  see  Isid.  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire  :  Histoire  des  ano- 
malies, t.  II.  p.  65  and  following.  Tardieu  and  Laugier,  Dictionnaire  de  medi- 
cine, art.  "  Hermaphrodisme,"  etc. 


68  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

eighty  years  of  age,  and  who  in  reaHty  was  a  man,  but 
whose  character  had  been  rendered  effeminate  by 
habits." 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  review  the  perversions  or 
aberrations  of  the  sexual  instinct,*  each  of  which 
stamps  its  mark  upon  personality,  affects  it  more  or 
less  either  transiently  or  permanently.  As  a  culminat- 
ing point  of  these  partial  alterations  we  have  the  total 
transformation,  the  change  of  sex.  There  are  numer- 
ous instances  of  this,  and  the  following  may  serve  as 
a  type.  Lallemant  relates  "the  fact  of  a  patient, 
who  believed  himself  to  be  a  woman,  and  used  to  write 
letters  to  an  imaginary  lover.  At  the  autopsy  it  was 
discovered  that  hypertrophy  with  induration  of  the 
prostate  gland  had  taken  place,  and  impairment  of 
the  ejaculatory  ducts. "  It  is  probable  that  in  many 
cases  of  this  kind  perversion  or  abolition  of  the  sex- 
ual sensations  has  occurred. 

I  must,  however,  point  out  a  few  exceptions.  Sev- 
eral detailed  observations,  (which  may  be  found  in 
Leuret,  Frag77ients psych,  p.  114  and  following,)  show 
us  individuals,  who  assume  the  carriage,  the  habits, 
the  voice,  and  when  they  are  able,  the  dress  of  the  sex 
they  imagine  themselves  to  belong  to,  yet  without  ex- 
hibiting any  anatomical  or  physiological  anomaly  of 
the  sexual  organs.  In  cases  of  this  kind  the  starting- 
point  of  the  metamorphosis  must  have  its  seat  else- 
where. And  this  can  only  be  in  the  cerebro-spinal 
organ.  In  fact,  we  may  observe,  that  whatever  has 
been  said  of  the  sexual  organ  as  constituting  or  modi- 
fying personality  must  not  be  understood  simply  of 

*  For  the  complete  exposition  of  this  question  see  the  article  of  Dr.  Gley 
"Sur  les  aberrations  de  I'instinct  sexuel,"  in  the  Revue  philosophiqtie  for 
January,  1884. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  69 

the  organ  itself  as  defined  by  its  anatomic  conforma- 
tion ;  it  applies  also  to  its  connection  with  the  brain, 
where  it  is  represented.  Physiologists  place  the 
genito-spinal  reflex  centre  in  the  lumbar  region  of 
the  cord.  From  this  centre  to  the  brain  nothing 
with  regard  to  the  activity  and  the  seat  of  the  function 
is  known ;  for  the  hypothesis  of  Gall,  who  made  the 
cerebellum  the  seat  of  physical  love,  notwithstanding 
a  few  favorable  observations  of  Budge  and  of  Lussana, 
has  not  been  widely  accepted.  Whatever  may  be  our 
ignorance  upon  this  point,  it  is  evident  that  the  sexual 
impressions  must  reach  the  brain,  since  they  are 
felt,  and  because  there  are  centres  from  whence  the 
psychic  incitations  are  transmitted  to  the  sexual  or- 
gans, in  order  to  arouse  them  into  action.  These 
nerve-elements,  whatever  be  their  nature,  number,  or 
seat,  whether  they  are  localized  or  diffused,  must  be 
the  cerebral,  and  consequently  the  psychic,  represen- 
tatives of  the  sexual  organs  ;  and  as  in  creating  a  par- 
ticular state  of  consciousness,  others  are  usually  ex- 
cited, there  must  needs  exist  an  association  between 
this  group  of  psycho-physiological  states  and  a  cer- 
tain number  of  other  groups.  From  the  above-men- 
tioned cases,  we  must,  accordingly,  infer  that  there  is 
produced  a  cerebral  disturbance  of  unknown  nature, 
(a  woman  believing  herself  a  man,  a  man  believing 
himself  a  woman,)  the  result  of  which  is  a  fixed  and 
erroneous  state  of  consciousness.  This  fixed,  exclu- 
sively predominant  state  thereupon  produces  a  num- 
ber of  almost  automatic  natural  associations,  which 
are,  as  it  were,  its  radiations  (feelings,  carriage,  lan- 
guage, dress  of  the  imaginary  sex):  it  tends  to  com- 
plete itself.  It  is  a  metamorphosis  which  proceeds 
from  above,  and  not   from  below.      Here  we  have  an 


70  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

instance  of  what  is  called  the  influence  of  the  moral 
over  the  physical  nature ;  and  we  shall  try  to  show 
later  on  that  the  ego  discussed  by  the  majority'  of 
psychologists,  (it  is  not  here  the  question  of  the  real 
ego?)  is  formed  according  to  an  analogous  process. 
These  cases,  however,  belong  to  the  intellectual  devia- 
tions of  personality,  of  which  we  shall  speak  in  the 
next  chapter. 

Before  taking  leave  of  this  subject,  I  should  not  like 
to  leave   unnoticed   a  few   matters  of  fact  which   are 
difficult  to  explain,  yet  which  cannot  be  seriously  ad- 
vanced against  us.      I  allude  to  the  singular  phenom- 
enon called  '^  opposite  sexuality"  {sexualite  co7ttraire~), 
which  has  been   quite    frequently   discussed   of  late, 
and   which  it  will  suffice   to  mention  in  a   few  words. 
Certain  patients  observed  by  Westphal,  Krafft  Ebing, 
Charcot    and     Magnan,    Servaes,    Gock,*    etc.,     dis- 
play   a    congenital  inversion    of    the    sexual   instinct, 
whence  there  results,  notwithstanding  a  normal  phys- 
ical constitution,  an   instinctive  and  violent  attraction 
for  a  person  of  the   same  sex,  with  a  marked  aversion 
for  the  opposite  sex;   briefly,  ''a  woman  is  physically 
a  woman,  and  psychically  a  man,  a  man  is  physically  a 
man  and   psychically  a  woman."     Such  facts  are  in 
complete  disaccord  with  all  that  logic  and  experience 
teach   us.      The  physical  and   moral   contradict  each 
other.      Strictly  speaking,  those  who  maintain  the  en- 
tity of  the  ego,  might  avail  themselves  of  these  anom- 
alies, and  assert  that  they  prove  its  independence,  its 
autonomous  existence.  This,  however,  would  be  a  great 
mistake,  for  their  entire  reasoning  would  rest  upon  two 
very  weak  foundations,  upon  facts  which  are  very  un- 

*  Charcot  and  Magnan,  Archives  de  Neurologie,  1882,  Nos.  7  and  12 ;  West- 
phal, Archiv  fiir  Psychiatric,  1870  and  1876.     Krafft-Ebing,  Ibid.  1877,  etc. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  71 

common,  and  the  present  difficulty  of  explaining  them. 
Nobody  will  deny  that  the  cases  of  opposite  sexuality 
represent  an  infinitely  small  fraction  of  the  sum  of  the 
cases  furnished  by  experience.  By  their  very  rarity 
they  are  exceptions  ;  by  their  nature  a  psychological 
monstrosity;  still,  monstrosities  are  not  miracles,  and 
it  is  necessary  to  know  whence  they  originate. 

One  might  attempt  several  explanations,  which 
usually  means  that  none  of  them  is  really  sufficient.  I 
shall  refrain  from  inflicting  any  upon  the  reader.  Psy- 
chology, like  every  other  science  must  submit  to  a 
provisory  ignorance  concerning  a  number  of  points,  and 
need  not  be  afraid  to  admit  it.  In  this  respect  it  widely 
differs  from  metaphysics,  which  pretends  to  explain 
everything.  Scientists  who  have  studied  these  strange 
beings  from  the  exclusive  point  of  view  of  medical 
science,  regard  them  as  degenerate  beings.  To  us 
the  curious  point  at  issue  is  to  know  why  this  degen- 
eracy should  have  assumed  this  particular  form  and 
not  some  other.  It  is  probable  that  the  clearing  up  of 
this  mystery  must  be  sought  for  in  the  multiple  ele 
ments  of  heredity,  in  the  complicated  play  of  conflict- 
ing male  and  female  influences ;  but  I  shall  leave  this 
task  to  more  clear-sighted  and  fortunate  individuals. 
Setting  aside  the  question  of  causes,  it  is  altogether 
impossible  to  refuse  to  admit  an  aberration  of  the  cereb- 
ral mechanism,  as  in  the  cases  of  Leuret  and  analogous 
cases.  However,  the  influence  of  the  sexual  organs 
upon  the  nature  and  formation  of  character  is  so  little 
contested  that  to  dilate  longer  upon  the  subject  would 
be  time  wasted,  and  any  hypothetical  explanation  of 
opposite  sexuality  would  not  in  the  least  advance  our 
present  researches. 


72  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


I 

III. 


The  instincts,  desires,  tendencies,  and  feelings  re- 
lating to  the  preservation  of  the  individual  and  to  that  of 
the  species  have  their  well-determined  material  condi- 
tions— the  former  in  the  totalit}^  of  organic  life  and 
the  latter  in  a  particular  part  of  ,it.  But  when  from 
the  primitive  and  fundamental  forms  of  emotional  life 
we  pass  to  those  that  are  of  secondary  formation,  born 
later  in  the  course  of  evolution  (social,,  moral,  intel- 
lectual, aesthetic  tendencies),  beside  the  impossibility  of 
assigning  to  these  their  immediate  organic  basis, — a 
circumstance  that  would  cause  us  to  grope  our  way  in 
darkness, — we  observe  that  they  have  not  the  same 
degree  of  generality.  With  the  exception,  perhaps, 
of  the  moral  and  social  tendencies,  none  of  them  ex- 
presses the  individual  in  its  totality;  they  are  partial  and 
only  represent  a  group  in  the  totality  of  its  tendencies. 
Hence  no  one  of  them  by  itself  alone  has  the  power 
of  producing  a  metamorphosis  of  the  personality.  So 
long  as  the  habitude  called  the  bodily  sense,  and  that 
other  habitude  which  is  memiory,  are  not  brought 
into  play,  a  complete  transformation  does  not  take 
place  :  the  individual  may  become  changed;  it  cannot 
become  another. 

Still  these  variations,  even  when  partial,  have  an 
interest  of  their  own.  They  show  the  transition  from 
the  normal  to  the  morbid  state.  In  studying  the  di- 
seases of  the  will  we  found  in  ordinary  life  many  pre- 
dictions of  the  most  serious  forms.  Here  likewise 
common  observation  shows  us  that  the  normal  ego  is 
but  slightly  endowed  with  cohesion  and  unity.  Irre- 
spective of  characters  that  are  perfectly  concordant, 
(which  in  a  rigorous  sense  of  the  word  do  not  exist,) 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  J2> 

there  are  in  every  one  of  us  all  sorts  of  tendencies,  all 
possible  antitheses,  and   among  these  contradictions, 
all  kinds   of  intermediate   shades,    and   among  those 
tendencies   every  possible  combination.      This  is  be- 
cause the  ego  is  not  only  a  memory,  a  store-house  of 
recollections  connected  with   the  present,  but   an   ag- 
gregate   of   instincts,    tendencies,    desires,    which  are 
merely  its   innate   and   acquired  constitution  coming 
into  play.      To   use   expressions   much    in   vogue,  we 
might  say  that  memory  is  the  static,  and  the  group  of 
tendencies    the    dynamic    ego.      If,    instead   of   being 
guided   unconsciously  by  this    conception   of  an  ego- 
entity, — a  prejudice  that  has  been   strengthened  in  us 
by  education  and  the  supposed  evidence  of  conscious- 
ness,— we  simply  agreed  to  take  it  for  such  as  it  is,  to 
wit,    as   a   co-ordination    of    tendencies    and    psychic 
states,  the  relative  cause  of  which  ought  to  be  sought 
in  the  co-ordination  and  the   consensus  of  the  organ- 
ism, we  should  no  more  wonder  at  these  oscillations, — 
incessant  in  flighty  characters  but  rare  in  steady  dis- 
positions,— which,  during  a  long,  short,  or  almost  im- 
perceptible  space   of   time,    show  us    the    person    in 
a  new  light.      An  organic  state,  an  external  influence 
strengthens  a  tendency  ;  the   latter  becomes  a  centre 
of  attraction   toward  which  converge   the  states   and 
tendencies  that  are  directly  associated  with  it ;  there- 
upon  the   associations   draw  nearer   and  nearer  :   the 
centre  of  gravity  of  the  ego  is   displaced,  and  the  per- 
sonality  has   become    another.       "Two   souls,"    said 
Goethe,    ''dwell  within   my  breast."     Only  two  !      If 
moralists,  poets,  novelists,  dramatists  have   shown  us 
to  satiety  these  two  egos  in  a  state  of  conflict  within 
the   same  ego,  common   experience  .is  still  richer ;  it 
shows  us  several,    each   one   excluding  the   other,  as 


74  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

soon  as  it  advances  to  the  front.  This  may  be  less 
dramatic,  but  it  is  more  true.  ''Our  ego  at  diverse 
epochs  is  very  different  from  itself :  according  to  age, 
the  various  duties  and  events  of  life,  the  excitations 
of  the  moment,  a  certain  complexus  of  ideas,  which  at 
a  given  moment  represents  the  ego,  develops  itself 
over  and  above  all  others,  and  advances  to  the  front. 
We  become  another  and  yet  are  the  same.  My  ego  as 
a  physician,  as  a  scholar,  my  sensual  ego,  my  moral 
ego,  etc. ,  that  is,  the  complexus  of  ideas,  of  inclinations,, 
and  of  directions  of  the  will  that  are  designated  by 
these  terms,  may  at  any  given  moment  enter  into  op- 
position and  repel  each  other.  This  circumstance 
would  have  for  a  result,  not  only  the  inconsistency  and 
separation  of  the  thought  and  of  the  will,  but  also  the 
complete  absence  of  energy  for  each  of  these  isolated 
phases  of  the  ego,  if,  in  all  these  spheres  there  was 
not  a  more  or  less  clear  return  for  the  consciousness 
of  some  of  these  fundamental  directions."  *  The  ora- 
tor, master  of  his  eloquence  who  while  speaking 
judges  himself,  the  actor  beholding  himself  play,  the 
psychologist  studying  himself,  are  also  instances  of  this 
normal  separation  in  the  ego. 

Between  these  momentary  and  partial  transforma- 
tions, the  trivial  nature  of  which  diminishes  their  im- 
portance as  psychological  proofs,  and  the  serious 
states,  of  which  we  shall  speak,  there  are  other  inter- 
mediate variations  more  constant,  more  penetrating, 
or  both.  The  dipsomaniac,  for  example,  has  two  al- 
ternate lives  ;  in  the  one  he  is  sober,  methodical,  in- 
dustrious j  in  the  other  he  is   entirely  swayed  by  his 


*  Griesinger,  Traitedes  maladies  mentales'^  trans.  Doumic,  p.  55.  See 
also  an  excellent  study  by  M.  Paulhan  on  "  The  variations  of  personality  in- 
the  normal  state,"  June  1882,  in  the  Revue philosophique. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  75 

passion,  improvident,  disorderly,  dissipated.  Have  we 
not  here  as  it  were  two  incomplete  and  contrary  individ- 
uals welded  together  in  one  common  trunk  ?  The  same 
happens  in  the  case  of  all  persons  who  are  subject  to 
irresistible  impulses,  who  insist  that  a  mysterious 
power  impels  them  to  act  in  spite  of  themselves.  Let 
us  moreover  recall  to  mind  those  transformations  of 
character  that  are  accompanied  by  cutaneous  anaes- 
thesia, and  which  have  been  observed  by  several 
alienists.  One  of  the  most  curious  of  such  cases  was 
observed  by  Renaudin.  A  certain  young  man  whose 
conduct  .had  always  been  exemplary  suddenly  aban- 
dons himself  to  tendencies  of  the  worst  kind.  In  his 
mental  condition  it  was  impossible  to  verify  any  symp- 
tom of  manifest  alienation,  but  one  could  see  that  the 
entire  surface  of  his  skin  had  become  absolutely  insen- 
sible. The  cutaneous  anaesthesia  was  intermittent. 
''As  soon  as  it  ceases,  the  inclinations  of  the  young 
man  are  entirely  different ;  he  is  docile,  affectionate, 
and  understands  thoroughly  the  painful  character  of 
his  condition.  When  it  manifests  itself,  the  resistless 
power  of  the  worst  inclinations  is  its  immediate  con- 
sequence, and  we  have  proof  that  it  could  proceed 
as  far  as  murder."  Maudsley  reports  certain  anal- 
ogous cases  of  insanity  in  children,  that  suggested  to 
him  the  following  reflections  :  ''The  special  defective 
sensibiHty  of  skin  in  these  cases  is  full  of  instruction 
in  relation  to  the  profound  and  general  defect  or  per- 
version of  the  sensibility  or  receptive  capacity  of  the 
whole  nervous  system  which  is  shown  in  their  per- 
verted likings  and  dislikes,  in  their  inability  to  join 
with  other  children  in  play  or  work,  and  in  the  impos- 
sibility to  modify  their  characters  by  disciphne ;  they 
cannot  feel  impressions  as  they  naturally  should  feel 


76  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

them  nor  adjust  themselves  to  their  surroundings, 
with  which  they  are  in  discord  ;  and  the  motor  out- 
comes of  the  perverted  affections  of  self  are  accord- 
ingly of  a  meaningless  and  destructive  character.  The 
insensibility  of  skin  is  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of 
a  corresponding  inward  and  invisible  defect,  as  it  no- 
tably is  also  in  idiocy."* 

We  inevitably  revert  to  the  organism,  but  this 
review  we  have  made  of  facts  of  every  kind  which 
may  seem  monotonous,  shows  us  the  variations  of 
personality  in  all  its  aspects.  As  there  are  no  two 
identical  cases,  each  case  presents  a  peculiar  decom- 
position of  the  ego.  The  cases  last  quoted  show  us 
a  transformation  of  character  without  injury  to  mem- 
or}^  In  proportion  as  we  advance  in  our  review  of  mat- 
ters of  fact,  one  conclusion,  as  it  were,  becomes  more 
and  more  apparent  to  our  minds  ;  it  is  ihsit  pej'sonality 
results  from  two  fundamental  factors,  the  constitution  of 
the  body  with  the  tendencies  and  sentimerits  that  manifest 
it,  a7id  the  memory. 

If  (as  said  above)  only  the  first  factor  is  modified, 
there  results  a  momentary  dissociation,  followed  by  a 
partial  change  of  the  ego.  If  the  modification  is  so 
serious,  that  the  organic  bases  of  memory  undergo  a 
kind  of  paralysis,  from  which  they  cannot  revive,  then 
the  disintegration  of  the  personality  is  complete  :  there 
is  no  longer  a  memory  of  the  past,  and  the  present  has 
taken  a  new  form.  Then  a  new  ego  is  formed,  usually 
quite  unconscious  of  the  former  ego.  Of  these  we 
have  several  examples,  so  well  known,  that  I  shall 
merely  mention  them  :  the  American  lady  reported  by 
Macnish,  the  case  of  Dr.  Azam  (Felida),  and  the  case 

*  Maudsley,  p.  287. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  77 

of  Dr.  Dufay.*  By  their  very  generality  these  cases  do 
not  come  under  any  special  division,  and  we  have 
no  reason  to  mention  them  here  rather  than  elsewhere, 
except  to  remark,  that  the  transition  from  one  per- 
sonality to  another  is  always  accompanied  by  a  change 
of  character,  undoubtedly  connected  with  the  un- 
known organic  change  which  rules  the  whole  situa- 
tion. This  change  is  very  distinctly  and  repeatedly 
pointed  out  by  Dr.  Azam  :  his  patient  during  a  certain 
period  is  gloomy,  cold,  reserved,  but  at  other  times 
gay,  buoyant  even  to  the  verge  of  turbulence.  This 
change  is  even  still  greater  in  the  following  case,  and 
which  I  shall  report  more  fully,  because  it  is  recent 
and  but  little  known,  f 

The  subject  is  a  young  man  of  seventeen  years 
V  .  .  .  L  .  .  .,  affected  with  hysterical  epilepsy,  who 
entirely  lost  the  .memory  of  one  year  of  his  existence, 
and  during  this  period  was  completely  changed  in 
character. 

Born  of  an  unmarried  mother,  who  was  ^'addicted 
to  an  open  life  of  debauchery,  and  of  an  unknown  father, 
he  began  to  roam  and  beg  on  the  streets  as  soon  as  he 
could  walk.  Later  he  became  a  thief,  was  arrested, 
and  sent  to  the  reformatory  of  Saint-Urbain  where  he 
did  some  field-work."  One  day  being  occupied  in  a 
vineyard  he  happened  to  lay  his  hands  upon  a  ser- 
pent, hidden  in  a  fagot  of  twigs.  The  boy  was  ter- 
ribly frightened,  and  in  the  evening,  on  returning  to 
the  reformatory,  became  unconscious.      These  crises 

*  For  complete  observations,  seeTaine,  De  V Intelligence ,  t.  i,  p.  165  ;  Azam, 
Revue  scientifique,  1876,  20th  May,  and  i8th  September  ;  1877,  loth  November  ; 
1879  8th  March  ;  and  Dufay  ibid.,  15th  July,  1876.  As  regards  the  part  played  by 
memory  in  these  pathological  cases  we  refer  the  reader  to  our  v7ork  Maladies 
de  la  memoire,  p.  76  and  following. 

t  This  observation  of  Dr.  Camuset  is  found  in  extenso  in  Annales  inedico- 
psychologiques,  January,  1882. 


78  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

from  time  to  time  were  repeated,  his  legs  grew  weak, 
finally  a  paralysis  of  the  lower  limbs  set  in,  his  intel- 
lect remaining  unimpaired.  He  was  thereupon  trans- 
ferred to  the  asylum  of  Bonneval.  There  it  was  re- 
ported ^'that  the  patient  has  an  open  and  sympathetic 
expression,  that  his  character  is  amiable,  and  that  he 
shows  himself  grateful  for  the  care  that  is  bestowed 
upon  him.  He  tells  the  history  of  his  life  with  all  its 
minute  details,  even  his  thefts  which  he  deplores,  of 
which  he  is  ashamed,  and  which  he  attributes  to  his 
forsaken  condition  and  his  comrades  who  led  him  into 
evil  ways.  He  regrets  very  much  what  has  happened, 
and  declares  that  in  the  future  he  will  be  more  honest. " 
It  was  then  decided  to  teach  him  a  trade  compatible 
with  his  infirmity.  ''He  can  read,  and  is  learning  to 
write.  He  is  taken  every  morning  to  the  tailors-shop, 
where  he  is  placed  upon  a  table  and  assumes  naturally 
the  classical  position  by  virtue  of  the  condition  of  his 
lower  limbs  which  are  atrophied  and  contracted.  In 
two  months  time  he  learned  to  sew  pretty  well.  He 
works  with  enthusiasm,  and  everybody  is  satisfied  with 
his  progress." 

At  this  stage  he  is  seized  by  an  attack  of  hyster- 
ical epilepsy,  which  ends  after  fifty  hours  with  a  tran- 
quil sleep.  It  is  then  that  his  old  personality  reap- 
pears. 

''On  awakening,  V  .  .  .  wants  to  get  up.  He  asks 
for  his  clothes,  and  is  able  to  dress  himself,  but  per- 
forms the  operation  in  a  very  bungling  manner;  he 
then  takes  a  few  steps  through  the  hail ;  his  para- 
plegia having  disappeared.  His  legs  totter  and  with 
difficulty  support  the  body  because  of  the  atrophy  of 
the  muscles.  .  .  .  When  once  dressed,  he  asks  to  go 
with  his   comrades  into  the  vineyards  to  work.  .  .  . 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  79 

We  quickly  perceive  that  our  subject  still  believes 
himself  at  Saint-Urbain,  and  wishes  to  assume  his  ha- 
bitual occupations.  In  fact,  he  has  no  recollection  of 
his  crisis,  and  recognises  nobod}^,  not  even  the  physi- 
cians and  attendants  any  more  than  his  companions 
in  the  ward.  He  does  not  admit  having  been  par- 
alysed and  accuses  those  about  him  of  teasing  him. 
This  appeared  like  temporary  insanity,  which  was  only 
to  be  expected  after  so  severe  an  attack  of  hysteria, 
but  time  passes  and  still  his  memory  does  not  return. 
V  .  .  .  very  distinctly  remembers  that  he  had  been  sent 
to  Saint-Urbain;  he  knows  that  'the  other  day '  he 
was  frightened  by  a  serpent ;  but  from  this  moment 
all  is  oblivion.  He  remembers  nothing  more  and  does 
not  even  realize  the  lapse  of  time. 

''It  was  thought  that  he  might  be  simulating,  as 
hysterical  patients  often  do,  and  we  emplo37ed  all 
means  to  make  V  .  .  .  contradict  himself,  but  without 
ever  succeeding  in  doing  so.  Thus,  without  letting 
him  know  where  he  was  going,  we  have  him  taken 
to  the  tailors'  workshop.  We  walk  by  his  side,  and 
take  care  not  to  influence  him  as  to  the  direction  to 
be  taken.  V  .  .  .  does  not  know  whither  he  is  going. 
On  arriving  in  the  shop  he  has  every  appearance  of  a 
person  who  does  not  know  where  he  is  and  he  de- 
clares that  he  has  not  been  there  before.  He  is  given 
a  needle,  and  asked  to  sew.  He  sets  about  the  task 
as  awkwardly  as  any  man  who  performs  for  the  first 
time  a  job  of  this  kind.  They  show  him  some  clothes 
the  seams  of  which  had  been  sewn  by  him,  during  the 
time  he  was  paralysed.  He  laughs  and  seems  to  doubt, 
but  finally  yields  to  our  observations.  After  a  month 
of  experiment  and  trials  of  all  kinds,  we  remain  con- 
vinced that  V  .  .  .  really  remembers  nothing." 


8o  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  points  in  regard  to 
this  case  is  the  modification  that  the  character  of  the 
patient  underwent,  namely,  a  return  to  his  early  life 
and  to  his  hereditary  antecedents  :  ''He  is  no  longer 
the  same  subject ;  he  has  become  quarrelsome  and  a 
glutton  ;  he  answers  impolitely.  Formerly  he  did  not 
like  wine  and  most  frequently  gave  his  share  to  his 
companions  ;  but  now  he  will  steal  theirs.  When  they 
tell  him  that  he  once  committed  thefts,  and  caution 
him  not  to  begin  again,  he  becomes  arrogant  and  will 
say  :  'if  he  did  steal,  he  paid  for  it,  as  they  put  him 
into  jail.'  They  employ  him  in  the  garden.  One  day 
he  escapes  taking  with  him  sixty  francs  belonging  to 
an  attendant  of  the  infirmary.  He  is  recaptured  five 
miles  from  Bonneval,  at  the  moment  when,  after  sell- 
ing his  clothes  in  order  to  purchase  others,  he  is  on 
the  point  of  boarding  the  railway  train  for  Paris.  He 
resists  arrest,  and  strikes  and  bites  at  the  wardens  sent 
in  search  of  him.  Returned  to  the  asylum,  he  be- 
comes furious,  cries,  rolls  on  the  ground ;  finally  it  is 
necessary  to  confine  him  in  a  solitary  cell." 

IV. 

Although  we  have  not  as  yet  studied  the  anomalies 
of  personality  in  all  their  forms,  it  will  not  be  out  of 
place  to  essay  here  a  few  conclusions,  although  par- 
tial and  provisory,  which  may  contribute  to  diminish 
the  obscurity  of  the  subject.  In  so  doing,  I  shall, 
however,  confine  myself  to  a  single  feature, — to  cases 
of  fictitious  personality,  reducible  to  a  fixed  idea ;  to 
a  predominant  idea  toward  which  an  entire  group  of 
concordant  ideas  usually  converge,  all  others  being 
eliminated,  and  as  if  annihilated.  Such  are  those  who 
imagine  themselves  to  be   God,  pope  or  emperor,  and 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  8i 

speak  and  act  accordingly.      The  study  of  the  intel- 
lectual cond,t.ons  of  personality  has  in  store  for  us  a 

jects  upon  whom  is  imposed  a  personage  or  roleV  the 
cases  of  this  kind  that  we  already  knol  are  s   ffid  n 
for  us  to  enquire  what  they  teach 

At  first  sight,  these  cases  are  quite  simple  as  regards 

obscure  .   Why  is  a  particular  idea  produced  and  not 
some    other?     Usually   we    know    nothing    whatever 
about  It;  but  the  morbid  conception  once  borlgrows 
and  increases    until  its  climax  is  reached,  throi^gh  Z 
mere  automatism  of  the  association  of  ideas.      I  need 
not  dwell  upon  this  point,  longer  than  to  show  that 
«iese  pathological  cases  explain  for  us  an  illusion,    nto 
which  psychology  has  almost  always  fallen  when  it 
has  based  itself  simply  upon  internal  observation   and 
which  can  be  thus  stated  :  the  substitution  for  the'  real 
ego  of  a  factitious  ego  that  is  much  more  simple 

In  order  to  lay  hold  of  the   real  concrete  person- 
ality, and  not  a  mere  abstraction  that  takes  its  place 
It    IS    not    necessary  to   withdraw   within    our    con- 
sciousness, with  closed  eyes,  and  obstinately  to  ques- 
tion it ;    on  the  contrary,  we   need   to  keep   our  eyes 
wide  open,  and  observe.     The  child,  the  peasant  The 
workingman,  the  millions  of  people  that  walk  in  the 
streets  and  in  the  fields,  who  never  in  their  lives  have 
heard  anything  about  Fichte,  about  Maine  de  BFran 
who   never   have   read   dissertations    upon    the   ego 
and  the  non-ego,  or  even  a  line  of  psychology-one 
and   all  of  them   have   their  definite  personally  and 
each  instant  affirm  it  instinctively.     Ever  since  that 
ong.forgotten  epoch  when  their  ego  was  const  tued 
that  IS,  since  their   ego  was  formed   as  a  coherent 


82  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

group  in  the  midst  of  the  processes  assailing  it, — this 
group  maintains  itself  constantly  while  continually 
modifying  itself.  This  coherent  group  is  composed 
for  the  greater  part  of  states  and  acts,  almost  auto- 
matic, that  constitute  in  each  the  feeling  of  his  body 
and  the  routine  of  life,  and  that  serve  as  a  support 
for  all  the  rest,  yet  any  alteration  of  which,  even  a 
short  and  partial  one,  is  immediately  felt.  In  a  great 
measure  also  it  is  composed  of  an  aggregate  of  sensa- 
tions, images,  and  ideas  representing  the  usual  sur- 
roundings amidst  which  we  live  and  move,  together 
with  the  recollections  that  are  connected  with  them. 
All  this  represents  organised  states  solidly  connected 
among  themselves,  reciprocally  supporting  each  other, 
and  forming  a  bodily  whole.  We  verify  now  the  fact, 
without  seeking  the  cause  of  it.  All  that  is  new  or 
unusual,  any  change  in  the  state  of  the  body  or  of  its 
surroundings,  is  adopted  without  hesitation  and  classed 
by  an  instinctive  act,  either  as  making  a  part  of  the 
personality  or  as  being  strange  to  it.  This  operation 
is  performed  every  moment,  not  through  any  clear  and 
explicit  judgment,  but  through  an  unconscious  and 
far  deeper  logic.  If  we  have  to  characterize  by  a 
definite  word  this  natural,  spontaneous  and  real  form 
of  personality,  I  should  call  it  a  habit,  for  it  cannot  be 
anything  else,  being,  as  we  maintain,  only  the  ex- 
pression of  an  organism.  If  the  reader  instead  of  ob- 
serving himself  will  rather  proceed  objectively,  that  is, 
observe  and  interpret  by  the  aid  of  the  data  of  his  own 
consciousness  the  condition  of  those  who  have  never 
reflected  on  their  personality,  (and  this  is  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  the  human  species,)  he  will  find  that  the  pre- 
ceding thesis  is  correct,  and  that  real  personality 
.affirms  itself  not  by  reflection  but  by  acts. 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  83 

Let  us  now  examine  what  is  called  factitious  or 
artificial  personality.  When  the  psychologist  through 
internal  observation  tries,  as  it  were,  to  comprehend 
himself,  he  attempts  an  impossibility.  At  the  mo- 
ment he  assumes  the  task  in  question,  either  he 
will  adhere  to  the  present,  and  then  hardly  advances 
at  all  ;  or  in  extending  his  reflection  toward  the  past, 
he  affirms  himself  to  be  the  same  as  he  was  one  year 
or  ten  years  ago  ;  in  either  case  he  only  expresses  in 
a  more  learned  and  laborious  manner  what  any  peasant 
knows  as  well  as  he  does.  Through  inward  observa- 
tion he  can  only  apprehend  passing  phenomena  ;  and 
I  am  not  aware  that  any  reply  has  been  given  to  the 
following  just  remarks  of  Hume:  ''For  my  part, 
when  I  enter  most  intimately  into  what  I  call  myself, 
I  always  stumble  on  some  particular  perception  * 
or  other  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade,  love  or 
hatred,  pain  or  pleasure.  I  never  can  catch  myself  at 
any  time  without  a  perception,  and  never  can  observe 
anything  but  the  perception.  If  anyone,  upon  seri- 
ous and  unprejudiced  reflection,  thinks  he  has  a 
different  notion  of  himself,  I  must  confess  I  can 
reason  no  longer  with  him.  All  I  can  allow  him  is, 
that  he  may  be  in  the  right  as  well  as  I,  and  that  we 
are  essentially  different  in  this  particular.  He  may, 
perhaps,  perceive  something  simple  and  continued, 
which  he  calls  himself,  though  I  am  certain  there  is  no 
such  principle  in  me."f  Since  Hume,  it  has  been 
said:  ''Through  effort  and  resistance  we  feel  our- 
selves cause."  This  is  very  well;  and  all  schools 
more  or  less  agree,  that  through  this  the  ego  is  distin- 

*  In  Hume's  language,  "perception  "  corresponds  almost  to  what  we  now 
call  state  of  consciousness. 

t  Philosophical  Works.     Vol.  I.,   p.  312. 


84  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

guished  from  the  non-ego ;  but  this  feeling  of  effort 
none  the  less  remains  a  simple  state  of  consciousness 
like  others,  the  feeling  of  muscular  energy  displayed 
in  order  to  produce  any  given  act. 

To  seek  through  analysis  to  comprehend  a  syn- 
thetic whole  like  the  personality,  or  through  an  in- 
tuition of  consciousness  that  scarcely  lasts  a  few 
seconds,  to  encompass  such  a  complex  thing  as  the 
ego,  is  to  attempt  a  problem,  the  data  of  which  are 
contradictory.  So,  as  a  fact,  psychologists  have  taken 
another  ground.  They  have  considered  the  states  of 
consciousness  as  accessories,  and  the  bond  which  unites 
them  as  the  essential  element,  and  it  is  this  mysterious 
underlying  something  that  under  the  names  of  unity, 
identity,  and  continuity,  has  become  the  true  ego.  It 
is  clear,  however,  that  we  have  nothing  here  but  an 
abstraction,  or  more  precisely,  a  scheme.  For  the  real 
personality  there  is  substituted  the  idea  of  personality, 
which  is  altogether  another  thing.  This  idea  of  per- 
sonality is,  like  all  general  terms,  formed  in  the 
same  manner  as  sensibility,  will,  etc. ;  but  it  does  not 
resemble  the  real  personality  more  than  the  plan  of  a 
city  resembles  the  city  itself.  And  as  in  cases  of 
aberration  of  personality,  which  have  led  us  to  the 
present  remarks,  one  single  idea  has  been  substituted 
for  a  plexus,  constituting  an  imaginary  and  a  dimin- 
ished personality ;  in  the  same  manner  a  fixed  scheme 
of  personality  has  been  substituted  by  psychologists 
for  concrete  personality,  and  upon  this  framework, 
almost  devoid  of  contents,  they  reason,  induce,  deduce, 
and  dogmatize.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  this  com- 
parison is  only  done  by  way  of  mutatis  mutandis  and 
with  many  restrictions,  which  the  reader  himself  will 
discover.    There  are  still  many  other  observations  that 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  85 

could  be  made,  but  I  am  not  engaged  here  on  a  strictly 
critical  work. 

In  short,  to  reflect  upon  our  ego,  is  to  assume  an 
artificial  position,  which  changes  the  nature  of  the 
ego ;  it  is  merely  to  substitute  an  abstract  representa- 
tion for  a  reality.  The  true  ego  is  the  one  that  feels, 
thinks,  acts,  without  making  of  itself  an  object  of 
vision,  for  it  is  a  subject  by  nature  and  by  definition, 
and  in  order  to  become  an  object,  it  has  to  undergo  a 
reduction,  a  kind  of  adaptation  to  the  optics  of  the 
mind  which  transform  and  mutilate  it. 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  treated  the  question  from 
its  negative  side.  To  what  positive  hypothesis  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  personality  are  we  led  by  a  consider- 
ation of  morbid  cases?  Let  us  first  eliminate  the 
hypothesis  of  a  transcendental  entity,  incompatible 
with  pathology,  and  which,  besides,  explains  nothing. 

Let  us  set  aside,  moreover,  the  hypothesis  which 
makes  of  the  ego  ''a  bundle  of  sensations,"  or  of  states 
of  consciousness,  as  is  frequently  repeated  after  Hume. 
This  is  to  be  influenced  by  appearances,  to  take  a 
group  of  signs  for  a  real  thing,  or  more  precisely,  to 
take  effects  for  their  cause.  And  again,  if,  as  we 
maintain,  consciousness  is  only  an  indicatory  phenom- 
enon, it  cannot  be  a  constitutive  state. 

We  must  advance  still  further,  to  that  consensus 
of  the  organism,  namely,  of  which  the  conscious  ego  is 
only  the  psychological  expression.  Has  this  hypoth- 
esis more  solidity  than  the  other  two?  Objectively,  as 
well  as  subjectively,  the  characteristic  trait  of  person- 
ality is  that  continuity  in  time,  that  permanence  which 
we  call  identity.  This  has  been  denied  to  the  organ- 
ism, upon  the  strength  of  arguments  too  well  known 
to  need  repeating  here  ;  but  it  is  strange  that  it  should 


86  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

not  have  been  perceived,  that  all  arguments  pleaded 
in  favor  of  a  transcendental  principle  are  really  ap- 
plicable to  the  organism,  and  that  all  reasons  that  can 
be  advanced  against  the  organism  are  applicable  to  a 
transcendental  principle.  The  remark  that  every  su- 
perior organism  is  one  in  its  complexity  is  as  old,  at 
least,  as  the  Hippocratic  writings,  and  since  Bichat 
no  one  attributes  this  unity  to  a  mysterious  vital  prin- 
ciple ;  yet  certain  people  make  a  great  stir  about  this 
whirlwind  or  continuous  molecular  renovation  which 
constitutes  life,  and  ask,  '^ Where  is  the  identity?" 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  everybody  believes  in 
this  identity  of  the  organism  and  affirms  it.  But, 
identity  is  not  immobility.  If,  as  some  scientists  think, 
life  resides  less  in  the  chemical  substance  of  the 
protoplasm  than  in  the  movements  with  which  the 
particles  of  this  substance  are  animated,  identity  would 
be  a  ^'combination  of  movements"  or  a  "form  of 
movement,"  and  this  continuous  molecular  renovation 
itself  would  be  subordinated  to  conditions  more  pro- 
found. Without  dilating  upon  the  subject,  it  must 
be  evident  to  any  unprejudiced  mind  that  the  organism 
has  its  identity.  And  from  this  point,  what  simpler 
or  more  natural  hypothesis  than  that  of  perceiving  in 
conscious  identity  the  internal  manifestation  of  the 
external  identity  which  is  in  the  organism  ?  "If  any 
one  chooses  to  assure  me  that  not  a  single  particle  of 
my  body  is  what  it  was  thirty  years  ago,  and  that  its 
form  has  entirely  changed  since  then  ;  that  it  is  absurd, 
therefore,  to  speak  of  its  identity;  and  that  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  suppose  it  to  be  inhabited  by  an 
immaterial  entity  which  holds  fast  the  personal  iden- 
tity amidst  the  shifting  changes  and  chances  of  struc- 
ture : — I    answer   him    that  other    people    who    have 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  87 

known  me  from  my  youth  upwards,  but  have  not  my 
self-conscious  certainty  of  identity,  are,  nevertheless, 
as  much  convinced  of  it  as  I  am,  and  would  be  equally 
sure  of  it  even  if,  deeming  me  the  greatest  liar  in  the 
world,  they  did  not  believe  a  word  of  my  subjective 
testimony  ;  that  they  are  equally  convinced  of  the  per- 
sonal identity  of  their  dogs  and  horses  whose  self- 
conscious  testimony  goes  for  nothing  in  the  matter  ; 
and  lastly,  that  admitting  an  immaterial  substance  in 
me,  it  must  be  admitted  to  have  gone  through  so 
many  changes,  that  I  am  not  sure  the  least  immaterial 
particle  of  it  is  what  it  was  thirty  years  ago  ;  that  with 
the  best  intention  in  the  world,  therefore,  I  see  not 
the  least  need  of,  nor  get  the  least  benefit  from,  the 
assumed  and  seemingly  superfluous  entity."* 

It  is,  however,  upon  this  physical  basis  of  the  or- 
ganism, that  rests,  according  to  our  thesis,  what  is 
called  the  unity  of  the  ego,  that  is  to  say,  the  solid- 
arity which  connects  the  states  of  consciousness.  The 
unity  of  the  ego  is  that  of  a  complexus,  and  it  is  only 
through  a  metaphysical  illusion  that  the  ideal  and 
fictitious  unity  of  the  mathematical  point  has  been 
attributed  to  it.  It  does  not  consist  in  the  act  of  a 
supposed  simple  ''essence,  "  but  in  a  co-ordination  of 
the  nerve-centres,  which,  themselves,  represent  a  co- 
ordination of  the  functions  of  the  organism.  Un- 
doubtedly we  are  here  within  the  sphere  of  hypothesis, 
but  at  least,  it  is  not  of  a  supernatural  character. 

Let  us  take  man  in  the  foetal  state,  before  the  birth 
of  any  psychic  life,  leaving  aside  any  hereditary  inclin- 
ations, already  impressed  upon  him  in  any  manner 
whatever,  an*d  which,  at  a  subsequent  time,  will  mani- 
fest themselves.      At  some  period  of  the  foetal  state,  at 

*  Maudsley,  Body  and  Will.     p.  -j-j. 


88  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

least  during  the  last  few  weeks  of  it,   some   kind   of 
sense  of  the  body  must  have  been   produced,    consist- 
ing in  a  vague  feeling  of  well-being  or  discomfort.   No 
matter  how  confused  we  may  suppose  it  to  be,  it  im- 
plies certain  modifications  in  the  nerve-centres,  as  far 
as  compatible  with  their  rudimentary  state.      When  to 
these  simple,  vital  organic  sensations  there  are  added 
sensations  from  an  external  cause  (objective  or  not) 
they   also   necessarily  produce  a   modification  in  the 
nerve-centres.      But  they  will  not  be  inscribed  upon  a 
tabula  7'asa ;  the  web  of  the  psychic  life   has  already 
been  woven,   and  this  web  is  the  general  sensibility, 
the  vital  feeling,   which,   vague  as  it  may  be  at  this 
period,  definitively  constitutes  almost  the  whole  sum 
of  consciousness.      The  bond  of  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness among  themselves  now   reveals  its  origin.      The 
first   sensation  (if  there  be  one  in  an  isolated  state) 
does   not   come   unexpectedly,    like   an  aerolite    in    a 
desert ;   at  its  first  entrance  it  is  connected  with  others, 
with  those  states  that  constitute  the  sense  of  body,  and 
which  are  simply  the  psychic  expression  of  the  organ- 
ism.     Translated  into  physiological  terms,  this  means 
that   the   modifications    of    the    nervous   system   that 
represent  materially  the  sensations  and   desires  which 
follow  the   first   elements  of  the  higher  psychic  life, 
attach  themselves  to  the  previous   modifications  that 
are  the  material  representatives  of  the   vital  and  or- 
ganic sensations  ;  and  by  this  means  there  are  estab- 
lished relations  between  these  nervous  elements  ;    so 
that  from  the  very  outset  the  complex  unity  of  the  ego 
has  its  conditions  of  existence  in  this  general  conscious- 
ness of  the  organism,    which,   though  so   frequently 
overlooked,    serves    as    the   support   of    all  the   rest. 
Thus,  finally,  upon  the  unity  of  the  organism  every- 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  89 

thing  depends,  and  when  passing  also  from  the  em- 
bryonic state,  the  psychic  life  is  formed,  the  mind 
may  be  compared  to  some  gorgeous  piece  of  tapestry, 
in  which  the  warp  has  completely  disappeared,  at  one 
place  beneath  a  faint  design,  at  another  beneath  a 
thick  embroidery  in  high  relief ;  the  psychologist  who 
restricts  himself  to  internal  observation,  perceives 
only  the  patterns  and  embroidery  and  is  lost  in  con- 
jectures and  guesses  as  to  what  lies  hidden  beneath  ; 
if  he  would  but  consent  to  change  his  position  and  to 
look  at  it  from  behind,  he  would   save  himself  many 

useless  inductions,  and  would  know  more  about  it. 

* 

We  might  discuss  the  same  thesis  under  the  form 
of  a  criticism  of  Hume.  The  ego  is  not,  as  he  main- 
tained, a  mere  bundle  of  perceptions.  Without  inter- 
posing the  teaching  of  physiology  but  confining  our- 
selves to  ideological  analysis,  we  observe  a  serious 
omission — that  of  the  relations  between  the  primitive 
states.  A  relation  is  an  element  of  a  vague  nature, 
difficult  to  determine,  because  it  does  not  exist  by 
itself.  It  is  nevertheless,  something  more  than  and 
different  from  the  two  states  by  which  it  is  limited.  In 
Herbert  Spencer's  Principles  of  Psychology  there  is  an 
ingenious  study  (which  has  been  too  Httle  noticed) 
of  these  elements  of  psychic  life,  with  certain  hypoth- 
eses regarding  their  material  conditions.  Prof.  W. 
James  has  quite  recently  treated  of  this  question."^  He 
compares  the  irregular  course  of  our  consciousness  to 
the  transit  of  a  bird  that  alternately  flies  and  perches. 
The  resting-places  are  occupied  by  relatively  stable 
sensations  and  images ;  the  places  passed  in  flight  are 

*  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  §  65.  Prof.  James  in 
Mind,  Jan.  1884,  p.  i,  and  following.     See  also  Huxley's  Hutne, 


go  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

represented  by  thoughts  of  relations  between  the  points 
of  rest :  the  latter — the  ^'transitive  portions  " — are  al- 
most always  forgotten.  It  seems  to  us  that  this  is 
another  form  of  our  thesis,  that  of  the  continuity  of 
the  psychic  phenomena,  by  virtue  of  a  deep,  hidden 
substratum,  which  must  be  sought  in  the  organism. 
In  truth,  it  would  be  a  very  precarious  personality 
that  had  no  other  basis  than  consciousness,  and  this 
hypothesis  is  defective  in  the  face  of  even  the  simplest 
facts ;  as,  for  example,  to  explain  how  after  six  or 
eight  hours  of  profound  sleep,  I  have  no  hesitation  in 
recognizing  my  own  identity.  To  place  the  essence 
of  our  personality  in  a  mode  of  existence  (conscious- 
ness) which  vanishes  during  almost  one  third  of  our 
life  is  a  singular  solution. 

We,  accordingly,  maintain  here,  as  we  have  else- 
where in  regard  to  memory,  that  we  must  not  con- 
found individuality  in  itself,  as  it  actually  exists  in 
the  nature  of  things,  with  individuality  as  it  exists  for 
itself,  by  virtue  of  consciousness  (personality).  The 
organic  memory  is  the  basis  of  all  the  highest  forms 
of  memory,  which  are  only  the  products  of  its  perfec- 
tion. The  organic  individuality  is  the  basis  of  all  the 
highest  forms  of  personality,  which  are  only  the  pro- 
ducts of  its  perfection.  I  shall  repeat  of  personality 
as  of  memory,  that  consciousness  completes  and  per- 
fects it,  but  does  not  constitute  it. 

Although, — in  order  not  to  prolong  these  already 
protracted  considerations, — I  have  strictly  refrained 
from  all  digression,  from  criticism  of  adverse  doctrines, 
and  from  the  exposition  of  points  of  detail,  I  must,  in- 
cidentally, point  out  a  problem  which  naturally  pre- 
sents itself.  There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discus- 
sion  as  to  whether  the  consciousness  of  our  personal 


EMOTIONAL  DISORDERS.  91 

identity  rests  on  memory  or  vice  versa.  One  says  :  It 
is  evident  that  without  memory  I  should  only  be  a 
present  existence  incessantly  renovated,  which  does 
away  with  all,  even  the  faintest  possibility  of  identity. 
The  other  says  :  It  is  evident  that  without  a  feeling  of 
identity  that  connects  them  reciprocally,  and  stamps 
upon  them  my  own  mark,  my  recollections  are  no 
longer  my  own  ;  they  are  extraneous  events.  So  then, 
is  it  the  memory  that  produces  the  feehng  of  identity, 
or  the  feehng  of  identity  that  constitutes  the  memory? 
I  answer  :  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  ;  both  are 
effects,  the  cause  of  which  must  be  sought  in  the  or- 
ganism ;  for,  on  the  one  hand,  its  objective  identity 
reveals  itself  by  that  subjective  condition  which  we 
call  the  feeling  of  personal  identity  ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  it  are  registered  the  organic  conditions  of  our 
recollections,  and  in  it  is  to  be  found  the  basis  of  our 
conscious  memory.  The  feehng  of  personal  identity 
and  the  memory  in  the  ps3^chological  sense,  are,  ac- 
cordingly, effects  of  which  neither  one  can  be  the  cause 
of  the  other.  Their  common- origin  is  in  the  organ- 
ism, in  which  identity  and  organic  registration  (i.  €., 
memory)  are  one.  Here  we  encounter  one  of  those  in- 
correctly formulated  problems,  that  frequently  occur 
in  connection  with  the  hypothesis  of  a  "conscious- 
ness-entity." 


CHAPTER  III. 
DISORDERS   OF  THE  INTELLECT. 


In  certain  morbid  states,  the  five  universally  ad- 
mitted classical  senses  are  subject  to  very  serious  de- 
rangements. Their  functions  are  perverted  or  dis- 
torted. Do  these  parastheses  and  dyscestheses  play  a 
part  in  the  alterations  of  personality?  Before  exam- 
ining this  point  there  arises  a  preliminary  question  : 
What  happens  in  the  case  of  the  suppression  of  one 
or  of  several  senses?  Is  the  personality  altered, 
thwarted,  transformed  ?  The  answer,  resting  upon 
experience,  seems  to  be  a  negative  one. 

The  total  loss  of  a  sense  may  be  acquired  or  be 
congenital.  Let  us  first  examine  the  former  case. 
We  shall  not  here  consider  the  two  secondary  senses 
of  taste  and  smell,  nor  the  sense  of  touch  in  all  its  dif- 
ferent forms,  coming,  as  it  does,  so  near  to  general 
sensibility.  We  will  limit  ourselves  to  sight  and  hear- 
ing. Acquired  blindness  and  deafness  are  not  rare; 
and  are  often  accompanied  by  certain  modifications 
of  character,  but  these  changes  are  not  radical,  and 
the  individual  remains  the  same.  Congenital  blind- 
ness and  deaf-muteness  affect  personality  more  deeply. 
Individuals  who  are  deaf  and  dumb  from  birth, 
limited  thus  to  their  own  resources  and  deprived  of 
artificial  language,  remain  in  a  state  of  notorious  in- 
tellectual inferiority.     This  however  has  been  at  times 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.       93 

exaggerated,*  but  nevertheless  it  is  incontestable,  and 
is  due  to  causes  that  have  been  too  frequently  dis- 
cussed to  need  repetition.  Conscious:personality  in 
the  above  instance  falls  below  the  normal  medium ; 
but  in  such  a  case  there  is  rather  an  arrest  of  devel- 
opment than  an  alteration  of  personality  in  a  strict 
sense  of  the  term. 

As  regards  those  who  are  born  blind  it  is  well 
known  that  many  attain  a  high  standard  of  intellectu- 
ality, and  therefore  we  have  no  authority  to  attribute 
to  them  any  diminution  or  alteration  of  personahty 
whatever.  Notwithstanding  that  their  conception  of  the 
visible  world,  formed  only  from  descriptions  of  it,  may 
seem  odd  and  whimsical  to  us,  it  does  not  seriously 
influence  either  the  nature  of  their  person  or  the  idea 
they  entertain  of  it. 

Let  us  take  the  case  of  Laura  Bridgman,  a  most 
remarkable  instance  of  sensorial  privation,  and  one 
that  has  been  very  minutely  observed,  and  fully  re- 
corded, f  Here  we  find  a  woman,  deprived  of  sight 
and  hearing  at  the  age  of  two  years,  and  almost  en- 
tirely of  the  senses  of  smell  and  taste,  and  possessing 
only  the  sense  of  touch.  We  must,  no  doubt,  make 
a  liberal  allowance  for  the  patient  and  the  intelHgent 
education  to  which  she  owed  her  development.  At  the 
same  time  the  fact  remains,  that  her  teachers  could 
not  endow  her  with  new  senses,  and  the  sense  of 
touch  alone  had  to  suffice  under  all  circumstances.  In 
spite  of   all  these   disadvantages  this  woman  presents 

*  Compare  upon  this  point  the  facts  reported  by  Kussmaul,  Die  Stdrungen 
der  Sprache,  Chap.  VII,  p.  i6,  and  following. 

t  As  to  Laura  Bridgman,  see  Revue  Philosophique ,  Vol.  I,  p.  401  ;  Vol.  VII, 
p.  316.  The  principal  data  relating  to  her  have  be.en  compiled  by  her  teacher 
Mary  Swift  Lamson,  m  her  work  :  The  Life  and  Education  of  Laura  Dewey 
Bridgman,  the  deaf  dumb,  and  blind  girl.     London  :  1878.     Triibner. 


94  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

herself  to  us  in  her  own  individuality,  possessed  of 
a  well-marked  character ;  an  amiable  disposition,  an 
almost  inalterable  good  temper,  as  patient  as  she  was 
eager  in  her  efforts  for  self-improvement ;  in  short 
she  confronts  us  as  an  ordinary  person. 

Omitting  the  innumerable  details  involved  in  the 
preceding  cases,  we  may  safely  infer,  that  the  natural 
or  acquired  privation  of  one  or  of  several  senses  is 
not  necessarily  accompanied  by  a  morbid  state  of  per- 
sonality. In  the  least  favorable  cases  there  is  a  rel- 
ative arrest  of  development,  which  is  remedied  by 
education. 

It  is  clear  to  those  who  maintain  that  the  ego  is 
an  exceedingly  complex  compound  (and  this  is  our 
own  thesis),  that  every  change,  addition,  or  subtrac- 
tion in  its  constituent  elements  will  affect  the  ego  more 
or  less.  But  the  purpose  of  our  analysis  is,  just  to 
distinguish  among  such  elements  those  that  are  essen- 
tial from  those  that  are  accessory.  The  part  contrib- 
uted by  the  external  senses  (touch  excepted)  is  not 
an  essential  factor.  The  senses  determine  and  cir- 
cumscribe personality,  but  do  not  constitute  it.  If  in 
questions  of  observation  and  experience  it  were  not 
too  rash  to  rely  upon  pure  logic,  this  conclusion  might 
have  been  drawn  a  priori.  Sight  and  hearing  are  pre- 
eminently objective;  they  reveal  to  us  that  which  is 
without,  not  that  which  is  within.  As  regards  touch^ 
a  complex  sense,  which  many  physiologists  resolve 
into  three  or  four  senses — in  so  far  as  it  acquaints  us 
with  the  properties  of  the  external  world,  and  is  an 
eye  to  the  blind,  it  belongs  to  the  group  of  vision  and 
hearing ;  otherwise  it  is  only  one  form  of  the  feeling 
that  we  have  of  our  own  body. 

It  may  seem  strange  \}ii'aXpar(Bsthesis  and  dyscesthesis^ 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.        95 

the  simple  sensorial  derangements  which  will  now  oc- 
cupy our  attention,  should  disorganize  the  ego.  Still, 
observation  proves  and  reflection  explains  the  fact. 
This  work  of  destruction  does  not  really  proceed  from 
the  sensorial  derangements  alone  ;  they  are  but  exter- 
nal symptoms  of  a  much  deeper  internal  disorder, 
which  affects  the  bodily  sense.  The  sensorial  altera- 
tions are  rather  auxiliary  than  efficient  causes.  This 
is  confirmed  by  the  facts. 

Alterations  of  the  personality  with  sensorial  dis- 
turbances, but  without  significant  hallucinations,  or 
loss  of  judgment,  are  met  with  in  a  certain  number  of 
morbid  states.  We  shall  select  as  a  type  the  neuro- 
sis, studied  by  Krishaber  under  the  name  of  ''cerebro- 
cardiac  neuropathy."  It  matters  little  to  us  whether 
or  not  this  group  of  symptoms  should  or  should  not 
be  regarded  as  a  distinct  pathological  unity;  this  is  a 
question  for  physicians.*  The  purpose  of  our  inves- 
tigation is  an  entirely  different  one. 

Let  us  resume  the  study  of  the  physiological  dis- 
orders, the  immediate  effect  of  which  is  to  produce  a 
change  in  the  coenesthesis  (the  sense  of  body).  At 
first  there  occur  derangements  of  the  circulation,  con- 
sisting chiefly  in  an  excessive  irritability  of  the  vas- 
cular system,  probably  due  to  an  excitation  of  the  cen- 
tral nervous  system,  whence  are  produced  contractions 
of  the  smaller  vessels,  ischcemia  in  certain  regions,  in- 
sufficient nutrition  and  exhaustion.  Then  there  are 
disorders  of  locomotion,  dizziness,  continuous  feeling 
of  vertigo  and  of  inebriation,  with  stumbling,  relaxa- 
tion of  the  limbs,  or  hesitating  gait,  and  an  involun- 

■^ De  la  nevropathie  cerebro-cardiaque,  by  Dr.  Krishaber.  Paris:  1873. 
Masson.  In  general  this  disease  is  regarded  not  as  a  distinct  species,  but  as 
a  particular  case  of  spinal  irritation  or  of  neurasthenia.  See  Axenfeld  and 
Huchard  :  TraiU  des  nevroses,  1873,  pp.  277  and  294. 


96  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

tary  forward  impulsion    ^^as   if   moved   by   a   sort    of 
spring." 

In  passing  from  the  internal  to  the  external,  we 
find  the  sense  of  touch,  which  forms  the  transition 
from  general  sensibility  to  the  special  senses.  Some 
persons  have  the  feeling  as  if  they  had  no  longer  any 
weight,  or  were  very  light.  Many  persons  lose  the 
exact  notion  of  resistance,  and  are  unable,  through 
the  sense  of  touch  alone,  to  recognize  the  form  of 
objects.  They  imagine  themselves  as  *' separated 
from  the  world ; "  their  body  enveloped,  as  it  were, 
by  isolating  surroundings,  that  interpose  themselves 
between  the  individual  and  the  external  world. 

*' There  appeared,"  said  one  of  them,  ^^a  dark 
atmosphere  all  around  my  person  ;  still,  I  saw  very 
well  that  it  was  broad  daylight.  The  word  'Mark" 
does  not  exactly  express  my  thought  j  I  ought  to  use 
the  German  word  dump/,  which  also  means  heavy, 
dense,  dull,  extinguished.  This  sensation  was  not 
only '  visual  but  also  cutaneous.  I  was  wrapt  in  a 
murky  atmosphere  ;  I  beheld  it,  felt  it ;  it  was  like  a 
heavy  layer  of  some  bad  conducting  medium  that 
isolated  me  from  the  external  world.  I  am  entirely 
unable  to  tell  you  how  impressive  this  sensation  was ; 
but,  it  seemed  to  me,  that  I  was  transported  far,  very 
far  from  this  world,  and  mechanically  I  cried  out,  in  a 
loud  voice,  *I  am  far,  far  away.'  At  the  same  time 
I  knew  perfectly  well  that  I  was  not  far  away;  I  dis- 
tinctly remembered  all  that  had  happened  to  me  ;  but 
between  the  moment  that  preceded,  and  that  which 
followed  my  attack,  there  intervened  an  immense  in- 
terval, a  distance  like  that  from  the  earth  to  the  sun." 
In  a  case  of  this  kind,  vision  is  always  affected. 
Without  speaking  of  slight  disorders  (such  as  photo- 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.       97 

phobia,  amblyopia)  some  persons  will  perceive  objects 
as  double  ;  to  others  they  seem  flattened,  and  a  man 
appears  to  them  as  a  reliefless  silhouette.  To  many, 
the  surrounding  objects  seem  to  grow  diminished  and 
to  recede  into  infinite  space. 

Auditory  derangements  are  of  the  same  nature. 
The  patient  no  longer  recognizes  the  sound  of  his  own 
voice  ;  it  seems  to  come  from  afar,  or  to  lose  itself  in 
space,  without  being  able  to  reach  the  ear  of  those 
with  whom  he  converses,  whose  answers,  likewise,  are 
scarcely  heard. 

If  now,  in  thought,  we  unite  together  all  these 
different  symptoms  (accompanied  by  physical  pain,, 
and  by  derangements  of  taste  and  smell)  suddenly, 
and  in  a  single  block,  arises  a  group  of  internal  and  ex- 
ternal sensations,  marked  by  a  new  character,  con- 
nected among  themselves  by  their  simultaneousness 
in  time,  and  still  more  profoundly  so  through  the  morbid 
state  which  is  their  common  source.  Here  we  have 
all  the  elements  of  a  new  ego,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,, 
sometimes  it  is  actually  formed.  '^I  have  lost  all 
consciousness  of  my  being;  I  am  no  more  myself." 
Such  is  the  formula  which  is  repeated  in  almost  all 
the  observations  of  this  kind.  Others  will  even  go 
still  further,  and  at  times,  imagine  themselves  double. 
''One  of  the  strangest  ideas,  which,  despite  myself,, 
is  forced  upon  my  mind,"  said  a  certain  engineer,  '*  is. 
to  believe  myself  double.  I  seem  to  possess  one  ego, 
which  thinks,  and  another  which  acts."     (Obs.  6.) 

This  process  of  formation  has  been  top  well  studied 
by  M.  Taine,  to  need  to  be  repeated.  ''We  could  not 
more  aptly  compare  the  condition  of  the  patient  than 
likening  it  to  that  of  a  caterpillar,  which,  while  pre- 
serving all  the  ideas  and  recollections  of  a  caterpillar, 


98  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

should  suddenly  become  a  butterfly,  with  the  senses 
and  sensations  of  a  butterfly.  Between  the  old  state 
and  the  new  state,  between  the  first  ego — that  of  a 
caterpillar — and  the  second  ego — that  of  a  butterfly — 
there  is  a  deep  gulf,  a  complete  rupture.  The  new 
sensations  do  not  find  any  anterior  series  to  which  they 
can  connect  themselves ;  the  patient  can  no  longer 
interpret  or  make  use  of  them  ;  he  does  not  even 
recognize  them,  they  are  unknown  to  him.  Hence, 
there  follows  two  strange  conclusions  ;  the  first,  which 
consists  in  saying  :  ^^  I  am  not ;  "  the  second,  a  trifle 
more  advanced,  which  says,  ''I  am  another."  * 

It  is,  indeed,  difficult  for  any  sane  and  well-balanced 
mind  to  figure  to  itself  an  extraordinary  mental  state 
of  this  kind.  But  although  inadmissible  to  the  sceptical 
observer,  who  looks  at  the  matter  from  without,  these 
conclusions  are  strictly  correct  to  the  patient  who  sees 
them  from  within.  For,  to  him  alone  is  the  continual 
state  of  vertigo  and  intoxication  like  a  permanent  chaos, 
in  which  the  state  of  equilibrium,  of  normal  co-ordina- 
tion, cannot  be  established,  or,  at  least,  cannot  endure. 

If  now  we  compare  with  the  other  more  or  less 
serious  forms,  this  change  of  personality  a  sensibus 
Icesis,  we  shall  find  that  a  new  ego  is  not  formed  in 
all  cases.  When  it  is  formed  it  always  disappears 
with  the  cessation  of  sensorial  derangements.  It  is 
never  able  entirely  to  supplant  the  normal  ego ;  there 
is  alternation  between  both  :  the  elements  of  the  orig- 
inal ego  preserve  enough  cohesion  to  allow  it  by  turns 
to  gain  predominance.  Hence  the  illusion  of  believ- 
ing oneself  double,  which,  strictly  speaking,  to  the 
patient  himself  is  not  an  illusion. 

*  Revue  philosophique,   Vol.   I.,   page  289,  and  Z'/^if^//z^^«<r^,  4th  Edition, 
Vol.  II,  Appendix. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.       99 

As  to  the  psychological  mechanism,  by  virtue  of 
which  he  believes  himself  double,  I  attribute  it  to  the 
memory.  I  have  previously  attempted  to  show,  that 
real  personality — with  its  enormous  mass  of  subcon- 
scious and  conscious  states  is  condensed  in  our  mind 
into  a  single  image  or  fundamental  tendency,  which 
we  call  the  idea  of  our  personality.  This  vague  con- 
ception {schema)  which  represents  real  personality, 
much  as  the  general  idea  of  man  represents  individ- 
ual men,  or  as  the  plan  of  a  city  represents  the  city — 
suffices  for  the  ordinary  needs  of  our  mental  life. 
Two  images  or  conceptions  must  exist  with  our  pa- 
tients, and  succeed  each  other  in  their  consciousness 
according  as  the  physiological  state  causes  the  old  or 
the  new  personality  to  prevail.  But  in  the  transition 
from  one  to  the  other,  however  sudden  it  may  appear, 
there  is  still  a  certain  continuity.  These  two  states 
of  consciousness  have  not  an  absolute  beginning  in 
the  one  case,  and  an  absolute  end  in  the  other,  and 
between  them  a  vacancy,  a  hiatus.  Like  all  states  of 
consciousness  they  have  a  duration ;  they  occupy  a 
portion  of  time,  and  the  terminal  end  of  the  one 
touches  the  initial  end  of  the  other.  In  other  words 
they  encroach  one  upon  the  other.  When  the  one 
begins  to  exist  the  other  still  subsists  in  a  diminishing 
state  ;  there  is  a  period  of  coexistence  in  which  they 
reciprocally  penetrate  each  other.  In  our  opinion  it  is 
during  this  period  of  transition  or  of  passage,  whenever 
it  is  produced,  that  the  patient  believes  himself  double. 

Let  us  remark  finally,  that  sensorial  derangements 
are  only  the  result  of  a  more  deeply-seated  disorder 
within  the  organism,  and  consequently  here  also  the 
sense  of  the  body  plays  the  principal  part  in  the  pa- 
thology of  personality. 


loo    DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

We  can  now  explain  how  the  natural  or  acquired 
suppression  of  one  or  of  several  senses  leaves  the  in- 
dividuality intact  at  its  base,  while  momentary  per- 
versions of  less  serious  appearance  will  transform  it. 

Physiologically,  in  the  former  case,  we  have  a  sum 
total  of  nervous  elements,  condemned  to  functional 
inertia,  either  at  the  beginning  or  during  the  course 
of  life :  the  personality  becomes  like  a  poor  or  weak- 
ened orchestra,  which  nevertheless  suffices  for  all 
necessary  purposes.  In  the  second  case,  all  the  nerv- 
ous elements  serving  the  injured  external  senses,  the 
muscular  sensibility,  the  organic  and  visceral  sensibil- 
ity, have  undergone  an  unusual  modification, — some- 
what like  an  orchestra  in  which  nearly  all  the  instru- 
ments have  suddenly  changed  their  tone, 

II. 

A  natural  transition  from  perceptions  to  ideas  is 
made  through  hallucinations  ;  and  we  shall  now  study 
the  part  played  by  the  latter  in  the  anomalies  of  per- 
sonality. At  the  outset  let  us  recall  to  mind  a  few 
general  points  regarding  the  hallucinatory  state.  Four 
hypotheses  have  been  advanced  to  explain  it*  :  i.  The 
peripheric  or  sensorial  theory,  which  places  the  seat 
of  hallucination  in  the  organ  of  the  senses.  2.  The 
psychic  theory  which  localizes  it  in  the  centre  of  idea- 
tion. 3.  The  mixed  or  psycho-sensorial  theory.  4.  The 
theory  which  attributes  hallucination  to  the  perceptive 
centres  of  the  cortical  layer. 

Observation  teaches  us  that  hallucinations  some- 
times affect  one  sense  only,  and  sometimes  several 
senses  ;  that  most  frequently  they  extend  to  both  sides 

*  For  the  complete  exposition  of  the  question,  see  the  important  articles 
of  M.  Binet.  Revtie  philosophique,  April  and  May,  1884. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      loi 

of  the  body,  but  occasionally  to  one  side  only  (right 
or  left,  indifferently);  still  more  rarely,  they  are  bilat- 
eral, yet  presenting  a  different  character  on  each  side; 
thus,  whilst  one  ear  is  assailed  by  threats,  injuries, 
evil  councils  ;  the  other  is  comforted  by  kind  and 
soothing  words  ;  one  eye  perceives  only  sad  and  re- 
pugnant objects,  the  other  beholds  gardens  rich  in 
flowers.  These  latter,  being  at  the  same  time  bilater- 
al and  opposite  by  nature,  are  to  us  the  most  interest- 
ing. 

Happily,  in  this  immense  domain,  we  have  only  to 
explore  a  very  small  area.  Let  us  carefully  limit  our 
subject.  In  the  normal  state  the  feeling  and  thinking  in- 
dividual is  entirely  adapted  to  his  surroundings.  Be- 
tween the  group  of  states  and  of  internal  relations  which 
constitute  the  mind,  and  the  group  of  states  and  of  exter- 
nal relations,  which  constitute  the  external  world,  there 
is  a  correspondence,  as  Spencer  has  minutely  shown. 
In  the  case  of  the  hallucinator  this  correspondence 
has  been  destroyed.  Hence,  false  judgments,  absurd 
acts,  that  is,  incongruous  and  unfitting  acts.  Still,  all 
this  constitutes  a  disease  of  reason  and  not  of  person- 
ality. Undoubtedly  the  ego  is  dethroned  ;  but  so  long 
as  the  consensus  which  constitutes  it  has  not  disap- 
peared, is  not  split  in  two,  or  has  not  alienated  a 
part  of  itself,  (as  we  shall  see  presently)  so  long  will 
there  not  be  any  disease  of  personality  in  a  proper 
sense ;  the  derangements  will  be  but  secondary  and 
superficial.  Consequently,  the  immense  majority  of 
cases  of  hallucination  are  withdrawn  from  our  consid- 
eration. 

Nor  have  we,  moreover,  either  to  occupy  ourselves 
with  that  numerous  category  of  patients,  who  misjudge 
the  personality  of  others,  and  who  take  the  physicians 


102  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

and  attendants  of  the  asylum  for  their  own  relatives, 
or  their  relatives  for  some  imaginary  persons  in  some 
connection  with  their  delusions.* 

Having  made  these  eliminations,  the  cases  to  be 
studied  become  sufficiently  circumscribed,  since  they 
are  reduced  to  changes  of  personality  the  basis  of 
which  is  hallucination.  There  is  almost  invariably 
an  alienatio7i  (in  the  etymological  sense)  of  certain 
states  of  consciousness,  which  the  ego  does  not  con- 
sider as  its  own,  but  makes  objective  and  places  out- 
side of  itself,  and  to  which,  ultimately,  it  attributes  a 
distinct  existence  yet  independent  of  its  own. 

As  regards  the  sense  of  hearing,  the  history  of  re-" 
ligious  mania  furnishes  numerous  examples.  I  shall 
quote  the  most  ordinary  cases,  namely, those  in  which 
at  first  the  hallucinatory  state  acts  alone.  A  woman 
was  persecuted  by  an  internal  voice,  "which  she  heard 
only  within  her  ear,"  and  which  would  rebel  against 
whatever  she  wished.  The  voice  alwaj^s  incited  evil 
when  the  patient  wished  for  good.  Without  being 
heard  externally,  the  voice  would  call  to  her:  ''Take 
a  knife  and  kill  yourself."  Another  hysterical  patient 
originally  had  thoughts,  and  would  utter  words  she  had 
no  intention  of  saying,  and  soon  would  express  them  in 
a  voice  that  differed  from  her  own.  This  voice  at  first 
only  made  indifferent  or  rational  remarks;  afterwards 
it  assumed  a  negative  character.  ''At  the  present 
time,  after  thirteen  years  the  voice  simply  verifies 
what  the  patient  has  just  said,  or  comments  upon  her 
words,  criticizes  them,  turns  them  into  ridicule.    The 

*  To  some  patients,  the  same  individual  is,  by  turns,  transformed  into 
an  imaginary  person  and  maintained  in  his  real  personality.  A  woman  at 
times  recognized  her  husband,  and  at  times  took  him  for  an  intruder.  She 
had  him  arrested,  and  he  had  great  difficulty  in  establishing  his  identity 
(Magnan  Clinique  de  Sainte-Anne ,  Feb.  ii,  1877.) 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      103 

tone  of  this  voice, when  the  mind  speaks,always  differs 
a  little,  and  sometimes  entirely  from  the  ordinary  voice 
of  the  patient,  and  this  is  the  reason  why  the  latter  be- 
lieves in  the  reality  of  this  mind.  I,  myself,  have  fre- 
quently observed  these  same  facts. '"^ 

As  regards  sight,  alienations  of  this  kind  are  less 
frequent.  ''A  very  intelligent  man,"  says  Wigan  (p. 
126)  ''had  the  power  of  putting  his  double  before  him- 
self. He  used  to  laugh  loudly  at  this  double,  which 
would  also  laugh  in  return.  For  a  long  time  this  was 
a  subject  of  amusement  to  the  man;  but  the  final  re- 
sult proved  lamentable.  By  degrees  he  became  con- 
vinced that  he  was  being  haunted  by  himself.  This 
other  ego  taunted  him,  worried  and  mortified  him  in- 
cessantly. In  order  to  put  an  end  to  this  sad  existence 
he  arranged  his  private  affairs,  and,  being  loath  to  be- 
gin a  new  year,  on  Dec.  31,  at  midnight,  he  shot  him- 
self in  the  mouth." 

FinallyDr.  Ball  in  VEncephale  (1882,  II.)  reports  the 
case  of  an  American,  who,  through  simultaneous  hal- 
lucinations of  hearing  and  sight,  possessed  in  all  its 
features  an  imaginary  double.  ''Prostrated  by  a  sun- 
stroke, he  remained  unconscious  for  a  month.  Short- 
ly after  recovering  his  senses,  he  heard  a  distinctly 
articulated  human  voice,  which  said:  'How  are  you?' 
The  patient  answered,  and  a  short  conversation  was 
begun.  On  the  following  day  the  same  question  was 
repeated.  The  patient  looked  around  but  saw  no 
one.  '  Who  are  you  ?  '  said  he.  '  I  am  Mr.  Cabbage, ' 
answered  the  voice.  A  few  days  later  the  patient  got 
a  glimpse  of  his  interlocutor,  who  from  that  time  pre- 
sented himself  with  the  same  features  and  in  the  same 

*  Griesinger,  Maladies  Mentales.  French  Trans.,  p.  285-286  ;  Baillarger  re- 
ports an  analogous  case,  Annates  Medico-psych.  ;  ist  series.  Vol.  VI.  p.  151. 


I04    BISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

dress ;  he  would  always  appear  in  front,  showing  only 
his  bust.  He  had  the  appearance  of  a  vigorous  and 
well  built  man  of  about  thirty-six  years,  with  a  strong 
beard, dark-brown  complexion,large  black  eyes, strong- 
ly penciled  eye-brows,  and  was  always  dressed  in  hunt- 
ing costume.  The  patient  would  fain  have  known  the  * 
profession  and  habits  of  his  questioner  and  where  he 
lived  ;  but  the  man  would  never  consent  to  give  any 
•other  information  than  simply  his  name."  At  last  Mr. 
Gabbage  grew  more  and  more  tyrannical:  ordering  the 
patient  to  threw  his  newspaper,  watch  and  chain  into 
the  fire,  to  take  care  of  a  young  woman  and  her  child 
whom  he  had  poisoned,  and  eventually  to  throw  him- 
self through  the  window  of  a  third  floor,  whence  he 
fell  and  was  killed  upon  the  pavement  below. 

These  facts  show  us  a  beginning  of  dissolution  of 
pei'sonality.  Later  on  we  shall  cite  other  cases  which 
have  not  hallucination  for  their  basis,  and  which  will 
enable  us  to  better  understand  those  already  referred 
to.  That  more  or  less  perfect  co-ordination  which  in 
the  normal  state  constitutes  the  ego,  is  here  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  broken.  Within  the  group  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness which  we  feel  as  our  own,  because  pro- 
duced or  experienced  by  ourselves,  there  exists  one, 
which,  although  having  its  source  in  the  organism,  still 
does  not  enter  into  the  consensus,  but  remains  apart 
and  appears  separate  from  it.  In  the  order  of  thought 
this  is  the  analogue  of  irresistible  impulsions ;  in  the 
order  of  action,  a  partial  inco-ordination.* 

These  voices  and  visions  emanate  from  the  patient 
himself ;  why  then  does  he  not  regard  them  as  his 
own?    This  is  a  very  obscure  question,  but  I  shall  at- 

*  Concerning  irresistible  impulsions  considered  as  a  phenomenon  of  par- 
tial inco-ordination,  see  my  Maladies  de  la  Volonte,  p.  71  and  following. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      105 

tempt  to  answer  it.    There  must  exist  here  anatomical 
and  physiological  causes,  unfortunately  at  present  un- 
known, the  discovery  of  which  would  solve  the  prob- 
lem.   Being  ignorant  of  these  causes,  we  are  restricted 
to  the  consideration  of  the  surface,  the  symptoms,  and 
the  states  of  consciousness  with   the  signs  that  reveal 
them.      Let  us,  accordingly,   suppose  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness  (with  its    organic  conditions)    having    the 
characteristic  of  being  local,  that  is  of  having  in  its 
physical  and  psychic  organization  the  weakest  possible 
radiation.      In   order  to  make  myself   understood  by 
way  of  antithesis,  let  us  suppose  any  violent,  sudden 
emotion  ;  it  resounds  through  the  whole  system, shakes 
completely  the  physical  and  mental  life ;  it  is  complete 
in  its  diffusion.    Our  case  is  exactly  the  reverse  of  this. 
Organically  and  psychically  it  has  only  rare  and  pre- 
carious connections  with  the  rest  of  the  individual ;  it 
remains  apart,  like  a  foreign  body,  lodged  within  the 
organism,  but  having  no  share  in  its  life.     It  does  not 
enter  that  great  woof  of  coenesthesia  which  sustains 
and  unifies  everything.      It  is  a  cerebral  phenomenon 
almost  without  support,  analogous   to  the  ideas  that 
are  imposed  by  way  of  suggestion  in  hypnotism.    This 
attempt  at  an  explanation  is  corroborated  by  the  fact 
that  any  morbid  state — if  it  be  not  arrested  by  nature 
itself  or  by  medical  treatment— has  a  fatal  tendency  to 
increase  and  expand  at  the  expense  of  the  primitive 
personality,  which,  attacked  by  this  parasite,  dimin- 
ishes.   Still,  in  this  case  it  preserves  its  original  mark, 
and  does  not  constitute  a  dupHcation  but  an  alienation 
of  personality. 

I  only  offer  this  attempt  at  an  explanation  as  an  hy- 
pothesis, being  perfectly  convinced  that  our  present 
lack  of  knowledge  of  the  organic  conditions  of  thephe- 


io6  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

nomenon  precludes  the  possibility  of  a  satisfactory 
diagnosis.  In  submitting  this  explanation  I  have  been 
compelled  to  anticipate  what  will  afterwards  be  said 
in  reference  to  ideas,  and  which,  perhaps,  will  furnish 
us  with  new  arguments  in  favor  of  that  hypothesis. 

*  * 

We  have  now  to  speak  of  recent  experiments  upon 
hallucinations  which,  taken  with  other  facts,  have 
led  certain  authors  to  give  an  explanation  of  the 
duplication  of  personality,  so  simple  as  to  be,  so 
to  say  palpable,  that  it  looks  quite  obvious.  In 
the  first  place  they  point  out  the  functional  inde- 
pendence of  the  two  hemispheres  of  the  brain, 
and  hence  they  conclude  that  from  their  synergy  re- 
sults the  equilibrium  of  the  mind,  and  from  their  dis- 
accord various  derangements  and  ultimately  the  di- 
vision of  the  psychic  individual.  We  have  here  two 
distinct  questions,  which  have  been  clearly  discerned 
by  several  of  the  scientists  whom  I  shall  quote,  and 
much  confounded  by  others. 

Sir  Henry  Holland,  a  physician  and  well-known 
psychologist,  was  the  first  who  (in  1840)  studied  the 
brain  as  a  double  organ,  suggesting  that  certain  aber- 
rations of  the  mind  might  be  due  to  the  irregular  ac- 
tion of  the  two  hemispheres,  of  which  the  one  in  cer- 
tain cases  seems  to  correct  the  perceptions  and  senti- 
ments of  the  other.  In  1844  Wigan  went  still  further. 
He  maintained  that  we  had  two  brains  and  not  merely 
one;  and  that  ''the  corpus  callosum,  far  from  being  a 
bond  of  union  between  them,  is  really  a  wall  of  separ- 
ation," and  maintained  even  more  positively  than  his 
predecessor,  the  duality  of  the  mind.*     The  advance- 

*  Wigan  :   The  duality  of  mind  proved  by  the  structure,  functions,  and  dis- 
eases of  the  brains,  and  by  the  phenonietia  of  mental  derangement,  and  shewn 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      107 

ment  of  cerebral  anatomy  has  subsequently  yielded 
other  and -more  positive  results;  such  as  inequality 
of  weight  of  the  two  lobes  of  the  brain,  their  constant 
asymmetry,  differences  in  the  topography  of  the  cortex, 
etc.  The  discovery  by  Broca  of  the  seat  of  aphasia, 
was  a  new  argument  of  great  value.  It  was  also  sup- 
posed that  the  left  hemisphere  was  the  principal 
seat  of  intelligence  and  of  will,  that  the  right  hemi- 
sphere was  more  particularly  devoted  to  the  life  of  nu- 
trition (Brown-Sequard).  I  abridge  this  historical  re- 
sume, which  could  be  much  lengthened,  and  come  back 
at  once  to  hallucinations.  The  existence  of  simul- 
taneous hallucinations,  sad  on  the  one  side,  joyous  on 
the  other,  in  all  cases  different  and  even  contradictory, 
attracted  the  attention  of  observers.  But  there  was 
something  better  to  do  than  observing;  there  were 
experiments  to  be  made.  Hypnotism  furnished  the 
means  for  the  latter.  Let  us  remember  that  the  hypno- 
tised subject  can  pass  through  three  phases  :  the  first 
lethargic,  characterized  by  neuro-muscular  excitabil- 
ity; the  second,  cataleptic,  produced  by  raising  the 
eyelids;  and  the  third, somnambulistic, caused  by  pres- 
sure upon  the  vertex.  If  during  the  cataleptic  state 
we  lower  the  right  eyelid,  we  act  upon  the  left  brain, 
and  we  determine  a  lethargic  state  of  the  right  side 
only.  The  subject  thus  becomes,  as  it  were,  divided 
into  two — hemilethargic  to  the  right,  hemicataleptic 
to  the  left,  and  I  will  now  state  what  occurs  tak- 
ing the  facts  from  M.  P.  Richer's  well-known  book  : 
''I  place  upon  the  table  a  water-jug,  a  basin,  and 
some  soap  ;  as  soon  as  the  patient's  glance  has  been 
attracted  towards  these  objects,  or  her  hands   touch 

to  be  essential  to  moral  responsibility.     London,   1884.     This  badly  digested 
book  does  not  bear  out  what  the  title  claims. 


io8  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

any  of  them,  she  proceeds  with  apparent  spontaneity 
to  pour  water  into  the  basin,  takes  the  soap  and 
washes  her  hands  with  very  minute  care.  If  we  then 
lower  the  hd  of  one  of  her  eyes — the  right  eye  for  ex- 
ample— then  all  the  right  side  becomes  lethargic,  and 
the  right  hand  immediately  stops  ;  but  the  left  hand, 
nevertheless,  continues  the  movement.  On  again  rais- 
ing the  eyelid,  both  hands  at  once  resume  their  action 
as  before."  The  same  thing  is  also  produced  on  the 
left  side.  '^If  we  put  into  the  patient's  hands  the  box 
containing  her  crochet-work,  she  will  open  it,  take  out 
her  work  and  begin  to  crochet  with  remarkable  skill 
....  If  we  close  one  of  her  eyes,  the  corresponding 
hand  will  stop,  the  arm  drops  motionless  .  .  .  but  the 
other  hand,  unaided,  seeks  to  continue  a  work  that 
has  now  become  impossible  ;  the  mechanism  continues 
to  work  on  one  side,  but  it  modifies  its  movement, 
with  the  purpose  of  rendering  it  efficacious." 

The  author  reports  several  other  cases  of  the  same 
kind,  of  which  I  shall  only  quote  the  last,  because  it 
confirms  Broca's  discovery.  On  placing  in  the  hands 
of  the  subject  an  open  book,  and  directing  her  glance 
toward  one  of  its  lines,  she  reads.  ''In  the  midst  of 
her  reading,  the  closure  of  the  right  eye,  through  the 
decussation  of  the  optic  nerves,  which  affects  the  left 
brain,  stops  the  patient  abruptly  in  the  middle  of  a 
word  or  phrase.  As  soon  as  the  eye  is  opened  again 
she  resumes  her  reading,  finishing  the  word  or  phrase 
that  had  been  interrupted.  If  on  the  contrary  the  left 
eye  is  closed,  she  continues  her  reading,  only  hesitat- 
ing a  little  on  account  of  partial  amblyopia  and  achro- 
matopsia of  the  right  eye."'*' 

One  might  var}^  these  experiments.    A  different  at- 

*  p.  Richer.     Etudes  cliniques  sur  V hystero-epilepsie,  pp.  391 — 393. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      109 

titude  is  impressed  upon  the  limbs  of  each  side  of  the 
body  ;  on  one  side  the  subject  bears  a  stern  expres- 
sion, while  on  the  other  side  she  smiles  and  sends 
kisses.  The  hallucinatory  state  can  be  provoked  only 
on  the  left  or  on  the  right  side.  Finally,  let  two  per- 
sons approach  the  subject,  one  at  each  ear  ;  the  per- 
son on  the  right  describes  the  fine  weather,  the  right 
side  smiles;  the  other  on  the  left  describes  the  rain, 
the  left  side  betrays  displeasure  and  the  labial  com- 
missure islowered.  Or  again,  while  suggesting  through 
the  right  ear  the  hallucination  of  a  picnic,  near  the 
left  ear  let  the  barking  of  a  dog  be  imitated  ;  the  face 
will  express  pleasure  at  the  right  and  alarm  at  the  left 
side.* 

These  experiments,  of  which  we  only  give  a  very 
condensed  summary,  together  with  many  other  facts, 
have  very  logically  led  to  the  following  conclusion  : 
that  there  exists  a  7'elative  independence  of  the  two 
cerebral  hemispheres,  which  by  no  means  excludes 
their  normal  co-ordination,  but  which  in  certain  path- 
ological cases  becomes  a  perfect  dualism. 

Some  authors  have  been  inclined  to  go  still  further 
and  to  hold  that  this  cerebral  dualism  suffices  to  ex- 
plain every  discrepancy  existing  within  the  mind,  from 
simple  hesitation  between  two  resolves  to  be  made,  to 
the  complete  duplication  of  personality.  If  at  the 
same  time  we  wish  good  and  evil ;  if  we  have  criminal 
impulses  and  a  conscience  that  reproves  them  ;  if  the 
insane  at  times  recognizes  his  folly  ;  if  the  delirious 
has  moments  of  lucidity  j  if,  in  fine,  some  persons  be- 
lieve themselves  double,  it  is  simply  because  the  two 
hemispheres  are  in  disaccord ;  the  one  is  healthy,  the 
other  is  morbid ;  one  state  has  its  seat  to  the  right, 

*Magnan  and  Dumontpailler,  Union  Medicate,  15  May  1883. 


no  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

its  contrary  to  the  left ;  it  is  a  kind  of  psychological 
mancinism. 

Griesinger,  upon  encountering  this  theory,  already 
put  forth  with  diffidence  in  his  day,  after  quoting  the 
facts  which  it  vindicates,  and  the  case  of  one  of  his 
patients,  who  '^felt  himself  growing  irrational  only  on 
one  side  of  his  head,  that  is  on  the  right  side,"  con- 
cludes in  the  following  terms  :  ''As  to  us,  we  are  not 
by  any  means  inclined  to  attribute  any  particularly 
high  value  to  these  facts. '"^ 

Have  they  gained  in  weight  since  that  time  ?  It  is 
very  doubtful.  In  the  first  place  (since  the  theory 
rests  upon  a  question  of  number)  are  there  not  indi- 
viduals who  believe  themselves  triple  ?  I  find  at  least 
one  instance.  ''In  a  certain  lunatic  asylum,"  says 
Esquiros,  "I  have  met  with  a  priest,  who  through  the 
excessive  application  of  his  mind  to  the  theological 
mystery  of  the  Trinity,  eventually  came  to  regard  all 
objects  around  him  as  triple.  He  even  imagined  him- 
self to  be  in  three  persons,  and  requested  the  attend- 
ants to  lay  three  covers  for  him  at  table,  with  three 
plates  and  three  napkins,  "f 

I  believe  that  by  dint  of  active  search  we  should 
find  other  cases  of  this  kind ;  but  I  refrain  from  avail- 
ing myself  of  this  case  of  triplicity  which  to  me  seems 
capable  of  several  interpretations. 

Against  that  theory  there  could  be  alleged  the  best 
possible  reasons,  and  supported  by  plain  facts.  It 
ultimately  rests  upon  the  absolutely  arbitrary  hy- 
pothesis that  the  struggle  is  always  between  two 
states  only.    Experience  contradicts  it  completely.    To 

*  op.  cit.  p.  28.  See  also  the  negative  conclusions  of  Charlton  Bastian  upon 
this  point,  Vol.  II.,  ch.  XXIV. 

t  Revue  des  Deux-Mondes,  15  Oct.  1845,  p.  307. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT,     iii 

whom  has  it  not  happened,  to  deliberate  upon  the  ad- 
visabiHty  of  acting  in  a  given  sense ;  to  hesitate  be- 
tween acting  according  to  one  reason  or  according  to 
the  contrary  reason,  or  to  refrain  from  acting  at  all, 
say  between  journeying  northward  or  southward,  or 
remaining  at  home?  In  our  lives  it  repeatedly  hap- 
pens that  we  have  to  decide  between  three  alterna- 
tives, of  which  each  necessarily  excludes  the  other 
two.  Where  shall  we  locate  the  third?  for  it  is  in 
this  strange  form  that  this  question  has  been  mooted. 

In  a  few  cases  of  congenital  atrophy  of  the  brain, 
which  seem  based  upon  authentic  observations,  indi- 
viduals have  been  seen  who  possessed  from  their  in- 
fancy only  one  cerebral  hemisphere  ;  yet  their  intellec- 
tual development  was  not  impaired  and  they  resembled 
ordinar}^  men.*  According  to  the  hypothesis  we  are 
combating,  in  these  individuals  there  could  not  have 
occurred  any  internal  struggle.  However,  it  is  use- 
less to  dilate  upon  this  criticism,  and  1  shall  content 
myself  by  calling  to  mind  Griesinger's  comment  upon  a 
well-known  line  in  Faust:  ''Not  only  two  but  several 
souls  dwell  within  us." 

In  fact  this  discussion  itself  would  be  idle,  were 
it  not  that  it  gives  us  an  opportunity  of  viewing'  our 
subject  from  a  different  aspect.  These  contradictions 
in  the  personality,  these  partial  scissions  of  the  ego, 
such  as  are  found  in  the  lucid  moments  of  insanity  and 
of  delirium, fin  the  self-condemnation  and  reprobation 
of  the  dipsomaniac,  while  he  is  still  drinking,  are  not 
oppositions  in  space  (from  one  hemisphere  to  the 
other)  but  oppositions  in  time.     They  are — to   use   a 

*  Cotard,  Etude  sur  Vatrophie  cerebrale,  Paris,  1868  ;  Diet,  encycl.  des 
sciences  medicales,  art.   "  Cerveau"     (Pathologie),  pp.  298  and  453. 

tjessen  in  his  Versuch  einer  wissenschaftlichen  Begriindung  der  Psycho- 
logies p.  i8g,  reports  a  curious  instance. 


112     DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

favorite  expression  of  Lewes — successive  ^^  attitudes  '^ 
of  the  ego.  This  hypothesis  accounts  for  all  that  the 
other  explains,  and  in  addition  it  explains  what  the 
other  theory  does  not. 

If  we  are  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  idea  that 
personality  is  a  consensus,  we  shall  have  no  difficulty  in 
admitting  that  the  body  of  conscious,  sub-conscious 
and  unconscious  states  which  constitute  it,  may  at  a 
given  moment  be  summed  up  in  a  tendency  or  a  pre- 
ponderating state  which  is  its  momentary  expression 
to  the  individual  himself  and  to  others.  And  just  as 
suddenly  the  same  mass  of  constituent  elements  is  re- 
capitulated in  a  contrary  state,  which  thereupon  as- 
sumes the  foremost  importance.  Such  is  our  dipso- 
maniac, who  drinks  and  at  the  same  time  reproaches 
himself.  The  preponderating  state  of  consciousness 
at  each  moment  constitutes  to  the  individual  and  to 
others  his  personality.  It  is  a  natural  illusion,  of  which 
it  is  difficult  to  rid  ourselves,  yet  an  illusion  which  rests 
upon  a  partial  consciousness.  In  reality  there  are  only 
two  successive  attitudes,  namely,  a  different  grouping 
between  the  same  elements  with  the  predominance  of 
a  few  and  that  which  follows.  In  the  same  manner 
our  body  can  successively  assume  two  contrary  atti- 
tudes without  ceasing  to  be  the  same  body. 

It  is  clear  that  three  or  more  states  can  succeed 
each  other  (coexist  apparently)  through  the  same 
mechanism.  We  are  no  longer  bound  to  the  exclusive 
number  of  two.  We  must,  however,  acknowledge  that 
this  internal  scission  is  more  frequent  between  two 
contrary  states,  than  between  three  or  a  still  larger 
number  of  states.  This  depends  upon  certain  condi- 
tions of  consciousness  which  must  be  recalled  to  mind. 

Is  there  a  real  coexistence  between  two  states  of 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      113 

consciousness,  or  such  a  rapid  succession  that  it  ap- 
pears to  be  simultaneousness  ?  Thrs  is  a  very  delicate 
question  and  is  as  yet  unanswered,  although  at  some 
future  day  it  may  be  solved  by  psycho-physicians. 
Hamilton  and  others  have  maintained  that  we  can 
have  as  many  as  six  impressions  at  the  same  time,  but 
their  conclusion  is  derived  from  very  meagre  inves- 
tigations. The  determination,  according  to  strict 
methods  of  physical  science  of  the  duration  of  the 
states  of  consciousness,  is  a  great  step  in  advance. 
Wundt  has  tried  to  advance  even  further,  and  to  fix 
by  experiment  what  he  correctly  calls  the  extent  of 
consciousness  {JJmfang  des  Bewusstseins),  that  is,  the 
maximum  number  of  states  which  it  can  contain  at  the 
same  time.  His  experiments  only  bear  upon  certain 
exceedingly  simple  impressions  (the  strokes  of  a  pen- 
dulum regularly  interrupted  by  the  strokes  of  a  small 
bell),  and  consequently  are  not  in  every  point  applicable 
to  the  complex  states  that  here  occupy  our  attention. 
He  has  found  ''that  twelve  representations  form  the 
maximum  extent  of  consciousness  for  the  successive,, 
relatively  simple  states."* 

Experiment,  accordingly,  seems  to  decide  in  favor 
of  a  very  rapid  succession,  equivalent  to  a  coexistence. 
The  two,  three,  or  four  contrary  states  would  in  reality 
be  a  succession. 

We  know,  moreover,  according  to  a  frequently  used 
comparison,  that  consciousness  has  its  ''yellow  spot," 
like  the  retina.  Distinct  vision  is  only  a  small  portion 
of  total  vision ;  and  clear  consciousness  is  but  a  small 
portion  of  total  consciousness.  Here  we  touch  the 
natural  and  incurable  cause  of  that  illusion  by  virtue 
of  which   the    individual  identifies    himself   with    his 

*  GrundzUge  der  physiol.  Psychologic.     2d  Edition,  Vol.  II,  p.  215. 


114  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

present  state  of  consciousness,  above  all  when  it  is  in- 
tense ;  and  obviously  this  illusion  is  by  far  stronger  to 
himself  than  to  others.  We  also  perceive  why  apparent 
coexistence  is  much  easier  for  two  contrary  states 
than  for  three,  and  above  all  than  for  a  larger  number. 
This  fact  depends  on  the  limits  of  consciousness  ;  or 
to  repeat  my  previous  statement,  it  is  an  opposition 
in  time  and  not  in  space. 

Briefly,  the  relative  independence  of  the  two  hemi- 
spheres is  not  disputable.  The  derangement  produced 
in  personality  through  their  disaccord  is  admitted, 
but  to  reduce  everything  to  a  simple  division  between 
the  left  and  the  right  side  is  an  hypothesis  which  hith- 
erto has  not  been  supported  by  any  substantial  proof. 

III. 

A  few  words  on  the  subject  of  memory.  There  is 
no  reason  why  we  should  study  it  apart,  for  it  is  found 
everywhere  throughout  our  subject.  Personality  in  fact 
is  not  a  phenomenon  but  an  evolution ;  not  a  momen- 
tary event,  but  a  history ;  not  merely  a  present  or  a 
past,  but  both.  Let  us  leave  aside  what  I  shall  call 
objective,  intellectual  memory ;  viz.  perceptions,  im- 
ages, experiences,  and  stored  up  knowledge.  All  this 
may  disappear  either  partially  or  totally;  these  are 
the  diseases  of  memory,of  which  I  have  given  numerous 
instances  elsewhere. 

Let  us  consider  only  subjective  memory,  that  of 
ourselves,  that  of  our  own  physiological  life  and  of  the 
sensations  or  feelings  that  accompany  it.  This  distinc- 
tion is  purely  factitious,  but  it  will  allow  us  to  simplify. 

In  the  first  place,  does  there  exist  a  memory  of  this 
kind  ?  We  might  maintain,  that  in  any  perfectly  healthy 
individual  the  vital  tone  is  so  constant,  that  the  con- 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      115 

sciousness  which  such  an  individual  has  of  its  own 
body  is  only  a  present  time,  incessantly  repeating  it- 
self ;  but  this  monotony,  if  it  exists,  would  on  the  con- 
trary, by  excluding  consciousness,  favor  the  formation 
of  an  organic  memory.  In  fact,  there  are  always 
changes  taking  place  however  slight  they  may  be,  and, 
as  we  are  conscious  only  of  differences,  those  changes 
are  also  felt.  So  long  as  they  are  feeble  and  partial 
the  impression  of  uniformity  will  persist,  because  the 
incessantly  repeated  actions  are  represented  in  the 
nervous  system  in  a  far  more  stable  manner  than  the 
ephemeral  changes.  Their  memory  by  sequence  is 
organized  beneath  consciousness,  and  hence  is  all  the 
more  solid.  Here  lies  the  foundation  of  our  identity. 
These  diminutive  changes  will  act  in  the  long  run,  and 
produce  what  is  called  the  insensible  change.  After 
ten  years  of  absence  an  object,  a  monument  is  seen  to 
be  the  same  ;  but  it  is  ViOt  felt  the  same  ;  it  is  not  the 
faculty  of  perceiving,  but  its  accompaniment  that  has 
changed.  Yet  all  this  belongs  to  the  state  of  health, 
and  is  the  simple  transformation  inherent  in  all  that 
lives  and  evolves. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  vital  habitude  of  an  indi- 
vidual represented  by  another  habitude,  viz.  organic 
memory.  Let  us  suppose  the  entrance  of  causes,  al- 
most unknown,  of  which  we  are  only  able  to  verify  the 
subjective  and  objective  effects.  They  produce  a  deep, 
sudden  or  at  least  rapid  and  persistent  transformation 
of  the  coenesthesis.  What  will  then  happen  ?  Exper- 
ience alone  can  return  an  answer,  since  ignorance  of 
the  causes  reduces  us  to  pure  empiricism.  In  extreme 
cases,  and  we  shall  not  notice  others,  the  individual  is 
changed.  As  regards  memory  this  metamorphosis  is 
met  with  under  the  following  three  principal  forms  : 


ii6  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

1.  After  a  more  or  less  protracted  period  of  tran- 
sition, the  new  personality  alone  remains ;  the  old  per- 
sonality is  forgotten  (as  in  the  case  of  the  patient  of 
Leuret).  This  case  is  a  rare  one.  It  supposes  that 
the  old  ccenesthesis  has  been  entirely  abolished,  or  at 
least,  has  for  all  time  become  inactive  and  incapable 
of  reviviscence.  We  need  not  wonder  at  meeting  so 
seldom  with  a  case  of  this  kind,  when  we  consider  that 
the  absolute  transformation  of  personality,  that  is,  the 
substitution  of  one  personality  for  another — complete- 
ly so  without  reserve  and  without  any  link  connecting 
the  present  with  the  past— supposes  a  radical  change 
within  the  organism.  To  my  knowledge  there  does 
not  exist  any  case  in  which  the  second  personality  has 
not  inherited  at  least  a  few  relics  of  the  other,  were  it 
only  certain  acquisitions  become  automatic,  such  as 
walking,  speaking,  etc. 

2.  Generally,  the  old  organic  memory  will  subsist 
below  the  new  sense  of  the  body,  which  has  been  organ- 
ized and  which  has  become  the  basis  of  the  existing 
ego.  From  time  to  time  it  will  return  to  the  conscious- 
ness, weakened  like  any  youthful  recollection  that  has 
not  been  revived  by  repetition.  This  reviviscence 
probably  has  for  its  cause  some  background  common 
to  the  two  states;  and  then  the  individual  appears  to 
himself  as  another.  The  existing  state  of  conscious- 
ness will  evoke  one  that  is  similar,  but  which  has  a 
different  accompaniment.  The  two  appear  as  mine, 
although  they  contradict  each  other.  Such  are  those 
patients,  who  find  that  all  remains  the  same,  and 
nevertheless  that  everything  is  changed.    * 

3.  Finally,  there  are  the  cases  of  alternation.  Here 
it  is  hardly  doubtful  that  the  two  subjective  memories 
— the  organized  expression  of  the  two  coenestheses — 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      117 

subsist  and  by  turns  predominate.  Each  is  accom- 
panied by,  and  puts  into  activity,  a  certain  group  of 
feelings,  of  physical  and  intellectual  aptitudes,  which 
do  not  exist  in  the  other.  Each  forms  a  part  of  a  dis- 
tinct complexus.  The  case  of  Azam  affords  an  excel- 
lent example  of  the  alternation  of  two  memories. 

Upon  this  subject  we  could  not  say  anything 
more  without  falling  into  repetitions,  or  without  ac- 
cumulating a  number  of  hypotheses.  Ignorance  of  the 
causes  arrests  our  progress.  The  psychologist  is  here 
like  a  physician  who  is  confronted  by  some  disease 
that  only  betrays  its  symptoms.  What  then  are  the 
physiological  influences  that  thus  change  the  general 
tone  of  the  organism,  consequently  the  coenesthesis 
and  the  memory  ?  Is  it  through  some  condition  of  the 
vascular  system  ?  Is  it  an  inhibitory  action,  an  ar- 
rested function  ?  No  one  can  say.  Until  this  problem 
has  been  solved,  we  cannot  penetrate  beneath  the  sur- 
face of  the  question.  We  have  simply  wished  to  show 
that  memory,  although  in  some  respects  blended  with 
personality,  is  not  its  last  foundation.  Memory  rests 
upon  the  state  of  the  body  whether  conscious  or  not, 
and  depends  upon  it.  Even  in  the  normal  state  the  same 
physical  situation  has  a  tendency  to  recall  the  same 
mental  situation.  I  have  frequently  remarked  that  at 
the  moment  of  falling  asleep,  some  dream  of  the  pre- 
ceding night,  until  then  entirely  forgotten,  will  sud- 
denly return  to  my  recollection  completely  and  vividly. 
In  travelling,  when  leaving  one  town  to  sleep  in  an- 
other, this  reproduction  will  sometimes  take  place;  but 
my  dream  will  then  emerge  in  disconnected  fragments, 
which  it  is  difficult  to  reconstruct.  Is  this  the  effect 
of  the  physical  conditions — alike  in  the  former  in- 
stance, slightly  modified  in   the  latter  ?     Although  I 


ii8  DISEASES  OE  lERSONALITY. 

have  not  seen  the  above  fact  mentioned  in  any  work 
on  dreams,  I  doubt  whether  it  is  a  particular  and  ex- 
clusive experience  of  my  own. 

Then  again,  there  are  other  well-known  facts,  even 
more  conclusive.  In  natural  or  induced  somnambulism 
the  events  of  former  states,  forgotten  during  wakeful- 
ness, will  return  during  the  hypnotic  state.  Let  us 
recall  to  mind  the  well-known  story  of  the  carrier,  who 
while  intoxicated  lost  a  packet,  which  he  was  unable 
to  find  when  sober ;  he  got  drunk  again  and  then 
found  it.  Is  there  not  in  this  instance  a  marked  ten- 
dency toward  the  constitution  of  two  memories — the 
one  normal,  the  other  pathological — expressions  of  two 
distinct  states  of  the  organism,  and  which  are  like  em- 
bryonic forms  of  the  extreme  cases  that  we  have  spoken 
about  ? 

IV. 

The  part  played  b}^  ideas  in  the  transformations  of 
personality,  has  already  been  incidentally  mooted. 
Let  us  now  watch  this  new  factor  at  work,  in  order  to 
verify  what  results  it  produces  by  itself  separately. 
Among  all  the  numerous  elements,  the  consensus  of 
which  constitutes  the  ego,  there  is,  perhaps,  not  any 
one  of  them  that  can  more  easily  be  set  apart,  and 
artificially  separated.  Still,  as  regards  this  point,  we 
must  be  careful  to  avoid  equivocation.  To  the  con- 
scious individual  the  idea  of  his  personality  may  be  an 
effect  or  a  cause,  a  result  or  an  initial  factor,  a  point 
of  arrival  or  a  point  of  departure.  In  the  healthy  state 
it  is  always  an  effect,  a  result,  a  point  of  arrival.  In 
the  morbid  state  it  is  both  cause  and  effect.  In  many 
of  the  examples  that  have  been  enumerated  we  have 
seen  organic,  emotional  or  sensorial  derangements  pro- 


DISORDERS  OR   THE  INTELLECT,      iig 

duce  such  an  exuberance,  or  such  a  vital  despondency 
that  the  individual  will  declare  that  he  is  a  god,  king, 
giant,  great  man;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  that  he  is  an 
automaton,  a  phantom,  or  a  corpse.  These  erroneous 
ideas  are  evidently  the  relatively  logical  conclusion  of 

the    profound    transformation  of   the  individual the 

definitive  formula  that  recapitulates  and  completes  it. 
But  there  are  also  entirely  contrary  cases,in  which  the 
transformation   of  personality  is  not  from  above  but 
from  below ;  and  in  which  the  transformation  begins, 
but  is  not  completed  in  the  brain  ;   and  consequently 
the  idea  is  not  a  conclusion,  but  a  premise.     It  doubt- 
less would  seem  exceedingly  rash  to  maintain  that  in 
many  instances  where  a  wrong  idea  serves  as  a  start- 
ing-point for  a  change  of  the  ego,  it  has  not  below  it 
and  in   advance  of  it  some  organic  or  emotional  de- 
rangement.   On  the  contrary  we  may  confidently  assert 
that  such  will  always  be  present,  even  in  hypnotised  in- 
dividuals, in  whom  personality  is  changed  by  sugges- 
tion.  Between  the  two  forms  of  metamorphosis  above 
indicated  there  does  not  exist  a  clear  line  of  demar- 
cation;  the   term  '^ ideal  metamorphosis  of  personal- 
ity "  is  but  a  designation  a  potiori.    Having  made  this 
exception,  let  us  examine  this  new  aspect  of  our  sub- 
ject, starting,  as  we   have  hitherto,  from   the  normal 
state. 

Nothing  is  more  frequent  or  better  known  than  the 
momentary  dispossession  of  personality  through  some 
fixed  and  intense  idea.  So  long  as  this  idea  occupies 
the  consciousness,  we  might  without  much  exagger- 
ation say  that  it  constitutes  the  individual.  The  ob- 
stinate pursuit  of  any  problem,  invention  or  research 
in  all  their  various  forms,  represents  a  mental  state  in 
which  the   entire  personality  has  been  drained  for  the 


I20  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

benefit  of  a  single  idea.  Such  an  one  is,  to  use  a  com- 
mon expression,  absent,  that  is  automatic.  Here  there 
is  an  abnormal  state,  implying  a  rupture  of  equilib- 
rium. Numberless  current  anecdotes  concerning  either 
rational  or  chimerical  inventors  bear  witness  to  the 
fact.  And  incidentally  let  us  observe,  that  every  fixed 
idea  is  at  the  bottom  a  sentiment  or  a  fixed  passion. 
At  all  times  some  desire,  love,  hatred,  or  interest  will 
support  the  idea,  and  impart  to  it  its  intensity,  stability, 
tenacity.  Whatever  we  may  plead  to  the  contrary, 
ideas  are  always  in  the  service  of  passions ;  at  the 
same  time  they  resem.ble  some  masters,  who  actually 
obey  while  believing  that  they  always  rule. 

Whatever  may  be  the  result,  this  state  is  but  a 
mental  hypertrophy,  and  people  are  perfectly  right, 
when  in  identifying  the  inventor  and  his  work,  they 
designate  the  one  by  the  other;  in  this  instance  work 
is  equivalent  to  personality. 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  no  change  of  person- 
alit}^,  but  a  simple  deviation  from  the  normal  type, 
— or,  what  is  better,  the  schematic  type, — in  which 
by  hypothesis  the  organic,  emotional,  and  intellectual 
elements  would  form  a  perfect  consensus.  Hyper- 
trophied  at  one  point  and  atrophied  at  some  other 
points,  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  compensation  or  of 
organic  equilibrium.  And  now  let  us  consider  the 
morbid  cases.  With  the  exception  of  certain  artificial 
changes,  produced  during  hypnotism,  it  is  difficult  to 
find  many  cases  of  derangem.ent  the  incontestable 
starting  point  of  which  is  an  idea.  Among  changes 
of  personality,  from  an  intellectual  cause,  it  appears 
to  me  we  may  class  the  facts  relating  to  lycanthropy 
and  zoanthropy,  in  all  their  forms,  formerly  of  fre- 
quent occurrence,  but  now  very  rare.    Still,  in  all  cases 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      121 

of  this  kind*  of  which  we  have  an  authentic  record, 
the  mental  debility  in  the  lycanthrope  is  so  great,  al- 
most verging  on  stupidity,  that  we  might  almost  be 
tempted  to  look  upon  it  as  a  case  of  retrogression  ;  a 
return  toward  the  form  of  animal  individuality.  Let 
us  add,  that  inasmuch  as  these  cases  are  complicated 
with  visceral  disorders,  cutaneous  and  visual  hallu- 
cinations, it  is  not  easy  to  see,  whether  they  are  the 
effects  of  a  preconceived  idea,  or  whether  they  them- 
selves produce  it.  We  must  remark,  however,  that 
lycanthropy  has  at  times  been  epidemic,  which  is  to 
say,  that  at  least  in  imitating  subjects,  it  must  have 
originated  in  some  fixed  idea.  Finally,  this  type  of 
disease  disappeared,  when  people  no  longer  believed 
in  it,  that  is  to  say,  when  the  idea  that  a  man  is  a 
wolf,  could  no  longer  fix  itself  in  the  brain  of  an  in- 
dividual, and  make  him  act  accordingly. 

The  only  perfectly  clear  cases  of  ideal  transforma- 
tion of  personality,  are  those  already  cited,  of  men 
who  believe  themselves  women,  and  of  women  who 
believe  themselves  men,  without  any  sexual  anomaly 
justifying  that  metamorphosis.  With  subjects  who 
are  possessed,  demonomaniacs,  the  influence  of  an 
idea  also  seems  initial  or  preponderating.  It  frequently 
acts  by  contagion  upon  the  exorcists  themselves.  To 
quote  only  one  instance  of  this,  Father  Surin,  who  for 
so  long  a  time  was  concerned  in  the  notorious  affair 
the  Ursuline  Nuns  of  Loudun,  felt  within  himself  two 
souls,  and  sometimes  as  it  seems,  even  three,  f 

*  See  Calmeil  :  De  la  folie  consideree  sous  le  point  de  vue  pathologiqice , 
pkilosophique,  historique  et  judiciaire.  Vol.  i,  Bk.  Ill,  Ch.  II,  §§9,  16,  17; 
Bk.  IV,  Ch.  II,  §  I. 

t  P.  Surin  left  a  detailed  report  of  his  own  mental  state  :  Histoire  des 
diables  de  Loudun,  p.  217  and  following.  "  I  am  not  able  to  describe  to  you 
what  is  going  on  within  me  at  such  a  time  (he  alludes  to  the  time  when  the 
demon  passes  from  the  body  of  the  possessed  woman  into  his  own),  and  how 


122  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

In  other  words,  the  transformations  of  personality 
by  effect  of  an  idea  are  not  of  a  very  frequent  occur- 
rence j  and  this  is  a  fresh  proof  of  what  we  have 
again  and  again  repeated,  that  personality  rises  from 
below.  It  is  in  the  highest  nervous  centres  that  per- 
sonality attains  its  unity,  affirms  itself  with  full  con- 
sciousness ;  in  them  it  completes  itself.  If  through 
some  inverse  mechanism  personality  descends  from 
above  to  below,  it  will  remain  superficial,  precarious, 
momentary. 

The  creation  of  artificial  personalities  with  hypno- 
tised subjects  affords  an  excellent  proof  of  the  above  ;, 
and  to  this  effect  M.  Ch.  Richet  has  published  very 
abundant  and  precise  observations,*  which  I  shall 
briefly  quote.  By  turns  they  make  the  hypnotised 
subject  (usually  a  woman)  believe  that  she  is  a  peasant- 
girl,  an  actress,  a  general,  an  archbishop,  a  nun,  a 
sailor,  a  little  girl,  etc.,  and  the  subject  will  play  all 
these  parts  to  the  degree  of  perfect  illusion.  Here  the 
psychological  data  are  perfectly  clear.  In  this  state 
of  provoked  somnambulism,  the  real  personality  re- 
mains intact ;  the  organic,  emotional,  intellectual  ele- 

that  spirit  unites  itself  with  mine,  without  depriving  me  either  of  conscious- 
ness or  of  the  freedom  of  my  soul,  yet  becoming  like  another  ego  of  myself, 
and  as  if  I  had  two  souls,  of  which  one  is  dispossessed  of  its  body,  and  of  the 
use  of  its  organs,  and  compelled  to  keep  aloof,  looking  merely  upon  the  doings, 
of  the  other  intruding  soul.  The  two  spirits  wrestle  together  in  the  same  field, 
which  is  the  body,  and  the  soul  is  as  though  it  was  divided.  According  to  the 
one  side  of  its  ego,  the  soul  is  the  subject  of  the  diabolical  impressions,  and 
according  to  the  other  side  it  is  the  subject  of  the  movements  proper  to  it,  or 
that  God  gives  to  it.  When — through  the  movement  of  one  of  these  two  souls 
— I  wish  to  make  a  sign  of  the  cross  upon  somebody's  lips,  the  other  soul  very 
quickly  turns  my  hand  and  seizes  my  finger  to  bite  it  furiously  with  the  teeth. 
....  When  I  wish  to  speak,  I  am  stopped  short;  at  table  I  cannot  raise  a 
morsel  of  food  to  my  mouth  ;  at  confession  I  suddenly  forget  my  sins  and  I 
feel  the  demon  coming  and  going  within  me  as  in  his  own  house  " 

*  Revue  Philosophique,  March  1883.  M.  Richet  has  published  more  recent 
observations  in  his  book  Dhomme  et  V intelligence,  p.  539  and  541.  See  alsO' 
Carpenter  :  Mental  Physiology,  p,  562  and  following. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      123 

merits  have  not  undergone  any  important  change  ;  but 
all  remain  in  a  potential  state.  An  imperfectly  under- 
stood condition  of  nervous  centres,  an  arrest  of  func- 
tion, prevents  them  from  passing  into  action.  An 
idea  is  evoked  by  way  of  suggestion,  and  at  once, 
through  the  mechanism  of  association,  it  excites  anal- 
ogous states  of  consciousness,  and  no  others ;  and 
with  them, — always  by  association, — appropriate  ges- 
tures, acts,  words,  and  sentiments.  In  this  manner 
there  is  constituted  a  personality  external  to  the  real 
personality,  composed  of  borrowed  and  automatic  ele- 
ments. Experiments  of  this  kind  clearly  show  what 
an  idea  may  achieve  when  freed  from  all  control,  and 
reduced  to  its  own  power  and  destitute  of  the  support 
and  co-operation  of  the  individual  in  its  totality. 

In  certain  cases  of  incomplete  hypnotism  a  dual- 
ism is  produced.  Dr.  North,  professor  of  physiology 
at  Westminster  Hospital,  says,  when  speaking  of  the 
period  during  which  he  was  affected  by  the  fixed 
look  :  "I  was  not  unconscious,  but  it  seemed  to  me 
that  I  was  existing  in  double.  I  imagined  that  within 
there  existed  another  ego,  perfectly  alive  to  all  that 
happened,  but  which  did  not  care  to  interfere  with 
the  acts  of  the  external  ego,  or  to  control  them.  The 
repugnance  or  incapacity  of  this  internal  ego  to  con- 
trol the  external  ego  seemed  to  increase  in  proportion 
as  the  situation  was  further  prolonged."* 

*Hack  Tuke,  "  On  the  mental  condition  in  hypnotism  "  in  The  Journal 
of  Mental  Science,  April,  1883.  In  this  article  is  also  found  the  case  of  a  phy- 
sician, who  during  an  uneasy  sleep  after  twenty  hours'  climbing  in  the  Alps 
becomes  double  in  his  dream  :  one  of  the  two  egos  dies,  and  the  other  makes 
its  autopsy.  In  certain  cases  of  intoxication  and  delirium  the  psychic  coor- 
dination disappears,  and  there  is  produced  a  kind  of  scission  of  the  person 
into  two.  See  the  articles  of  Dr.  Azam  on  changes  of  personality  (Revue  Sci~ 
entifique,  Nov.  17,  1883)  and  of  Dr.  Galicier  {Revue  Philosophique  July,  1877,  p. 
92).  Taine  has  reported  a  curious  case  of  semi-pathological  incoordination  : 
"  I  have  seen  a  person,  who  while  conversing  or  singing,  will  write,  without 


124  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

But,  would  it  be  possible  to  suppress  this  true,  in- 
ternal personality  ?  Can  the  real  character  of  the  in- 
dividual be  reduced  to  naught  or  to  the  point  of  actu- 
ally transforming  itself  into  its  contrary?  We  cannot 
doubt  this  possibility ;  the  persisting  authority  of  the 
operator  is  indeed  able  to  effect  this  result,  after  a 
more  or  less  prolonged  resistance.  Thus  M.  Ch. 
Richet  has  impressed  with  radical  republican  ideas  a 
lady  known  for  her  ultra-Bonapartist  opinions.  Braid, 
after  hynotising  a  strict  teetotaller,  several  times  re- 
peated to  him  that  he  was  drunk.  ^'This  affirmation 
being  also  corroborated  by  a  sensation  of  staggering 
(produced  by  way  of  muscular  suggestion),  and  it  was 
amusing  to  behold  him  divided  between  this  imposed 
idea  and  the  conviction  resulting  from  his  ordinary 
habits."*  This  momentary  metamorphosis  however 
has  nothing  alarming  about  it.  As  M.  Richet  justly 
remarks,  ''in  these  curious  modifications  the  changes 
that  take  place  are  only  in  the  external  form  of  the 
being,  in  habit  and  general  attitudes  and  not  in  in- 
dividuality properly  so  called."  As  to  the  question, 
whether  by  means  of  reiterated  suggestions,  we  might 
not  eventually  produce  in  susceptible  subjects  a  gen- 
uine modification  of  character,  it  is  a  problem  that 
experience  alone  can  solve,  and  besides  it  is  beyond 
the  aim  of  our  present  purpose. 

looking  at  the  paper,  connected  phrases,  and  even  whole  pages,  being  quite 
unconscious  of  what  she  writes.  To  me  her  sincerity  is  manifest ;  for  she  de- 
clares when  arrived  at  the  bottom  of  the  page,  she  has  not  the  slightest  idea 
of  what  she  has  been  tracing  on  the  paper  ;  when  she  reads  those  ideas,  she 
is  herself  astonished,  even  sometimes  alarmed.  The  handwriting  is  different 
from  her  ordinary  style.  The  movement  of  the  fingers  is  stiff,  and  seems 
automatic.  Her  writing  always  finishes  with  a  signature— that  of  a  deceased 
person — and  bears  the  impression  of  secret  thoughts,  of  a  mental  background 
which  the  author  is  not  inclined  to  divulge."  (^De  V intelligence,  3d  edit.  pref. 
pp.  16-17.) 

*  Richet,  Op.  cit.  p.  541 ;  Carpenter,  Op.  cit.  §  368. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      125 

Perhaps  this  is  a  favorable  opportunity  to  call  at- 
tention to  the  phenomenon  known  as  disappearance  of 
personality,  which  the  mystics  of  all  epochs  and  of  all 
countries  have  described  according  to  their  own  ex- 
perience, often  in  the  most  glowing  language."^  Pan- 
theistic metaphysicians  without  reaching  the  state  of 
ecstasy  have  also  spoken  of  a  state  in  which  the  spirit 
thinks  itself  ''under  the  form  of  eternity";  appears  to 
itself  as  beyond  time  and  space,  free  from  all  contin- 
gent modality,  one  with  the  infinite.  This  psycholo- 
gical phenomenon  although  rare  must  not  be  forgotten. 
I  take  it  to  be  the  absolute  dispossession  of  men- 
tal activity  effected  by  a  single  idea  (positive  to  mys- 
tics, negative  to  empirics),  but  which  through  its 
high  degree  of  abstraction,  and  its  absence  of  deter- 
mination and  limit,  contradicts  and  excludes  all  indi- 
vidual sentiment.  But  let  one  single  sensation  how- 
ever ordinary  be  perceived  and  the  entire  illusion  will 
be    destroyed.      This    extraordinary    state    is    neither 


*  of  these  descriptions  I  shall  only  cite  one — the  nearest  to  us  by  lan- 
guage and  time.  "It  seems  to  me  that  I  have  become  a  statue  on  the  banks 
of  the  river  of  time,  and  am  attending  the  celebration  of  some  mystery  from 
whence  I  shall  come  forth  old  or  without  age.  I  feel  as  it  were  anonymous, 
impersonal ;  my  eye  is  fixed  as  in  death  :  my  mind  is  vague  and  universal,  as 
nihility  or  the  absolute.  I  am  in  suspense  ;  as  if  non-existent.  In  these  mo- 
ments it  seems  to  me  that  my  consciousness  withdraws  into  its  eternity  .... 
it  perceives  itself  even  in  its  substance,  superior  to  every  form  containing  its 
past,  present,  and  future ;  a  vacuum  that  encloses  everything  ;  an  invisible 
and  prolific  medium  ;  virtuality  of  a  world  divesting  itself  of  its  o#n  existence, 
in  order  to  lay  hold  of  itself  again  in  its  own  pure  inwardness.  In  these  sub- 
lime instants  the  soul  has  re-entered  into  itself ;  and  having  returned  to  the 
state  of  indetermination  it  is  reabsorbed  beyond  the  bounds  of  its  own  life, 
it  becomes  again  a  divine  embryo.  Everything  is  effaced,  dissolved,  distend- 
ed ;  changed  into  its  primitive  state,  re-immersed  in  the  original  fluidity, 
without  shape,  angles,  or  definite  design.  This  state  is  contemplation  and 
not  stupor  ;  it  is  neither  painful,  nor  joyous,  nor  sad  ;  it  is  without  all  special 
sentiment  and  beyond  all  finished  thought.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  being, 
and  the  consciousness  of  the  latent  omnipossibility  at  the  base  of  this  being. 
Such  is  the  sensation  of  the  spiritual  infinite."  (Amiel,  Journal  intime,  1856, 
cited  by  M.  Scherer  in  his  preface.) 


126  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

above  nor  below  the  personality,  but  without  and  be- 
yond it. 

To  sum  up  :  The  states  of  consciousness  that  are 
called  ideas,  are  only  a  secondary  factor  in  the  consti- 
tution and  changes  of  personality.  The  idea  certainly 
plays  a  part,  but  not  a  preponderating  one.  These 
results  agree  with  what  psychology  has  long  since 
taught,  namely,  that  ideas  have  an  objective  charac- 
ter. Hence  it  follows,  that  they  cannot  express  the 
individual  in  the  same  proportion  as  his  desires,  sen- 
timents, and  passions. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY. 


I. 

In  closing  our  review  of  these  facts,  I  must  not 
omit  to  say  a  few  words  regarding  changes  of  person- 
ality in  cases  of  progressive  dementia,  caused  by  old 
age,  general  paralysis,  or  any  other  morbid  condition. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  in  the  normal  state  personality 
depends  upon  the  most  perfect  possible  psycho-physi- 
ological co-ordination,  which  maintains  itself  despite 
perpetual  changes  and  partial  and  transient  incoor- 
dinations (such  as  sudden  impulses,  eccentric  notions, 
etc.),  then  dementia,  which  is  a  progressive  movement 
toward  physical  and  mental  dissolution,  ought  to  re- 
veal itself  in  the  form  of  an  ever  increasing  incoor- 
dination, until  the  moment  when  the  ego  entirely  dis- 
appears in  absolute  incoherence,  and  there  only  re- 
main in  the  individual  purely  vital  co-ordinations,  viz., 
those  that  are  best  organised,  the  lowest,  simplest,  and 
consequently  the  most  stable,  which  in  their  turn  must 
also  disappear.  It  is  perhaps  in  these  cases  of  pro- 
gressive and  inevitable  dissolution  alone  that  we  find 
double  personality  in  a  strict  sense,  that  is  coexistent 
personalities.  We  have  in  the  course  of  this  work, 
found  many  cases  of  successive  personalities,  (those 
of  Azam,  Dufay,  Camuset);  others  in  which  a  new  per- 
sonality had  been  substituted  for  a  forgotten  or  ex- 


128  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

pelled  one,  considered  as  external  and  foreign  (cases 
of  Leuret,  of  the  Austerlitz  soldier);  finally  the  inva- 
sion of  the  normal  personality  by  unusual  sensations, 
which  it  resists  as  well  as  it  can,  and  which  sometimes 
and  momentarily  cause  the  patient  to  believe  himself 
double  (case  of  Krishaber,  etc.).  But  in  demented 
subjects  the  disorganisation  actually  organises  itself  : 
they  really  are  double,  believe  themselves  double,  act 
as  double  personalities.  To  them  there  exists  no  doubt. 
They  do  not  even  preserve  that  remnant  of  indeci- 
sion, which  in  the  numerous  cases  I  have  cited,  show 
that  normal  personality  (or  what  remains  of  it)  still 
retains  at  least  a  residuum  of  power,  which  after 
weeks  or  months  will  ensure  its  final  return.  To  them 
it  seems  as  natural  to  be  double,  as  to  us  it  is  to  be  of 
one  personality.  On  their  part  there  is  no  scepticism 
as  regards  their  own  state,  and  they  do  not  admit  of 
any  in  others.  Their  manner  of  being,  given  them  by 
their  consciousness,  appears  to  them  with  a  character 
of  such  clearness  and  evidence  as  to  be  above  all 
doubt,  and  not  open  to  question.  It  is  important  to 
take  note  of  this  point,  because  it  shows  in  all  morbid 
forms  of  personality  that  spontaneity  of  affirmation 
and  of  action  which  characterizes  every  natural  ^tate. 
The  following  are  two  instances  of  this  kind.  An  old 
soldier,  D  .  .  .  .,  who  afterwards  became  sergeant  of 
police,  several  times  sustained  severe  injuries  to  the 
head,  these  were  followed  by  a  gradual  loss  of  mem- 
ory which  rendered  him  incapable  of  performing  his 
duties.  His  mind  grew  more  and  more  clouded,  un- 
til finally  he  believed  himself  double.  *'In  speaking 
he  always  uses  the  pronoun  we :  we  shall  go,  we  have 
walked  much,  etc.  He  explains  that  he  speaks  in  this 
way  because  there  is  another  subject  within  him.     At 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      129 

table  he  says  :  ''I  have  had  sufficient,  but  the  other 
has  not."  He  starts  running  ;  and  upon  being  asked 
why  he  is  running  he  answers  that  he  would  prefer  to 
rest,  but  that  'the  other'  forces  him  to  run,  notwith- 
standing that  he  tries  to  hold  him  back  by  the  tails  of 
his  coat.  One  day  he  pounces  upon  a  child  and  tries  to 
strangle  it,  saying  that  it  is  not  himself  but  '  the 
other.'  Finally,  he  tries  to  commit  suicide  in  order 
to  kill  'the  other'  whom  he  believes  to  be  concealed 
in  the  left  side  of  his  body,  and  whom  he  therefore 
calls  by  the  name  of  the  left  D  '  .  .  .  as  opposed  to  him- 
self, the  right  D  .  .  .  .  This  patient  became  by  degrees 
entirely  demented."* 

A  case  reported  by  Langlois  takes  us  one  degree 
lower  still.  "The  subject  G  ....  is  imbecile,  shift- 
less, loquacious,  without  hesitation  in  speech,  and  free 
from  paralysis  or  derangement  of  the  cutaneous  sen- 
sibility. Notwithstanding  his  loquacity,  he  only  re- 
peats certain  stereotyped  phrases.  He  always  speaks 
of  himself  in  the  third  person  ;  almost  every  morning 
he  receives  us  by  saying:  '  G  ....  is  sick,  he  ought  to  be 
taken  to  the  infirmary.'  Frequently  he  yAW  go  down 
upon  his  knees  and  soundly  box  his  own  ears,  then 
laugh  immoderately,  and  rubbing  his  hands  with  an  air 
of  satisfaction  exclaim  :  'G  .  .  .  .  has  been  naughty,  and 
had  to  be  punished.'  He  will  also  seize  his  wooden 
shoe,  and  violently  strike  his  head,  thrust  his  nails 
into  his  cheeks  and  tear  the  flesh.  These  moments  of 
fury  occur  suddenly  and  while  they  last  his  counte- 
nance expresses  anger,  which  is  followed  by  an  ex- 
pression of  satisfaction  as  soon  as  he  has  ceased  to 
correct  the  other.  When  he  is  not  over-excited  from 
his  imaginary  resentments,   we  ask  him  :    '  Where   is 

*Jaffe,  Archiv.  fiir  Psychiatric,  1870. 


1 30  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

G  .  .  .  .?'  ^  Here  he  is, 'he  answers,  striking  his  chest. 
We  touch  his  head,  asking  him  to  whom  it  belongs. 
^That,'  says  he,  'is  the  pig's  head.'  'Why  do  you 
strike  it  thus  ?'  '  Because  the  pig's  head  has  to  be 
punished  !'  'But  just  now  you  have  struck  G  .  .  .  .' 
'  No,  G  .  .  .  .  has  not  done  wrong  to-day ;  it  is  the 
pig's  head  that  must  be  beaten.'  During  several 
months  we  asked  him  the  same  questions  and  inva- 
riably obtained  the  same  answers.  Generally  it  is 
G  .  .  .  .  who  is  discontented,  but  sometimes  it  is  the 
opposite  that  takes  place,  in  which  case  the  head  is  not 
struck."* 

A  patient  who  suffered  from  general  paralysis,  in 
a  state  verging  on  dementia,  was  incessantly  giving 
himself  advice  and  reproaching  himself.  He  would 
say:  "You  know,  Mr.  G  .  .  .  .,  that  you  have  been 
placed  in  this  establishment,  and  here  you  remain. 
....  We  warn  you  that  we  entirely  despair  of  your 
recovery,  etc.,  etc."  In  proportion  as  the  general 
paralysis  progressed  his  words  became  less  intelligible. 
Still,  in  the  midst  of  his  delirium  this  conversation 
with  himself  could  always  be  detected.  Sometimes 
he  would  ask  questions  and  answer  them  himself.  The 
patient  continued  to  exhibit  this  phenomenon  even 
when  the  dementia  was  complete.  He  would  shout 
and  become  excited ;  but  soon  he  would  calm  down, 
and  say  to  himself  in  a  low  voice  and  with  a  marked 
gesture  :  "  Will  you  be  quiet,  and  speak  lower."  Then 
he  would  reply,  "Yes,  I  will  speak  lower  .  .  .  ."  An- 
other time  we  find  him  very  busy  making  all  the  move- 
ments of  tasting  something  and  spitting.  We  ask 
him  :  "Are  you  amusing  yourself,  Mr.  G  .  .  .  .?"  He 
answers:    "Which?" — and    thereupon    relapses    into 

'^Annates  medico-psych.,  sixth  series,  Vol.  VI,  p.  80. 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      131 

complete  incoherence.  This  reply,  textually  reproduced 
here  along  with  the  question,  may  seem  the  result  of 
chance,  but,  it  accords  so  perfectly  with  the  notion  of 
duality  so  long  observed  in  the  patient,  that  we  have 
considered  it  worthy  of  mention.* 

In  the  following  observation  the  dissolution  of  per- 
sonality presents  itself  in  a  different  aspect :  the  indi- 
vidual here  is  no  longer  conscious  of  a  part  of  himself, 
which  has  become  estranged  from  or  hostile  to  him. 
In  speaking  of  hallucinations  we  have  already  seen 
that  the  patient  gives  them  by  degrees  bodily  form,  and 
finally  makes  for  them  an  objective  existence.  In  de- 
mented patients  the  case  is  more  serious.  It  is  here 
a  question  of  acts  or  states  perfectly  normal  to  any 
healthy  subject  and  having  nothing  of  the  morbid  and 
imaginary  character  of  hallucinations ;  yet  the  patient 
perceives  them  as  external,  and  is  not  conscious  of  be- 
ing the  cause  of  them.  How  then  are  we  to  explain 
a  situation  of  this  singular  kind  without  admitting  a 
profound  change  of  the  coenesthesis ;  without  supposing 
that  certain  parts  of  the  body  are  no  longer  represent- 
ed or  felt  within  the  collapsed  brain.  Visual  percep- 
tion indeed  still  subsists  (experience  proves  it);  but 
the  patient  sees  his  own  movements  as  an  external, 
antagonistic  phenomenon,  which  he  attributes  neither 

*  Descourtis,  Du  fractionnement  des  operations  cerebrales  et  en  particulier 
de  leur  dedoublement  dans  les  psychopathies.  Paris,  18S2,  pp.  33-34.  For  other 
facts  see  pp.  32  and  35.  It  is  possible  that  the  second  personality,  advising 
and  admonishing  the  other,  is  only  the  purely  passive  reproduction  of  the 
phrases  addressed  to  the  patient  by  his  physician  or  attendants.  Let  us 
also  remark  that  it  is  not  by  any  means  uncommon  for  demented  subjects  to 
speak  of  themselves  in  the  third  person.  This  may  also  be  observed  in  little 
children,  and  has  been  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  their  personality  has 
not  as  yet  revealed  itself.  In  my  opinion  it  is  simply  a  phenomenon  of  imita- 
tion. The  child  is  accustomed  to  hearing  such  remarks  as  :  "  Paul  has  been 
naughty,  he  will  be  whipped,"  etc.  The  child  thereupon  addresses  itself  in 
the  same  manner.  Could  the  use  of  the  third  person  by  certain  demented 
subjects  be  a  case  of  retrogression  ?  / 


132     DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

to  himself  nor  to  others  and  verifies  only  passively 
without  searching  further,  because,  his  internal  sensa- 
tions having  been  abolished,  and  his  faculty  of  reason- 
ing being  powerless,  there  is  no  help  against  the  exis- 
ting incoordination. 

Then  we  have  the  case  of  the  man  suffering  from 
general  paralysis  in  the  period  of  dementia,  whose  ut- 
terance had  become  almost  unintelligible,  and  whose 
knowledge  of  the  external  world  had  likewise  become 
very  vague.  "One  day  he  was  engaged  in  picking 
peas.  Although  awkward  he  was  naturally  right- 
handed,  but  now  employed  only  his  left  hand.  Sud- 
denly the  right  hand  would  stretch  forth,  as  if  to  per- 
form its  share  in  the  work,  but  hardly  had  it  reached 
its  object,  when  the  other  hand  would  seize  it  and  vio- 
lently restrain  it.  At  the  same  time  the  countenance  of 
the  patient  expressed  much  anger,  and  he  would  repeat 
in  a  commanding  tone  :  'No,  no  !  '  His  frame  shook 
with  sudden  fits  of  excitement,  and  everything  be- 
trayed a  violent  struggle  raging  within  him.  At  an- 
other time  when  they  had  to  tie  him  in  an  arm  chair, 
his  features  grew  clouded,  and  seizing  his  right  hand 
with  his  left  he  cried  out :  ''  Look  !  it  is  your  fault  ;  it 
is  all  through  you  that  they  have  bound  me  here,"  and 
thereupon  he  struck  the  offending  hand  repeatedly. 

"These  two  occurrences  are  b}^  no  means  isolated. 
At  different  times  it  was  observed  that  whenever  the 
right  hand  emerged  from  its  customary  inactivity,  the 
patient  would  stop  it  with  his  left.  He  would  grow 
angry  and  excited,  and  strike  at  the  hand  as  violently 
as  his  strength  allowed  him.  Sensibility  was  still  pre 
served  in  the  upper  right-hand  member  as  elsev/here, 
although  it  had  grown  dull.'"'' 

*  Descourtis,  Op.  Cit.  p.  37. 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      133 

Some  demented  patients  impute  to  others  the 
sounds  which  they  themselves  utter,  and  complain  of 
being  disturbed  by  their  cries.  Finally,  we  shall  quote 
a  case,  observed  by  Hunter,  of  an  old  man  whose 
faculties  were  extremely  enfeebled.  He  incessantly  re- 
ferred to  the  present  time  the  incidents  of  his  earlier 
days.  ''Although  able  to  act  correctly,  according  to 
certain  impressions,  and  to  attribute  them  to  those 
parts  of  his  body  which  the)^  really  affected,  he  per- 
sistently imputed  his  own  sensations  to  those  who 
surrounded  him.  Thus  he  would  say  to  his  keeper  and 
the  assistants  that  he  was  sure  they  were  hungry  or 
thirsty.  But  if  food  or  drink  was  brought  to  him,  it 
was  evident  from  the  avidity  with  which  he  accepted 
it  that  the  absurd  idea  in  question  had  been  suggested 
to  him  by  his  own  feeling  of  hunger  and  thirst,  and 
that  the  word  they  referred  to  himself,  and  not  to  the 
others.  He  was  subject  to  violent  fits  of  coughing, 
and  after  each  paroxysm  he  would  resume  the  thread 
of  the  conversation  \  but  not  before  having  expressed, 
in  appropriate  terms,  how  sorry  he  was  to  perceive 
the  sad  state  of  his  friend's  health.  -I  am  grieved,' 
he  would  say,  'to  ^&& you  suffering  from  such  a  pain- 
ful and  exhausting  cough.'  "  * 

By  degrees  all  these  cases  terminate  in  an  ever  in- 
creasing incoordination  and  complete  incoherency. 
They  approach  to  that  congenital  imbecility  which 
has  never  been  able  to  reach  the  average  level  of 
human  personality.  In  idiots,  that  co-ordination  of 
multiple  and  ascending  degrees  which  constitutes  the 
normal  man,  has  been  arrested  in  its  development. 
In  such  cases  evolution  has  not  proceeded  beyond  the 
first  stage.      It  has   merely  provided  for  the  physical 

*  Hunter.  See  Winslovv's  work,  On  Obscure  Diseases  of  the  Brain,  p.  278. 


134  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

life  and  with  it  a  few  elementary  psychic  manifesta- 
tions j  but  the  conditions  of  an  ulterior  development 
have  been  lacking.  At  the  close  of  the  present  treatise, 
accordingly,  we  shall  have  to  inquire  more  minutely 
into  the  fact  of  co-ordination  as  the  basis  of  person- 
ality. 

II. 

Before  proceeding  further  let  us  make  a  cursory 
classification  of  the  derangements  of  personality  of 
which  we  have  given  so  many  illustrations,  so  unlike 
among  themselves  that  at  first  it  seems  impossible 
to  reduce  them  to  a  few  fundamental  types. 

Although  in  the  normal  state  the  sense  of  our  body 
may  change  in  different  manners  in  the  course  of  life, 
— above  all  through  that  evolution  which  carries  us 
onward  from  birth  to  death — still  the  change  is  usually 
so  slow  and  continuous  that  the  assimilation  of  new 
sensations  takes  place  gradually ;  the  transformation 
is  imperceptible  j  and  in  this  manner  is  realized  what 
we  call  identity,  viz.  an  apparent  permanency  amidst 
incessant  variations.  However,  serious  diseases,  or 
certain  radical  changes,  e.  g.  climacteric  periods,  pu- 
berty, etc.,  will  induce  some  indecision;  the  fusion 
between  the  new  and  the  old  state  is  not  immediate, 
and,  as  has  been  observed,  ^^at  first  the  novel  sensa- 
tions present  themselves  to  the  old  ego  as  a  foreign 
ego,  exciting  surprise."  But  if  the  general  sense  of 
the  body  is  suddenly  modified,  if  there  is  produced  a 
sudden,  abundant  afflux  of  unusual  states,  then  the 
fundamental  element  of  the  ego  is  likewise  completely 
transformed  ;  the  individual  becomes  separated  from 
its  former  personality,  appears  to  itself  like  another. 
Most  frequently  there  occurs  a  period  of  derangement 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      135 

and  uncertainty  ;  the  rupture  is  not  instantly  achieved. 
When  this  morbid  state  has  become  fixed,  one  of  the 
following  three  types  of  diseases  of  personality  will, 
in  our  opinion,  be  presented. 

I.   The    general  sense  of   the  bod}^   is  completely 
changed.  The  new  state  serves  as  basis  for  a  newpsychic 
life ;    a  new  manner   of  feeling,  perceiving,  thinking, 
whence  results  a  new  memory.  There  remains  of  the  old 
ego   only  the  completely  organized  functions,  such  as 
walking,  speech,  manual  work,  etc.,  purely  automatic, 
almost  unconscious  activities,  which  like  slaves  are  ever 
ready  to  serve  any  master.     We  must  further  remark 
that  this  type  presents  in  reality  certain  exceptions. 
Occasionally  a  part  of  the  automatic  acquisitions  do 
not  enter  into   the  new  ego.      Then  again,  at  distant 
intervals,  a  few  vestiges  of  the  old  personality  are  re- 
vived, and   throw  a  transient  indecision   into  the  new 
one.     Taking   a  general  view  of  the  symptoms,  and 
disregarding  unimportant  deviations,  we  may  say  that 
we  have  here  an  alienation  of  personality,  the  old  hav- 
ing grown  alien  to  the  new,   so  that  the  individual  is 
ignorant  of  its  fofmer  life,  or  when  reminded  of  it  con- 
templates  it  objectively,  as   separated  from  itself.      A 
typical  instance  of  this  is  found  in  the  woman  of  Sal- 
petriere  who  from  her  forty-eighth  year  onward  spoke 
of  herself  as  ''the  person  of  myself."     Concerning  her 
former  personality  she  would    give   much  correct  in- 
formation, always  attributing  it,  however,  to  another: 
''The  person   of  myself   does  not  know  her  who  was 
born  in  1779"   (her  own  former  personality).*     The 
case  of  "  Old  Lambert  "  (see  p.  34)  also  belongs  to  this 
type.      Hack  Tuke  records  the  case  of  a  patient  who 
during   several  years  was  an   inmate  of  Bedlam  Hos- 

*  For  a  full  account  of  this  case  see  Leuret,  Frag,  psychol.,  pp.  121-124. 


136  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

pital.  This  patient  had  lost  the  ego  that  was  famihar 
to  him,  and  was  in  the  habit  of  searching  for  himself 
under  the  bed.'*' 

2.  The  second  type  has  as  basic  character  the  al 
te7'natio7i  of  two  personalities,  and  to  this  type  espe- 
cially belongs  the  current  designation  of  double  con- 
sciousness. We  have  already  observed  that  between 
the  first  and  second  type  we  should  find  certain  forms 
of  transition ;  but  for  the  present  we  shall  only  con- 
sider those  cases  that  are  clear  and  well  defined.  The 
physical  cause  of  this  alternation  is  very  obscure,  one 
might  say  unknown.  At  the  time  when  the  second 
personality  first  appears,  these  cases  do  not  differ 
from  those  of  the  first  class  ;  the  difference  begins  with 
the  reappearance  of  the  first  personality.  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  resist  the  hypothesis,  that  in  these  patients, 
usually  hysterical  subjects — that  is  to  say,  pre-emi- 
nently unstable — there  exist  among  the  secondar}^ 
changes  in  the  physical  life  two  d\'$>\AXiQX  habitus,  each 
of  which  serves  as  a  basis  for  a  psychic  organization. 
This  seems  all  the  more  probable,  when  we  remem- 
ber that  the  alternation  in  question  bears  upon  char- 
acter, upon  that  which  is  innermost  in  personality, 
and  which  most  deeply  expresses  individual  constitu- 
tion (e.  g.  the  cases  of  Azam,  Dufay,  Camuset). 

We  have  also  in  this  type  of  alternation  different 
forms.  Sometimes  the  two  personalities  are  both  ig- 
norant of  each  other  (case  of  Macnish).  At  other  times 
the  one  embraces  the  whole  of  life,  the  other  being 
only  partial  j  such  is  the  case  of  Azam.  Finally  in 
this  case — which  is  the  most  instructive,  because  it 
now  covers  a  period  of  twenty-eight  yearsf — we  behold 

*  The  Journal  of  Mental  Science,  April,  1883. 
t  In  1885. 


DISSOL  UTION  OF  PERSONA  LITY.      1 3  7 

the  second  personality  constantly  encroaching  upon 
the  first  ;  which  having  been  very  long  originally,  be- 
comes by  degrees  shorter  and  shorter,  so  that  we  can 
foresee  a  time  when  it  will  completely  disappear,  and 
the  second  only  will  remain.  It  would  seem  accord- 
ingly that  this  state  of  alternation  when  it  is  prolonged, 
has  a  fatal  tendency  toward  reducing  itself  to  the  first 
type,  occupying  thus  an  intermediate  position  between 
the  normal  state  and  the  complete  alienation  of  per- 
sonality. 

3.  The  third  type  is  more  superficial ;  I  shall  call 
it  a  substitution  of  personality.  To  this  type  I  refer 
the  rather  common  cases  in  which  the  individual 
simply  believes  his  or  her  condition  to  be  changed  ;  e.  g. 
a  man  declares  himself  to  be  a  woman,  and  vice  versa  ; 
a  rag-picker  believes  himself  a  king,  etc.  The  state 
of  certain  hypnotized  subjects,  of  whom  I  have  spoken, 
may  serve  as  examples  of  this  class.  The  alteration 
is  rather  psychical  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  than 
organic.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  suppose  that  it 
arises  and  persists  without  material  conditions.  I  onl}' 
wish  to  say,  that  it  is  not  as  in  the  two  preceding 
groups  caused  and  supported  by  any  deep  modifica- 
tion of  the  sense  of  body,  which  carries  with  it  a  com.- 
plete  transformation  of  person.  It  proceeds  from  the 
brain,  not  from  the  inmost  depths  of  the  organism  ; 
and  is  rather  a  local  than  a  general  disorder, — -the 
hypertrophy  of  a  fixed  idea,  which  renders  impossible 
the  co-ordination  that  is  necessary  to  the  normal  life 
of  the  mind.  Hence,  while  in  alienation  and  alternation 
of  personality  everything  conspires  and  co-operates  in 
its  way,  exhibiting  a  logical  internal  unity  of  the  organic 
compounds,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  him  who  claims 
to  be  a  king  to  admit  he  has  been  a  workingman,  and 


138     DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

for  the  pretended  millionaire  to  confess  that  he  used 
to  earn  two  francs  a  day.  Even  irrespective  of  these 
cases,  in  which  the  incoordination  is  obvious,  we  can 
easily  see  that  a  fixed  idea  is  but  a  diseased  excres- 
cence which  by  no  means  indicates  a  total  transforma- 
tion of  the  individual. 

This  classification,  proceeding  from  the  most  se- 
rious to  the  most  trivial  forms,  makes  no  pretensions 
to  completeness.  It  merely  serves  to  bring  something 
like  order  into  a  mass  of  facts  :  to  show  how  unlike 
they  are ;  and,  above  all,  once  more  to  demonstrate 
that  personality  has  its  roots  in  the  organism,  and 
that  it  changes  and  is  transformed  along  with  it. 


CONCLUSION. 


It  is  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  that  the  higher  forms  of  individuality  must 
have  proceeded  from  the  lower  by  way  of  aggregation 
and  coalescence  ;  and  further  also,  that  individuality  at 
its  highest  degree,  in  man,  is  the  accumulation  and 
condensation  in  the  cortical  layer  of  the  brain  of  ele- 
mentary consciousnesses  that  were  autonomous  and 
dispersed  at  their  origin. 

All  the  different  types  of  psychic  individuality  in 
the  animal  series,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest, 
could  be  described  and  fixed  only  by  a  psycho-zoolo- 
gist, and  at  the  cost  of  much  groping  amidst  uncer- 
tainties and  conjectures.  Hence  we  shall  merel}^  call 
attention  to  a  few  types,  in  view  of  the  principal  aim 
of  the  present  work,  which  is  to  demonstrate  that  the 
ascending  progress  toward  higher  individuality  is 
summed  up  in  an  increasing  complexity  and  coordina- 
tion. 

When  we  speak  of  a  man,  a  vertebrate,  or  even  of 
an  insect,  nothing  can  be  clearer  than  the  term  ''in- 
dividual ";  but  nothing  is  more  obscure  in  proportion 
as  we  descend  the  scale.  Upon  this  point  all  zoologists 
are  perfectly  agreed.*     According  to  the  etymology  of 

*  See  in  particular:  Haeckel,  General  Morphology ;  Gegenbaur,  Cotnpara- 
tive  Anatofjiy :  Espinas,  Societ'es  animales,  second  edit.,  Appendix  II  ;  Ponchet, 
Revue  scientifique,  Feb.  lo,  1883,  etc. 


I40    DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

the  word,  the  individual  {individuiis)  is  that  which  is 
not  divided.  In  that  case,  the  individual,  in  the  strict 
and  exclusive  sense  of  the  word,  must  be  sought  for 
at  a  very  low  stage.  While  there  is  nothing  to  limit 
the  dimensions  of  inorganic  compounds  (cr^^stals), 
"every  protoplasmic  mass  which  has  attained  a  few 
tenths  of  millimeters  at  the  maximum,  spontaneously 
divides  itself  into  two  or  several  distinct  masses, 
equivalent  to  the  mass  from  which  they  are  derived, 
and  v/hich  are  reproduceH  in  them.  Protoplasm,  ac- 
cordingly, exists  only  in  the  individual  state,  having  a 
limited  size  ;  and  this  is  why  every  living  being  is  ne- 
cessarily composed  of  cells."*  Life  could  not  attain 
to  any  considerable  growth  except  by  means  of  an  in- 
finite repetition  of  the  same  fundamental  theme, 
through  the  aggregation  of  an  infinite  number  of  small 
elements,  as  the  real  types  of  individuality. 

The  living  and  homogeneous  matter  constituting 
these  elementary,  primordial  individualities  unfolds 
itself,  rolls  itself  up,  lengthens  out  into  tiny  filaments, 
moves  from  place  to  place,  creeps  toward  substances 
adapted  to  its  nutrition,  absorbs  them,  decomposes 
them,  and  assimilates  their  atoms  with  itself.  In  this 
sense  scientists  have  spoken  of'  "rudiments  of  con- 
sciousness," of  an  obscure  volition,  determining  itself 
under  the  action  of  external  stimulations  and  vague 
cravings.  We  may  certainly  employ  this  term  in 
default  of  a  better,  but  we  must  not  forget  that 
it  has  no  precise  signification  for  us.  In  a  homo- 
geneous mass  which  does  not  present  the  slightest 
trace  of  differentiation,  in  which  the  vital  and  essential 


*  Perrier,  Les  Colonies  animales  et  la  /onnation  des  organismes.  Paris, 
1881,  p.  41.  According  to  Cattaneo  :  Le  Colonic  liiteari  e  la  morfologia  dei 
juolluschi,  the  division  might  be  carried  still  further. 


CONCLUSION.  141 

properties  (nutrition,  generation)  are  in  a  state  of 
diffusion  and  indistinctness,  the  only  and  rather  hum- 
ble representative  of  psychic  activity  is  simply  the 
irritability  common  to  all  living  beings,  which  later  in 
the  course  of  evolution  will  become  general  sensibil- 
ity, special  sensibiHty,  and  so  on.  Can  this  be  called 
a  consciousness? 

The  first  step  towards  a  higher  individuality  con- 
sists in  an  association  of  individuals  almost  com- 
pletely independent  of  each  other.  "Nevertheless,  en- 
forced proximity,  the  continuity  of  the  tissues,  and 
almost  constant  unity  of  the  digestive  apparatus, 
establish  among  them  a  certain  number  of  relations, 
and  these  prevent  the  individual  from  remaining  a 
perfect  stranger  to  what  takes  place  among  its  near- 
esL  companions.  Such  is  the  case  with  sponges,  col- 
onies of  hydra-polyps,  coralline  polyps,  bryozoans, 
and  a  few  colonies  of  ascidians.^  Yet,  properly  speak- 
ing, all  this  is  but  a  juxtaposition,  an  intertwine  of  a 
heap  of  small,  contiguous,  and  homogeneous  conscious- 
nesses, not  having  among  themselves  any  other  com- 
munity than  that  given  them  by  the  limitation  of  their 
assemblage  in  space. 

The  birth  of  a  ^^/^/z/^/ individuality  and  conscious- 
ness marks  a  great  step  toward  co-ordination.      Bein^ 

to 

formed  of  elementary  individualities,  such  a  colony 
tends  toward  transforming  itself  into  an  individuality 
of  a  higher  order,  in  which  a  division  of  labor  takes 
place.  In  colonies  of  Hydractmia  we  meet  with  seven 
different  kinds  of  individuals — nurses  or  feeders,  repro- 
ducers, others  of  either  sex  (male  and  female),  others 
that  feel  or  seize  their  prey,  etc.  In  the  siphonophor- 
ous  species,  among  AgalmidcE,  whose  entire  organism 

*  Perrier,  Op.  cit.  p.  774  ;  Esp-nas,  Des  societts  an/males,  section  2. 


142  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

measures  more  than  a  metre,  and  in  similar  types,  the 
faculty  of  locomotion  is  completely  centralised.  The 
individuals  that  compose  it  seem  independent,  while 
the  animal  allows  the  common  axis  upon  which  they 
are  imbedded  to  float ;  but  when  in  danger,  or  if  the 
animal  wishes  to  execute  any  complex  movement, 
the  axis  contracts,  and  drags  along  with  it  all  the 
polyps.  Physalia  (Portuguese  man-of-war)  is  able  to 
accelerate  or  slacken  its  movements,  to  emerge  or  dive 
at  will,  ascend,  descend,  go  straight  forwards,  or  swerve 
aside  ;  it  can  make  all  its  individual  organs  concur  in 
these  complicated  acts.  An  errant  life,  as  observed 
by  M.  Perrier,  seems  to  favor  the  development  of 
individuality.  ''Thence  there  necessarily  results  a 
greater  dependence  of  all  the  individuals ;  more  inti- 
m.ate  bonds  are  established  among  them  ;  the  impres- 
sions produced  upon  any  part  of  the  whole  must  ne- 
cessarily be  transmitted  to  the  locomotory  parts  ;  and 
the  movements  of  the  latter  must  be  co-ordinate,  or 
all  would  be  in  disorder.  There  accordingly  arises  a 
kind  of  colonial  consciousness;  through  which  the  colony 
tends  towards  constituting  a  new  unity,  and  toward 
forming  what  we  call  an  individual.'"  '^  As  regards 
other  colonies  the  common  consciousness  is  formed  in 
a  different  manner.  In  Botryllidce  (tunicaries)  there 
is  a  common  orifice,  the  cloaca,  round  which  are  dis- 
posed all  the  individuals.  Each  of  them  emits  toward 
the  cloaca  a  tongue-like  member  provided  with  a  nerv- 
ous process,  by  the  aid  of  which  communication  can 
be  established  in  a  permanent  manner  between  all  the 
members  of  the  same  group. f  But  ''because  one 
colony  acquires   the   notion  of  its  own  existence  as  a 

*  Perrier,  0J>.  cit.  pp.  232,  239,  770,  248,  and  262. 
+  Ibid.,  p.  771. 


CONCLUSION.  143 

colony,  it  does  not  follow  necessarily  that  each  of  the 
individuals  that  compose  it  loses  its  particular  con- 
sciousness. On  the  contrary,  each  individual  contin- 
ues to  act  as  if  it  were  single With  certain  kinds 

of  star-fish  each  separate  arm  continues  to  creep,  to 
follow  a  determined  route  or  to  deviate  from  it,  as  the 
case  may  happen,  to  quiver  when  it  is  excited,  and 
to  betray,  in  a  word,  real  consciousness.  The  con- 
sciousness of  a  ray  is  nevertheless  subordinate  to  the 
consciousness  of  the  whole  star-fish  as  is  proved  by 
the  harmony  which  is  established  between  the  move- 
ments of  the  several  parts,  when  the  animal  changes 
its  position."  * 

As  regards  man,  in  whom  centralisation   is  devel- 
oped to  a  very  high  degree,  it  will   always  be  exceed- 
ingly  difficult   to   obtain   anything   like   a   clear    idea 
of  a  mode  of  psychic  existence  in   which  partial  in- 
dividualities and  a  collective  individuality  are  found 
coexisting.      Strictly  speaking,  we   might  find  an  ana- 
logue to   this   in   certain  morbid    states.     We   might 
further  say  that  the  human  individual  is  conscious  of 
itself  at  the  same  time  as  a  person  and  as  a  member 
of  the  body  social ;  but  I  shall  avoid  comparisons  that 
might  be  contested.      Taking  the  question  objectively 
and  looking  at  it  from  without,— the  only  accessible 
point, — we  shall  see  that  this  colonial  consciousness, 
howsoever  intermittent  and  feebly  co-ordinated  it  may 
have  been  at  its  origin,  still  marks  a  capital  moment 
in  the  process  of  evolution.      Colonial  consciousness, 
in  fact,  is  the  germ  of  higher  individualities,— of  per- 
sonality itself.    By  degrees  it  will  pass  to  the  foremost 
rank,  appropriating   for  its  own  profit  all  special  indi- 
vidualities.   In  the  political  order  we  see  an  analogous 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  772-773. 


144  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

evolution  in  strongly  centralized  countries.  The  cen- 
tral power,  at  first  very  feeble,  hardly  recognised,  and 
often  less  important  than  its  subordinates,  is  strength- 
ened at  their  cost,  and  has,  by  absorbing  them,  slowly 
reduced  them. 

The  development  of  the  nervous  system — pre-emi- 
nently the  factor  of  co-ordination — is  the  visible  sign 
of  a  progress  toward  a  more  complex  and  more  har- 
monious individuality.  But  this  centralization  is  not 
established  all  at  once.  Among  the  annelidous  animals 
the  cerebroid  ganglia,  which  emit  nerves  to  the  organs 
of  the  senses,  seem  to  discharge  the  same  functions  as 
the  brain  of  the  vertebrates.  Still,  complete  centrali- 
zation is  far  from  being  effected  here.  The  psycholog- 
ical independence  of  the  different  rings  is  perfectly  evi- 
dent. ''Consciousness,  which  is  more  distinct  in  the 
brain,  has  a  tendency  toward  growing  fainter  in  pro- 
portion as  the  number  of  rings  increases.  Certain 
EuiiicecE.  (a  group  of  Annelids)  which  may  attain  to  a 
length  of  I  -5  metres,  bite  the  posterior  extremity  of 
their  body  without  seeming  in  the  least  to  feel  it. 
To  this  diminution  of  consciousness  we  have  doubtless 
to  attribute  the  facility  with  which  Annelids,  held  in 
captivity  under  disagreeable  conditions,  voluntarily 
mutilate  themselves."  In  linear  colonies,  the  indi- 
vidual forming  the  front,  being  compelled  to  take  the 
initiative  for  all  the  others,  to  advance  or  retreat,  to 
modify  the  attitude  of  the  colony  which  it  drags  be- 
hind,— becomes  a  head ;  but  it  must  be  understood 
that  zoologists  only  use  this  term  comparatively,  and 
we  must  not  assume  that  it  exactly  corresponds  to 
what  is  called  a  head  in  an  insect  or  an}^  other  artic- 
ulated animal.  The  individuality  which  it  represents 
is  to  such  a  degree  transitory,  that  in  certain  asexual 


CONCLUSION.  145 

Annelids,  composed  of  some  forty  rings,  we  see  the 
head  of  a  sexual  individual  form  at  the  level  of  the 
third  ring,  furnish  itself  with  tentacles  and  antennae, 
and  thereupon  detach  itself  from  the  primitive  indi- 
vidual in  order  to  live  its  own  life.* 

As  regards  details  we  refer  the  reader  to  other  spe- 
cial works  ;  it  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  the  subject 
of  higher  animals ;  individuality  in  the  usual  sense  of 
the  word  is  constituted ;  and  is  represented  by  the 
brain  becoming  more  and  more  predominant.  But 
this  digression  into  the  domain  of  zoology  will  not  be 
in  vain,  if  we  have  made  it  understood  that  this  co- 
ordination, so  often  mentioned,  is  not  a  simple  theory, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  is  an  objective,  visible,  and  tan- 
gible fact ;  that,  as  Espinas  maintains,  psychic  indi- 
viduality and  physiological  individualit}'^  are  parallel, 
and  that  consciousness  is  unified  or  dispersed  along 
with  the  organism.  Still,  the  term  consciousness  or 
physical  individuality  is  full  of  pitfalls  that  I  shall 
not  attempt  to  disguise.  If  psychic  individuality  is, 
as  we  maintain,  only  the  subjective  expression  of  the 
organism,  in  proportion  as  we  deviate  from  the  human 
type  the  greater  is  the  obscurity  that  surrounds  us. 
Consciousness  is  a  function  which  can  be  compared 
to  that  of  generation,  because  they  both  express  the 
whole  individual.  Let  us  grant  to  even  the  most  ele- 
mentary organisms  a  consciousness — diffuse  as  all  their 
vital  properties,  particularly  generation.  We  see  the 
latter,  in  proportion  as  we  ascend,  become  localized, 
monopolize  a  part  of  the  organism,  which,  through 
countless  modifications  and  improvements,  becomes 
as  regards  that  function  and  it  alone  the  representa- 
tive of  the   whole  organism.      The   psychic   function 

*  Periier,  Ibid.,  p.  448,  491,  501. 


146  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

follows  an  analogous  process.  In  its  highest  degree 
it  is  distinctly  localized ;  and  has  monopolized  a  part  of 
the  organism,  which  as  to  this  function  and  this  func- 
tion alone  becomes  a  representative  of  the  whole  or- 
ganism. By  a  long  series  of  successive  functional 
delegations,  the  brain  of  higher  animals  has  succeeded 
in  concentrating  within  itself  the  greater  part  of  the 
psychic  activity  of  the  colony;  by  degrees  it  has  re- 
ceived a  more  and  more  extended  mandate,  before 
obtaining  the  complete  abdication  of  its  associates.* 
But,  in  taking  a  species  of  animals  at  hazard,  how 
shall  we  know  correctly  the  degree  which  the  psychic 
activity  has  attained  ?  Physiologists  have  made  many 
experiments  upon  the  spinal  cord  in  frogs ;  is  its  re- 
lative psychic  value  the  same  with  man  ?  It  is  very 
doubtful. 

II. 

Let  us  revert  to  man,  and  let  us  first  study  his 
purely  physical  personality.  For  the  present  we  shall 
eliminate  all  states  of  consciousness, — without  for- 
getting to  restore  them  later, — in  order  to  consider  only 
the  material  bases  of  human  personality. 

We  need  scarcely  remind  the  reader  that  all  the 
organs  belonging  to  what  is  called  vegetative  life — the 
heart,  the  vessels,  the  lungs,  the  intestinal  canal,  the 
liver,  kidneys,  etc. — although  they  may  appear  in- 
dependent of  each  other,  and  each  seem  entirely  ab- 
sorbed in  its  particular  function,  are  yet  closely  and 
solidly  bound  together.  The  centripetal  and  centrif- 
ugal nerves  of  the  great  sympathetic  nerve  and  of 
the  cerebro-spinal  system  (the  difference  between  which 
tends  more  and  more  to  become  effaced)  are  with  their 

*  Espinas.     Les  Societes  Animales,  p.  520. 


CONCLUSION.  147 

ganglia  the  innumerable  agents  of  this  co-ordination. 
Now  is  their  activity  confined  to  the  simple  molecular 
disturbance  which  constitutes  the  nervous  influx,  or 
has  it  also  a  psychic,  conscious  effect?  There  can  be 
no  doubt  as  regards  morbid  cases  that  the  activity  in 
question  is  felt.  In  the  normal  case  it  only  produces 
that  vague  consciousness  of  life  which  we  have  so 
frequently  mentioned.  But  whether  vague  or  not  it 
matters  but  little.  We  maintain  even  that  the  nervous 
actions  which  represent  the  totality  of  organic  life  are 
really  the  fundamental  facts  of  personality,  and  that 
their  value  as  such,  thus  to  speak,  is  in  inverse  ratio 
to  their  psychological  intensity.  They  do  vastly  more 
than  merely  call  forth  a  few  unstable  and  superficial 
states  of  consciousness  ;  they  fashion  the  nervous  cen- 
tres, impart  to  them  a  proper  tone  and  habit.  Let  us 
imagine  for  a  moment  the  prodigious  power  of  such 
actions  (however  weak  we  may  suppose  them  to  be) 
incessantly  transmitted,  without  rest  or  respite,  ever 
repeating  the  same  theme  with  only  a  few  variations. 
Why  should  they  not  produce  as  a  result  the  constitu- 
tion of  organic  states,  that  is,  states  defined  as  stable, 
which  are  the  anatomical  and  physiological  represen- 
tatives of  the  internal  life?  Evidently  all  is  not  de- 
pendent upon  the  viscera  alone,  because  the  nervous 
centres  also  have  their  own  innate  or  hereditary  con- 
stitution by  virtue  of  which  they  react;  they  are  not 
only  receivers,  but  inciters  ;  and  we  must  not  separate 
them  from  the  organs  which  they  represent,  and  with 
which  they  make  one :  between  both  there  is  recipro- 
city of  action. 

Where  do  all  these  nervous  actions  finally  unite  that 
constitute  the  resu7ne  of  organic  life  ?  No  one  knows. 
Ferrier  supposes  that  the  occipital  lobes   are  in  some 


148  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

special  relation  with  the  sensibility  of  the  viscera,  and 
constitute  the  anatomical  substratum  of  the  sensations. 
Let  this  be  granted  purely  by  way  of  hypothesis,  and 
in  order  to  fix  ideas.  The  result  would  be  that  passing 
from  stage  to  stage,  from  one  delegation  to  another, 
visceral  life  would  here  find  its  last  representation  ; 
here  it  is  registered  in  a  language  unknown  to  us  but 
which  by  its  very  inscriptions,  or  (to  continue  the 
metaphor)  by  the  disposition  of  its  words  and  phrases, 
expresses  the  internal  individuality,  and  only  that,  to  the 
exclusion  of  all  other  individuality.  But  in  truth, 
whether  this  anatomical  representation  exists  there  or 
elsewhere,  whether  it  be  localized  or  disseminated, 
does  not  in  the  least  alter  our  conclusion,  provided 
it  actually  exists.  I  do  not  regret  having  dwelt 
upon  this  point,  because  the  co-ordination  of  the  in- 
numerable nervous  actions  of  the  organic  life  is  the 
basis  of  the  physical  and  psychical  personality  ;  be- 
cause all  other  co-ordinations  rest  upon  and  are  added 
to  it ;  because  it  is  the  inner  man,  the  material  form 
of  his  subjectivity,  the  ultimate  reason  of  his  manner 
of  feeling  and  acting,  the  source  of  his  instincts,  his 
sentiments,  and  his  passions,  and,  as  they  used  to  say 
in  the  middle  ages,  his  principle  of  individuation. 

Let  us  now  pass  from  within  to  without.  The 
periphery  of  the  body  forms  a  surface  upon  which  the 
terminal  laminae  of  the  nerves  are  unequally  distributed. 
Whether  few  or  many  the  nervous  filaments  receive 
and  transmit  impressions,  that  is  molecular  shocks, 
from  the  differ'^nt  points  of  the  body,  centralize  them- 
selves in  the  spinal  cord,  and  ascend  into  the  me- 
dulla and  isthmus  cerebri.  Here  there  is  a  new  im- 
portation,— that  from  the  cranial  nerves, — and  now  the 
transmission  of  the  sensorial  impressions  is  complete. 


CONCLUSION.  149 

Let  us  not  forget  that  the  centrifugal  nerves  behave 
in  the  same  vi^ay,  yet  in  the  direction  of  increasing  de- 
centralization. Briefly,  the  spinal  cord,  consisting  of 
a  mass  of  contiguous  and  accumulated  ganglia,  and 
particularly  the  medulla  with  its  special  centres  (of 
respiration,  phonation,  deglutition,  etc.),  while  they 
are  organs  of  transmission,  represent  a  reduction  to 
unity  of  an  infinity  of  nervous  actions  disseminated 
throughout  the  body. 

At  this  point  the  question  becomes  exceedingly  ob- 
scure. The  mesencephalon  seems  to  possess  a  more 
complicated  reflex  function  than  the  medulla,  and  the 
medulla  a  more  complex  function  than  the  spinal  cord. 
The  striated  bodies  would  seem  to  be  a  centre  in\ 
which  are  organized  the  habitual  or  automatic  move-/ 
ments.  The  optic  thalami  would  be  the  points  in 
which  the  sensitive  impressions  gather  together,  in 
order  to  reflect  themselves  in  movements. 

However  this  may  be,  we  know  that  the  internal 
capsule — a  bundle  of  white  substance  forming  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  cerebral  peduncle — traverses  the  opto- 
striate  bodies,  penetrating  into  the  channel  between 
the  optic  thalami  and  the  lenticular  nucleus,  and  that 
it  expands  within  the  hemisphere,  forming  the  corona 
radiata  of  Reil.  This  is  the  gateway  through  which 
pass  all  the  sensory  and  motor  fibres  that  come  from 
or  move  toward  the  opposite  part  of  the  body.  The 
anterior  part  contains  only  motor  fibres.  The  poste- 
rior part  contains  all  the  sensory  fibres,  a  certain  num- 
ber of  motor  fibres,  and  all  the  fibres  coming  from  the 
organs  of  sense.  The  sensory  bundle  of  fibres  being 
completed  is  again  divided  :  one  part  ascends  towards 
the  fronto-parietal  convolution ;  the  others  bend  back- 
ward towards  the  occipital  lobe;  the  bundle  of  motor 


I50  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

fibres  is  distributed  in  the  gray  cortex  of  the  motor 
zones. 

All  these  details,  however  wearisome  they  may 
seem  to  the  reader  notwithstanding  their  brevity, 
prove  the  intimate  correlation  established  between  all 
the  parts  of  the  body  and  the  cerebral  hemispheres. 
Here  the  study  of  the  localization  of  the  functions, 
although  imperfect,  admits  of  some  precision  :  for  in- 
stance, it  is  established  that  there  is  a  motor  zone 
(formpd  by  the  ascending  frontal  and  parietal  convolu- 
tions, paracentric  lobe,  and  base  of  the  frontal  convo- 
lutions) in  which  appear  represented  the  movements 
of  the  different  parts  of  the  body;  there  is  also  a  sen- 
sory zone,  which  is  less  defined  [the  occipital  lobes  (?) 
and  the  temporo-parietal  region].  The  function  of  the 
frontal  lobes  is  not  exactly  known.  We  may  however 
incidentally  notice  the  recent  hypothesis  of  Dr.  Hugh- 
lings  Jackson,  who  regards  them  as  more  complex 
combinations  and  co-ordinations  of  the  other  centres — 
being  as   it  were  a  representation  of  representations.* 

We  must  leave  aside  all  past  and  present  discus- 
sions upon  the  physiological  and  psychological  role  of 
these  centres ;  which  would  fill  a  large  volume.  Taking 
the  question  in  its  entirety,  we  may  say  that  the  cor- 
tical substance  represents  all  the  forms  of  the  nervous 
activity :  visceral,  muscular,  tactile,  visual,  auditory, 
olfactory,  gustatory,  motor,  significatory.  This  repre- 
sentation is  not  direct ;  an  impression  does  not  go  from 
the  periphery  to  the  brain  like  a  telegraphic  dispatch 
from  one  office  to  another.  In  a  certain  case  in  which 
the  spinal  cord  was  reduced  to  the  size  of  a  quill,  and 
the  gray  substance  infinitely  small,  the  subject  still 
had  feeling  (Charcot).     But,  whether  indirect  or  even 

*  Lectures  on  Evolution  and  Dissolution  of  Nervous  System^  1884. 


CONCLUSION.  151 

doubly  indirect,  this  representation  is  or  can  be  a  total 
representation.  Between  the  equivalents  of  these  ner- 
vous actions  disseminated  in  the  body  there  exist  in- 
numerable connections  (commissures  between  the  two 
hemispheres,  and  between  the  different  centres  of 
each  hemisphere);  some  innate,  others  established  by 
experience,*  having  all  possible  degrees  from  the  most 
stable  to  the  most  ephemeral.  Physical  personalit}^, 
accordingly,  or  more  exactly  its  last  representation, 
appears  to  us,  not  like  a  central  point  from  whence 
everything  radiates  and  on  which  everything  abuts 
(e.  g.  the  pineal  gland  of  Descartes),  but  like  some 
prodigiously  tangled  and  inextricable  maze  in  which 
histology,  anatomy,  and  physiology  are  bewildered  at 
every  turn. 

Even  from  this  exceedingly  imperfect  sketch  we  are 
able  to  perceive  that  the  term  consensus  or  coordina- 
tion is  not  a  simple  flatus  vocis,  an  abstraction,  but 
the  expression  of  the  nature  of  things. 

II. 

Reinstating,  now,  the  psychic  element  which  up  to 
this  point  had  been  eliminated,  let  us  see  what  will 
follow.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  to  us  conscious- 
ness is  not  an  entity,  but  a  sum  of  states  of  which 
each  is  a  phenomenon  of  a  particular  kind,  bound  up 
with  certain  conditions  of  the  activity  of  the  brain, 
which  exists  when  they  exist,  is  lacking  when  they  are 
absent,  disappears  when  they  disappear.  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  the  sum  of  the  states  of  consciousness  in  man 

*It  is  clear,  for  example,  that  with  a  man  who  does  not  know  how  to 
write,  certain  associations  of  very  delicate  movements  are  not  established, 
and  consequently  are  neither  represented  in  the  encephalon,  nor  associated 
with  the  nervous  dispositions  which  represent  the  same  words  in  a  vocal 
form.     This  applies  to  many  other  cases. 


152  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

is  very  inferior  to  the  sum  of  the  nervous  actions  (re- 
flexes of  every  order  from  the  most  simple  to  the  most 
compound).  To  be  more  precise  :  during  the  lapse  of 
say  five  minutes  there  is  produced  in  us  a  successive 
series  of  sensations,  feelings,  images,  ideas,  acts.  It 
is  possible  to  count  them,  and  to  determine  their  num- 
ber with  tolerable  certainty.  During  the  same  lapse 
of  time,  in  the  same  man,  there  will  be  produced  a 
much  greater  number  of  nervous  actions.  Conscious 
personality,  accordingly,  cannot  be  a  representation 
of  all  that  takes  place  in  the  nervous  centres ;  it  is  but 
an  extract,  a  synopsis  of  it.  Such  is  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  our  mental  nature  :  our  states  of  con- 
sciousness are  arranged  in  time,  not  in  space,  accord- 
ing to  one  dimension,  not  according  to  several.  By 
fusion  and  integration  of  the  simple  states  among  them- 
selves, very  complex  states  are  formed  which  enter  into 
the  series  as  if  they  were  simple  ;  to  a  certain  extent 
they  may  even  coexist  for  a  time ;  but  ultimately  we  have 
to  admit  that  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  the  ''Um- 
fang  des  Bewusstseins,"  above  all  of  clear  conscious- 
ness, remains  always  very  limited.  It  is,  accordingly, 
impossible  to  regard  conscious  personality  in  refer- 
ence to  objective,  cerebral  personality,  as  an  impres- 
sion that  corresponds  exactly  to  the  design  from  which 
it  is  made  :  it  resembles  rather  a  topographical  plan 
with  respect  to  the  country  which  it  represents. 

Why  do  certain  nervous  actions  become  conscious, 
and  which  are  they  ?  To  answer  this  question  would 
be  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  conditions  of  conscious- 
ness. But  as  we  have  already  said,  these  are  in  a 
great  measure  unknown.  There  also  has  been  much 
discussion  concerning  the  part  played  in  the  genesis 
of  consciousness  by  the  five  layers  of  the  cortical  cells  ; 


CONCLUSION.  153 

but  by  the  admissions  of  the  authors  themselves  all 
this  is  pure  hypothesis.  Let  us  pass  beyond,  there- 
fore ;  psychology  derives  no  profit  from  leaning  upon 
a  physiology  without  foundation.  We  can  prove  that 
the  ever  unstable  states  of  consciousness  evoke  and 
supplant  each  other.  It  is  the  effect  of  a  transmis- 
sion of  force  and  of  a  conflict  of  forces  which,  in 
our  view,  takes  place,  not  between  the  states  of  con- 
sciousness, as  is  generally  supposed,  but  between  the 
nervous  elements  that  support  and  engender  them. 
These  associations  and  antagonisms,  so  well  studied 
in  our  own  time,  do  not  pertain  to  the  present  subject. 
We  must  advance  still  further,  and  go  down  to  the 
conditions  of  their  organic  unity.  The  states  of  con- 
sciousness, in  fact,  are  not  like  will-o'-the-wisps,  b}' 
turns  kindled  and  extinguished  :  there  is  something 
that  unites  them,  and  which  is  the  subjective  expres- 
sion of  their  objective  co-ordination.  Here  we  may 
discern  the  ultimate  ground  of  their  continuity.  Al- 
though we  have  already  studied  this  point,  still,  in 
view  of  its  paramount  importance,  I  do  not  hesitate 
to  revert  to  it  under  a  different  form. 

We  observe  that  for  the  present  it  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  reflective  personality,  but  of  that  spontaneous, 
natural  feeling  of  ourselves,  which  exists  in  every 
healthy  individual.  Each  of  my  .states  of  conscious- 
ness enjoys  the  double  character  of  being  such  or  such 
a  one,  and  moreover  of  being  mine :  a  pain  is  not 
merely  a  pain,  but  is  also  my  pain  ;  the  vision  of  a  tree, 
not  only  the  vision  of  a  tree,  but  my  vision  of  a  tree. 
Each  state  bears  a  mark  through  which  it  appears  to 
me  as  belonging  to  myself  ;  without  which  it  appears  as 
something  foreign  to  me  ;  as  happens,  we  have  already 
seen,  in  several  morbid  cases.  This  common  mark  is  the 


154  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

sign  of  their  common  origin,  and  whence  could  it  spring 
except  from  the  organism?  Let  us  imagine  that  we 
were  able  to  suppress  in  a  fellow  man  the  five  special 
senses  and  along  with  them  their  entire  psychological 
products  (perceptions,  images,  ideas,  associations  of 
ideas  among  themselves  and  of  emotions  along  with 
the  ideas).  A  suppression  of  this  kind  having  been 
made,  there  still  remains  the  internal,  organic  life, 
with  its  own,  peculiar  sensibility — the  expression  of  the 
state  of  the  function  of  each  organ,  of  their  general  or 
local  variations,  of  the  rise  or  the  fall  of  the  vital  tone. 
The  state  of  a  man  immersed  in  profound  slumber  sen- 
sibly approaches  to  our  hypothesis.  If,  now,  we  essay 
the  contrary  hypothesis,  we  find  it  absurd  and  con- 
tradictory. We  cannot  conceive  to  ourselves  the  spe- 
cial senses,  with  the  psychic  life  which  they  support^ 
as  having  no  real  form,  as  being  isolated  from  general 
sensibility  and  suspended  in  vacuo.  Each  sensorial 
apparatus  is  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  an  abstraction  :. 
there  does  not  exist  a  visual  or  auditory  apparatus  in 
general,  such  as  is  described  in  treatises  on  physiology^ 
but  a  concrete,  individual  apparatus,  of  which  there 
are  never  produced  two  perfectly  identical  specimens 
in  individuals  of  the  same  species,  except,  perhaps,, 
occasionally  in  twins.  Yet  this  is  not  all.  Besides  hav- 
ing its  peculiar  constitution  in  each  individual — the 
stamp  which  it  directly  and  necessarily  impresses 
upon  all  its  products — each  sensorial  apparatus,  at 
every  instant  and  under  all  forms,  depends  on  the 
organic  life,  on  circulation,  digestion,  respiration, 
secretion,  and  the  rest.  These  different  expressions  of 
individuality  are  added  to  every  perception,  emotion, 
and  idea  ;  they  are  one  with  these,  as  harmonics  are  with 
a  fundamental  tone.     This  personal,  possessive  char- 


CONCLUSION.  155 

acter  of  our  states  of  consciousness  is  not,  accordingly, 
as  some  authors  have  maintained,  the  result  of  a  more 
or  less  expHcit  judgment  which  affirms  them  as  mine, 
at  the  instant  they  are  produced.  The  personal  mark 
is  not  superadded,  but  is  included ;  it  forms  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  event,  and  results  from  its  physio- 
logical conditions.  By  studying  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness alone  we  shall  not  be  able  to  discover  its  origin ; 
for  it  cannot  be  at  the  same  time  effect  and  cause, 
subjective  state  and  nervous  action. 

And  pathological  facts  confirm  this  conclusion. 
We  have  seen  the  feehng  of  the  ego  rise  or  fall  ac- 
cording to  the  state  of  the  organism  and  certain  pa- 
tients maintain  that  their  ''sensations  have  changed," 
which  means  that  the  fundamental  tone  has  no  longer 
the  same  harmonics.  Finally,  we  have  seen  states  of 
consciousness  by  slow  degrees  lose  their  personal  char- 
acter, become  objective  and  foreign  to  the  individual. 
Now  can  these  facts  be  explained  on  any  other  theory? 

Stuart  Mill,  in  a  passage  often  quoted,*  asks  where 
is  the  bond,  the  inexplicable  law,  ''the  organic  union," 
which  connects  one  state  of  consciousness  with  an- 
other, the  common  and  permanent  element  ;  and  he 
finds  that  we  know  nothing  definite  about  the  mind, 
except  its  states  of  consciousness.  Doubtless  so,  if 
we  limit  ourselves  to  pure  ideology.  But  a  group  of 
effects  is  not  a  cause,  and  however  minutely  we  may 

*  In  his  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy.  It  would  only 
be  fair  to  observe  that  in  the  form  in  which  Mill  puts  the  question— the  reduc- 
tion of  the  ego  to  organism  would  not  aid  him  much,  for  in  this  passage  he  con- 
siders the  body  not  as  a  physiologist,  but  as  a  metaphysician.  We  note  inci- 
dentally that  the  theory  maintained  here,  although  materialistic  in  form  can 
adopt  itself  to  any  metaphysics.  We  essay  to  reduce  conscious  personality  to 
its  immediate  conditions— the  organism.  As  regards  the  final  conditions  of 
these  conditions,  we  have  nothing  to  say,  and  everybody  is  free  to  conceive 
them  according  to  his  own  fancy.  Regarding  this  point  see  the  very  pertinent 
remarks  of  M.  Fouillee  in  his  La  science  sociale  contejnporaine,  pp.  224-225. 


156  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

study  them,  our  work  will  be  incomplete  if  we  do  not 
descend  lower — into  that  dark  region  where,  as  Taine 
says,  ''  innumerable  currents  incessantly  meander  with- 
out our  being  conscious  thereof."  The  organic  bond 
demanded  by  Stuart  Mill  exists,  by  definition  so  to 
speak,  in  the  organism. 

Thus  the  organism  and  the  brain,  as  its  highest 
representation,  constitute  the  real  personality,  con- 
taining in  itself  all  that  we  have  been,  and  the  possi- 
bilities of  all  that  we  shall  be.  The  complete  individ- 
ual character  is  inscribed  there  with  all  its  active  and 
passive  aptitudes,  sympathies,  and  antipathies ;  its 
genius,  talents,  or  stupidity;  its  virtues,  vices,  torpor, 
or  activity.  Of  all  these,  what  emerges  and  actually 
reaches  consciousness  is  only  a  small  item  compared 
with  what  remains  buried  below,  albeit  still  active. 
Conscious  personality  is  always  but  a  feeble  portion 
of  physical  personality. 

The  unity  of  the  ego,  consequently,  is  not  that  of 
the  one-entity  of  spiritualists  which  is  dispersed  into 
multiple  phenomena,  but  the  co-ordination  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  incessantly  renascent  states,  having 
for  their  support  the  vague  sense  of  our  bodies.  This 
unity  does  not  pass  from  above  to  below,  but  from  be- 
low to  above  ;  the  unity  of  the  ego  is  not  an  initial, 
but  a  terminal  point. 

Does  there  really  exist  a  perfect  unity  ?  Evidently 
not  in  the  strict,  mathematical  sense.  In  a  relative 
sense  it  is  met  with,  rarely  and  incidentally.  In  a 
clever  marksman  in  the  act  of  taking  aim,  or  in  a 
skilled  surgeon  performing  a  difficult  operation  all  is 
found  to  converge,  both  physically  and  mentally.  Still, 
let  us  take  note  of  the  result :  in  these  conditions  the 
awareness  of  real  personality  disappears ;  the  conscious 


CONCLUSION.  157 

individual  is  reduced  to  an  idea ;  whence  it  would 
follow  that  perfect  unity  of  consciousness  and  the 
awareness  of  personality  exclude  each  other.  By  a  dif- 
ferent course  we  again  reach  the  same  conclusion  ; 
the  ego  is  a  co-ordination.  It  oscillates  between  two 
extreme  points  at  which  it  ceases  to  exist :  viz.  perfect 
unity  and  absolute  incoordination.  All  the  intermediate 
degrees  are  met  with  in  fact,  and  without  any  line  of 
demarcation  between  the  healthy  and  the  morbid  ; 
the  one  encroaches  upon  the  other.  "*" 

The  unity  of  the  ego,  in  a  psychological  sense,  is, 
therefore,  the  cohesion,  during  a  given  time,  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  clear  states  of  consciousness,  accom- 
panied by  others  less  clear,  and  by  a  multitude  of  phys- 
iological states  which  without  being  accompanied  by 
consciousness  like  the  others,  yet  operate  as  much 
and  even  more  than  the  former.  Unity,  in  fact,  means 
co-ordination.  The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the 
above  remarks  is  namely  this,  that  the  consensus  of 
consciousness  being  subordinate  to  the  consensus  of 
the  organism,  the  problem  of  the  unity  of  the  ego  is, 
in  its  ultimate  form,  a  biological  problem.  To  biol- 
ogy pertains  the  task  of  explaining,  if  it  can,  the  gen- 
esis of  organisms  and  the  solidarity  of  their  component 
parts.  Psychological  interpretation  can  only  follow 
in  its  wake.  This  we  have  attempted  to  demonstrate 
in  detail  by  the  exposition  and  discussion  of  morbid 
cases.     At  this  point,  then,  our  present  task  ends. 

*  Even  in  the  normal  state  the  co-ordination  is  often  sufficiently  loose  to 
allow  several  series  to  co-exist  separately.  We  can  walk  or  perform  manual 
work  with  a  vague  and  intermittent  consciousness  of  the  movements,  at  the 
same  time  singing,  musing  :  but  if  the  activity  of  thought  increases,  the  singing 
will  cease.  With  many  people  it  is  a  kind  of  substitute  for  intellectual  ac- 
tivity, an  intermediate  state  between  thinking  and  not-thinking. 


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